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Newton and Sidhu: The History of the Original United States Sentencing Commission,

THE HISTORY OF THE ORIGINAL UNITED
STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, 1985-1987
Brent E. Newton*
DawinderS. Sidhu**

I.

INTRODUCTION

An eighteen-month period from the fall of 1985 to the spring of
1987 witnessed the most significant change to the federal criminal
justice system in American history. In those eighteen months, the United
States Sentencing Commission ("Commission"), a new and novel
independent agency in the federal judicial branch, developed sentencing
guidelines for all federal judges' during the same period when Congress

* Brent E. Newton has been Deputy Staff Director of the U.S. Sentencing Commission
since 2009.
** Dawinder S. Sidhu served as Special Assistant to Judge Patti S. Saris, then-Chair of the
Commission, in 2016 and was a Supreme Court Fellow at the Commission from 2013 to 2014. The
authors wish to thank Ken Cohen, Kathleen Grilli, and Christine Leonard for reviewing earlier
drafts of this Article and Brittany Davis, Meryl Nolan, and Emily Doyle for their research
assistance. The authors also thank several original Commissioners, staff members, and
consultants-including William W. Wilkins, Michael Block, Ronald Gainer, Paul Robinson, Rusty
Burress, Kenneth Feinberg, Peter Hoffman, Phyllis Newton, William Rhodes, and John Steer-for
discussing historical sources with one or both of us. Any factual or legal assertions or opinions
contained in this article do not represent the official position of the Commission and, instead, should
be attributed solely to the two authors.
1. See, e.g., Fed. Defs. of San Diego v. U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, 680 F. Supp. 26, 27, 30
(D.D.C. 1988) (stating that the new federal sentencing guidelines caused "a sweeping, even
revolutionary change in the method in which our country will strive to achieve criminal justice");
Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, This Issue in Brief 55 FED. PROB., Dec. 1991, at 1 ("Y[ears
from] now, 1987-the year sentencing guidelines went into effect-will be remembered as a
milestone in Federal criminal justice."); Edwin Meese n, U.S. Att'y Gen., The Sentencing
Commission's Guidelines, Remarks Before the American Law Institute 11 (May 22, 1987),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2011/08/23/05-22-1987.pdf ("These guidelines
mark a decisive turning point in the history of the federal criminal justice system. They point us
towards the sound, predictable, tough yet rational sentencing structure that the federal system long
has needed."); see also Interview by Gen. Accounting Office with Stephen G. Breyer, Comm'r, U.S.
Sentencing Comm'n, at 3 (May 12, 1987) (on file with authors) (describing the creation of the
original federal sentencing guidelines as "the most major reform of criminal law . .. in our lifetimes
and probably a reform in terms of change equal to anything you've seen an agency do").
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was enacting new mandatory minimum statutory penalties that
dramatically increased existing penalties for drug trafficking and
firearms offenses. 2 This Article describes this founding era of structured
federal sentencing, beginning with the Commission's first meeting and
ending with the transmittal of the initial Guidelines Manual to Congress
on April 13, 1987, for its 180-day review period.3 As the guidelines
remain the "lodestone" of federal sentencing thirty years later,' and as
improving the criminal justice system continues to be an important
national bipartisan aspiration,' a thorough exploration of the history of
the original Commission is both timely and important.
Parts II and III of this Article discuss the historical context in which
the Commission was created, the key players (Commissioners and staff)
during the Commission's first eighteen months, and the initial
challenges facing the Commission.' Part IV examines several of the key
policy decisions of the original Commission that are reflected in
the Guidelines Manual and that still largely govern federal sentencing
today, albeit in an "advisory" rather than a "mandatory" guidelines
system.' Finally, Part V offers some conclusions about the work of the
original Commission.8

2. See infra notes 91-93, 698-700 and accompanying text (discussing the Anti-Drug Abuse
Act of 1986 and other federal penal statutes enacted by Congress in the 1980s).
3.

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A.2 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 1987,

amended 2016) [hereinafter SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL] ("The law requires the
Commission to send its initial guidelines to Congress by April 13, 1987 .. . ."); see 28 U.S.C.
§ 994(p) (1988) (setting forth procedure whereby Congress has 180 days to review the sentencing
guidelines promulgated by the Commission and if at the end of the that period Congress does not
affirmatively reject the promulgated guidelines, they become effective).
4. Peugh v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2072, 2084 (2013).
5.

See, e.g., John G. Malcolm, CriminalJustice Reform at the Crossroads, 20 TEX. REv. L.

& POL. 249, 254-58, 275-77 (2016); Barack Obama, The President'sRole in Advancing Criminal
Justice Reform, 130 HARV. L. REv. 811, 822 (2017); Mike Lee, The Conservative Case for
Criminal Justice Reform, WASH. EXAMINER (Oct. 2, 2015, 10:38 AM), http://www.washington
examiner.com/the-conservative-case-for-criminal-justice-reform/article/2573283.

6. See infra Parts II-III.
7. See infra Part IV. Although Congress created a "mandatory" guidelines system in the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, the Supreme Court in 2005 held that such a system was
unconstitutional and, as a remedy, rendered the guidelines "advisory." United States v. Booker,

543 U.S. 220, 246-47 (2005); see infra note 116 and accompanying text. The advisory
guidelines nevertheless continue to anchor federal sentencing determinations. See Peugh, 133 S. Ct.
at 2087-88.
8.

See infra Part V.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol45/iss4/11

2

Newton and Sidhu: The History of the Original United States Sentencing Commission,

2017]

THE ORIGINAL UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION

II.

1169

HISTORICAL CONTEXT

As discussed below, the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 ("SRA") 9
ushered in the profound changes to the federal criminal justice system
implemented by the Commission from October 1985 through April
1987.10 A basic understanding of the federal sentencing system before
the SRA is necessary to appreciate the dramatic changes in the legal
landscape resulting from the original Commission's policy decisions that
implemented the many directives in the SRA. To put the original
Commission's work into perspective, it is also important to understand
both the crime and recidivism rates, and the prevailing negative attitude
toward rehabilitation, in the mid-1980s. Finally, an appreciation of the
SRA-including its extremely detailed legislative history-is necessary
to understand the history of the original Commission, insofar as it
compelled many of the original Commission's policy decisions.
A.

FederalSentencing Before the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984

1. Unregulated State of Federal Sentencing
At the time that the SRA was enacted, the federal sentencing
system was almost entirely unregulated: judges sentenced without any
legal constraints other than broad statutory penalty ranges (e.g., from
probation to twenty years of imprisonment for bank robbery)," and there
was virtually no appellate review of the sentences imposed.12 Federal
prosecutors also had broad discretion to bring whatever criminal charges
that they saw fit, and frequently entered into lenient plea bargains with
defendants that did not reflect the seriousness of their offenses.13 At
9. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 28
U.S.C.).
10. See infra Part II.D.
11. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §2113(a) (1988).
12. See, e.g., Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 431 (1974) ("[T]he general
proposition that once it is determined that a sentence is within the limitations set forth in the statute
under which it is imposed, appellate review is at an end.").
13.

See, e.g., ELMER B. STAATS, U.S. ATTORNEYS Do NOT PROSECUTE MANY SUSPECTED

13-14 (G.A.O. 1978) (noting that "U.S. attorneys have considerable
latitude in determining their prosecutive priorities through the exercise of prosecutive discretion,"
that the "Department of Justice does not exercise control over this discretion" and "has not provided
prosecutors with policy or guidelines to be used as a framework to mold prosecutive discretion,"
and that as a result, "[p]rosecutive priorities and guidelines are established by individual U.S.
attorneys"); Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, Negotiated Pleas Under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines: The First Fifteen Months, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 231, 252-53 (1989)
(observing that the DOJ's handbook on prosecutorial plea practices, issued the same day as the
initial Guidelines, "may have stemmed more from a desire to curb undue leniency than from a
fervor for equal treatment").
VIOLATORS OF FEDERAL LAWS
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sentencing hearings, there were no limitations on what evidence was
relevant to the court's sentencing decision. 14 Once federal district judges
decided upon a sentence, they were not required to give any reasons for
the particular sentences that they imposed.15
In addition to the broad prosecutorial and judicial discretion that
characterized federal sentencing at the "front-end" of the process,
defendants' sentencing exposure was, at the "back-end," subject to the
intervening actions of two executive branch agencies: the United States
Parole Commission, which typically released prisoners early on parole;
and the Federal Bureau of Prisons ("BOP"), which applied a complex set
of rules concerning "good time allowance.""6 The two agencies acted
independently from federal prosecutors and district judges. As the result
of parole and good time allowances, many federal prisoners were
released well before the expiration of the sentences of imprisonment
imposed by federal district courts."
a. Good Time Allowances Awarded by the Federal Bureau
of Prisons
Before the SRA, federal prisoners were able to earn good time
allowances that significantly reduced the length of time served relative
to the terms of imprisonment imposed by federal district courts. The
reductions depended not only on an inmate's good behavior, but also on
the length of the sentence imposed-ranging from reductions of up to
five days per month (or 17%) for sentences less than one year to ten days
per month (or 33%) for sentences of ten years or more." In addition to
such regular good time allowances, prisoners could earn additional good
time allowances-of up to five days per month or even more for
"exceptionally meritorious service"-by working in a prison industry or
camp. 19 As a result, for some prisoners, good time allowances resulted in
their service of less than half of the sentences imposed by the district

14. See, e.g., Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559, 563-64 (1984) (citing Williams v. New
York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949)) ("It is now well established that a judge ... is to be accorded very wide
discretion in determining an appropriate sentence. The sentencing court or jury must be permitted to
consider any and all information that reasonably might bear on the proper sentence for the particular
defendant, given the crime committed.").

15. See United States v. Bazzano, 570 F.2d 1120, 1133-37 (3d Cir. 1977) (Adams, J.,
concurring) (contending that a federal district court should disclose its reasons for imposing a
particular sentence but recognizing that there was no such requirement in the federal system).

16. See infra Part II.A.I.a.
17. See infra Part II.A.1.a.
18. 18 U.S.C. § 4161 (1982) (repealed 1984).
19. Id. § 4162.
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courts.20 In 1983, Congress found that the good time allowances resulted
in unpredictable and disparate sentences, 21 and subsequently, in the
SRA, Congress restricted good time allowances to only 15% of a federal
prisoner's sentence of more than one year while providing no good time
credit for sentences of less than one year.22
b. Early Release on Parole
Parole operated independently from early release based on good
time allowances.23 In the decades before the SRA, the Parole
Commission reviewed prison sentences of federal offenders that
exceeded one year and decided whether to exercise its discretion to
release them from prison at some point before the expiration of the
sentences imposed by federal district courts.24 By statute, most federal
prisoners became eligible to be paroled after they had served one-third
of the prison sentence imposed by a federal district court.25 Such early
release on parole was an integral part of the former "indeterminate"
sentencing system based on the theory that prison rehabilitated
offenders, thus allowing their reentry into the community well before the
expiration of the term of imprisonment imposed by a sentencing judge.26
In 1976, in order to reduce arbitrariness and disparities in the
granting of parole, Congress directed the Parole Commission to create
its own set of guidelines to follow in deciding whether to release eligible
prisoners on parole. 27 The parole guidelines, which were drafted by
20. See James B. Jacobs, Sentencing by Prison Personnel: Good Time, 30 UCLA L. REV.
217, 218 (1982) ("[P]rison officials . .. typically hold the discretionary authority to award 'good
time' credits which can reduce a sentence by one-third to one-half and sometimes more.").

21.

S. REP. No. 98-225, at 49 (1983) ("Even in those cases where the [Parole] Commission

can adjust court-imposed sentences in order to bring the actual prison terms in line with those for
similarly situated offenders across the country, the actual terms to be served are subject continually

to the 'good time' adjustments by the BOP and to counter-adjustments by the Parole Commission.
Thus, prisoners often do not really know how long they will spend in prison until the very day they
are released."). The Senate Report has been referred to as "the central document in the legislative
history of the Sentencing Reform Act." Marc Miller, Purposes at Sentencing, 66 S. CAL. L. REv.

413, 425 (1992).
22. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b) (1988); see Barber v. Thomas, 560 U.S. 474, 481-82 (2010)
(discussing this portion of the SRA).
23. See LaMagna v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 494 F. Supp. 189, 190-94 (D. Conn. 1980)
(discussing the interaction between parole and good time allowances).
24.

See PETER B. HOFFMAN, HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL PAROLE SYSTEM 6-7 (2003),

https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/uspc/legacy/2009/10/07/history.pdf
25. 18 U.S.C. § 4205(a) (1982).
26. S. REP. No. 98-225, at 40.
27. Parole Commission and Reorganization Act, Pub. L. No. 94-233, 90 Stat. 219, 219-20
(1976) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 4201-4203). Even before the 1976 legislation required
parole guidelines, the Parole Commission had created "pilot" guidelines and began using them in
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future Sentencing Commission staff member Peter Hoffman, thenResearch Director at the Parole Commission,2 8 were relatively simple in
nature compared to the federal sentencing guidelines that would be
created later. Similar to the eventual sentencing guidelines, the parole
release guidelines had a sentencing grid with two axes-a vertical axis,
with eight categories, accounting for "severity of offense behavior"; and
a horizontal axis, with four categories, accounting for an offender's
"parole prognosis" that was focused primarily on the offender's criminal
history. 29 The parole guidelines' thirty-two-cell grid, which appears as
Appendix A, contained different sentencing ranges (in months) based on
the intersection of the offense severity category and the "Salient Factor
Score" ("SFS").3 0
In four-fifths-about 80 0 /o-f all cases, the Parole Commission's
decision about when to release a prisoner on parole was ordinarily based
on the applicable range in the grid." In the rest of the cases, the Parole
Commission determined that there was a case-specific reason to depart
from the applicable range.3 2 Prisoners also could serve longer sentences
if they had engaged in misconduct in prison, 3 3 or if the top end of the
parole guideline range was below the minimum one-third of the district
court's sentence imposed. 34 Although sentencing judges were free to
recommend to the Parole Commission when it should release prisoners
on parole, the Parole Commission was not bound by those
recommendations and typically followed its own guidelines-even if it
meant that the actual sentence served was well below what a sentencing
court intended. 35
1972. See HOFFMAN, supranote 24, at 18, 21-23.
28.

HOFFMAN, supra note 24, at 19.

29. Id.; see 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 (1986) (basing an offender's parole prognosis on a "salient factor
score," which in turn was based primarily on an offender's criminal history).
30. See infra app. A. The SFS, which was used to determine a prisoner's parole prognosis
(i.e., risk of recidivism) is further discussed infra notes 853-67 and accompanying text.
31. S. REP. No. 98-225, at 52 n.71 (noting that the "Parole Commission currently sets prison
release dates outside its guidelines in about 20 percent of the cases").
32. 28 C.F.R. § 2.20(c)-(d) ("These time ranges are merely guidelines. Where the
circumstances warrant, decisions outside of the guidelines (either above or below) may be
rendered... . The guidelines contain instructions for the rating of certain offense behaviors.
However, especially mitigating or aggravating circumstances in a particular case may justify a
decision or a severity rating different from that listed.").
33. See id § 2.36(a) (setting forth a schedule of additional prison time that a prisoner had to
serve based on various types of institutional misconduct); see also id. § 2.20(b) (noting that the
parole guidelines set forth in the grid "are established specifically for cases with good institutional
adjustment and program progress").
34. Id. § 2.2(a) (providing that a federal prisoner may be released after the completion of onethird of his or her sentence).
35. See id.; § 2.2(a)-(d) (noting that release decisions are within the discretion of the Parole
Commission); see also id § 2.19(a)(4), (d) (including a sentencing judge's recommendation as
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The parole guidelines addressed all federal offense types that were
then common and, based on various aggravating and mitigating factors
associated with the different offense types, assigned different offense
severity categories.3 6 In determining which offense severity category
applied to a federal prisoner, the Parole Commission considered an
offender's "'real offense' conduct"-as set forth in the presentence
report-and not simply the elements of his offense of conviction. For
example, under the parole guidelines, a federal offender who was
convicted of theft of government property exceeding $100,38 a felony,
potentially could fall into categories one through six of the guidelines'
grid depending on the value of the stolen property, which was not an
element of the offense (other than being in excess of $100).39

Despite Congress's intent to reduce disparities through the creation
of parole guidelines, the interplay between a district judge's original
sentencing decision and the Parole Commission's application of its
guidelines injected arbitrariness into the sentencing process. At the
forefront of the mind of a district judge at a typical sentencing hearing
was the knowledge that the Parole Commission would very likely
release the defendant well before the expiration of the term of
imprisonment imposed by the judge-usually after the defendant had
served only one-third of his sentence.40 As a result, some judges would
among the information that may be considered by the Parole Commission); see also infra notes 4344 and accompanying text (discussing the interplay between Parole Commission decisions and the
expectations of the sentencing court as to actual time served).

36.

See 28 C.F.R.

§ 2.20

(1986). For instance, murder was always in Category Eight, assault

ranged from categories two through seven depending on the circumstances, and theft ranged from
categories one through six depending on the circumstances. Id. § 2.20, ch. 2.
37. Id. § 2.19(c) ("The Commission may take into account any substantial information
available to it in establishing the prisoner's offense severity rating, salient factor score, and any
aggravating or mitigating circumstances, provided the prisoner is apprised of the information and
afforded an opportunity to respond. If the prisoner disputes the accuracy of the information

presented, the Commission shall resolve such dispute by the preponderance of the evidence
standard; that is, the Commission shall rely upon such information only to the extent that it
represents the explanation of the facts that best accords with reason and probability."); see also U.S.
SENT. COMM'N, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON THE INITIAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND POLICY
STATEMENTS 25 (1987) [hereinafter SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT] (noting that the parole guidelines

adopt the 'real offense' conduct" approach).
38. 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1982), amended by 18 U.S.C. § 641 (2000). Theft of property not more
than $100 carried a maximum sentence of imprisonment of one year, while theft of property
exceeding $100 carried a maximum sentence often years of imprisonment. Id.
39. See 28 C.F.R. § 2.20, ch. 3 (for example offenses involving stolen property exceeding
$500,000 in value fell within category six, while offenses involving stolen property of a value less
than $2000 fell within category one, with other gradations for loss amounts in between).
40. S. REP. No. 98-225, at 46 & n.155 (1983) ("The presentence report informs the sentencing
judge as to probable application of the parole guidelines in each case. . . . It is probable that some
judges, believing that the parole date specified in the [parole] guidelines is reasonable, impose
sentences to imprisonment that assure the parole eligibility during the guideline range applicable in
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adjust the length of the prison sentence that they otherwise were inclined
to impose in order to account for the Parole Commission's application of
its guidelines.4 1 However, such predictions by district judges could be
inaccurate and, as a result, offenders sometimes served significantly less
42
or more time than what the district judges had intended. As explained
in 1988 by original Commissioner, and later Supreme Court Justice,
Stephen Breyer in giving an example of how the existence of dual
sentencing authorities in the pre-SRA era operated:
[T]he judge says twelve years [in one case] . . [b]ut the parole
commission [later] says ... [flour years [in paroling the offender after
only one-third of his term of imprisonment]. Well [in a future case] the
judge knowing [the next defendant is] going to really only get four
[years when the judge wants] to give twelve [years] gives him thirty
six [years]. But this time the parole commission [fools him and gives
the offender] thirty [years]. . .. [T]his goes back and forth [in the dual
43
sentencing system] and benefits nobody.

Commissioner Breyer noted that this system was "confusing" to the
public and did not bestow confidence in the federal criminal justice
45
system." This situation was particularly problematic for victims. In
addressing the need for certainty or truth in sentencing, the original
Commission received testimony from a "series of victims," including a

&

a particular case, while other judges may deliberately impose a sentence below the parole guideline
believing that it is too harsh or set a high sentence with parole eligibility above the guideline if it is
believed to be too low.").
41. Id. at 38-39, 46-47 ("[S]entencing judges and parole officials are constantly secondguessing each other, and, as a result, prisoners and the public are seldom certain about the real
sentence a defendant will serve.").
42. Id. at 46-47.
43. Judge Stephen G. Breyer, U.S. Court of Appeals, Address at Federalist Soc'y for Law
Pub. Policy Studies (Sept. 10, 1988), in U.S. Sentencing Commission Plan, C-SPAN, https://www.cspan.org/video/?5692-1/us-sentencing-commission-plan (last visited Aug. 1, 2017); see also Ilene
H. Nagel et al., Equality Versus Discretion in Sentencing, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1813, 1820 (1989).
Similarly, as stated in the Senate Judiciary Committee's report:
[T]he existence of the Parole Commission invites judicial fluctuation by encouraging
judges to keep the availability of parole in mind when they sentence offenders.
Sentencing judges, trying to anticipate what the Parole Commission will do, undoubtedly
are tempted to sentence on the basis of when they believe the Parole Commission will
release him. In doing so, some judges deliberately impose sentences above the parole
guidelines, leaving the Parole Commission to set the presumptive release date. Other
judges impose sentences consistent with or below the [parole] guidelines in order to
retain control over the release date.
S. REP. No. 98-225, at 46-47; see also United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 188-90 (1979)
(discussing the uncertainty in sentencing caused by independent sentencing decisions of district
courts and the Parole Commission).
44. See Breyer, supra note 43; Nagel et al., supra note 43, at 1820.
45. See infra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
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"woman who had been brutally raped [and whose] . . . husband had

been murdered," who "thought the offender was going to be in for 20
years, and 6 years later he's out stalking her." 4 6 Victims, in other words,
"thought that they were being duped."4 7 The back-and-forth between
judges and the Parole Commission amounted to a "systematic sham"
according to another one of the original Commissioners, Ilene Nagel.4 8
As part of the SRA, Congress abolished parole for offenders
sentenced for offenses committed on or after November 1, 1987, and
also provided that the Parole Commission itself would be abolished in
1992.49 The only potential early-release for federal prisoners sentenced
under the sentencing guidelines would be limited good time credit. 0
2. The Crazy Quilt of Federal Penal Laws and the Failure of
"Federal Code Reform" Efforts
Compounding the problems of unfettered prosecutorial and judicial
sentencing discretion, coupled with the prospective operation of the
parole guidelines and good time allowances, was the haphazard nature of
federal penal laws in the mid-1980s. As a leading scholar of federal
criminal law observed in 2006 (which was equally true in the mid1980s): "There actually is no federal criminal 'code' worthy of the
name.... What the federal government has is a haphazard grab-bag of
statutes accumulated over 200 years, rather than a comprehensive,
thoughtful, and internally consistent system of criminal law."" During
46. Interview with Ilene H. Nagel, Comm'r, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n 4 (June 22, 1994) (on
file with authors); see also Nagel et al., supra note 43, at 1816 (noting that sentences were
"misleading"); Professor Ilene Nagel, Address at Federalist Soc'y for Law & Pub. Policy Studies
(Sept. 10, 1988), in US. Sentencing Commission Plan, supra note 43 ("[Sentence] pronouncements
were misleading. A twelve year term of imprisonment meant four years. . . . [T]he public [and the
victim] were duped [by the] sham.").
47. Interview with Ilene H. Nagel, supra note 46.
48. Nagel, supra note 46.
49. See HOFFMAN, supra note 24, at 30-33. Congress later changed its mind and decided to
extend the life of the Parole Commission-not only to supervise federal offenders sentenced before
the guidelines went into effect, but also to supervise offenders who had been convicted in the courts
of the District of Columbia. Id. at 33-34.
50. Id. at 26.
51. Julie R. O'Sullivan, The Federal Criminal "Code" Is a Disgrace: Obstructions Statutes
as Case Study, 96 J. CRtM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 643, 643 (2006) ("'[Flederal criminal code' . . .is
simply a shorthand for an 'incomprehensible,' random and incoherent, 'duplicative, ambiguous,
incomplete, and organizationally nonsensical' mass of federal legislation that carries criminal
penalties."); see also Ronald L. Gainer, FederalCriminal Code Reform: Past and Future, 2 BUFF.
CRIM. L. REv. 45, 57-59 (1998). As noted in the Senate Judiciary Committee's report, with respect
to the "[f]ack of comprehensiveness and consistency" among federal criminal statutes: "Current
federal law contains no general sentencing provision. Instead, current law specifies the maximum
term of imprisonment and the maximum fine for each Federal offense.... These maximums are
usually prescribed with little regard the for relative seriousness of the offense compared to similar
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the 1970s and early 1980s, "federal code reform was a hot issue" pushed
by Democrats and Republicans in the legislative and executive
53
branches. 52 Yet federal code reform efforts died by the mid-1980s.
The only part of the "code reform" effort that succeeded was
"the attempted rationalization of sentencing" through the creation of the
Sentencing Commission.54
In essence, the politics and circumstances in the early 1980s meant
that, although Congress did not have the political will to reform the
criminal code at the front end-by sorting out crimes and statutory
maximums-it decided to let an expert, specialized agency attempt to
rationalize it through the back door-by attempting to make sentencing
more uniform and proportional. 55
As discussed in Part IV below, the Commission was forced to
construct a guideline system around the existing crazy quilt of federal
penal statutes.5 6 After the original Guidelines Manual was promulgated
in 1987, Commissioner Breyer commented that the initial Commission's
job would have been much easier if Congress had enacted federal code
reform legislation along with the SRA.57
3. The Nature of the Pre-Guidelines Federal Criminal Caseload
An appreciation of both the task faced by the original Commission
and the guideline system it ultimately produced is aided by a basic
understanding of the nature of cases being prosecuted in federal court in
the years before the guidelines went into effect. In the year before the
Commission promulgated the initial Guidelines Manual, the federal

offenses." S. REP. No. 98-225, at 39 (1983).
52. O'Sullivan, supranote 51, at 720.
53. See id As discussed below in Part IV.F.1.d, the federal criminal law landscape did have
one enormous change made to it between the time that President Reagan signed the SRA into law in
October 1984 and the time that the Commission was required to submit the original Guidelines
Manual to Congress in April 1987--Congress's enactment of a series of new statutory "mandatory
minimum" sentencing provisions. See infra Part IV.F.1.d.
54. O'Sullivan, supra note 51, at 720.
5 5. Id.
56. See infta Part IV.A.
57. Stephen Breyer, The Sentencing Guidelines and Substantive Criminal Code Revision,
Address at the Soc'y for Reform of the Criminal Law, 1-2, 57 (Jan. 24, 1990) (on file with authors)
("In my view, code revision would have helped a great deal."). As early as 1979, Senator Kennedy,
the primary sponsor of the SRA, envisioned a close coordination between "sentencing reform" and
"federal code reform"-and, at least in 1979, envisioned an overall reduction in federal prison
sentences if the two were to occur simultaneously. See Edward M. Kennedy, Toward a New System
of Criminal Sentencing: Law with Order, 16 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 353, 378-79 & nn.123-28, 380-81
(1979).
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caseload (excluding petty cases handled by magistrate judges) looked
as follows":
FIGURE 1: FISCAL YEAR 1986 CRIMNAL CASELOAD
DWI/Traflic
12.4%
Violent
Crimes
6.1%

Drug
Offenses
26.4%

4

Immigration
6.0%
Firearms
4.0%
Sex Offenses
0.6%
Non-Fraud
White
Collar
13.5%

Fraud
13.3%
Other
8.5%

Larceny
9.3%

Notably, the drug offenses that year were all prosecuted before the
effective date of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 ("ADAA"), which
introduced five- and ten-year mandatory minimum penalties for most
drug trafficking offenses.5 9 There were no mandatory minimum penalties
for federal drug offenses committed in fiscal year 1986.60
Approximately one-half of the sentences imposed in the 1986 cases
had a term of incarceration and approximately one-half had nonincarceration sentences, which was typically probation.' Of those cases
in which defendants received a term of incarceration, the average
sentence was 64.6 months, although, as noted above, most offenders
served only between one-third and one-half of the sentences imposed by
the sentencing courts as a result of parole or good time allowances.62

58. Brent E. Newton, The Story of Federal Probation, 53 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 311, 330-31
(2016) (providing pie charts that summarize fiscal year 1985 and 1986 cases). "Other" primarily
included regulatory offenses such as antitrust offenses and violations of the Food and Drug Act. See
id. app. at 346.
59. See Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498 U.S. 395, 404-07 (1991).
60. See infra note 757 and accompanying text; see also Gozlon-Peretz, 498 U.S. at 406
(pointing out that, while Congress was silent as to the effective date of the ADAA, Congress
indicated through subsequent action that the effective date of the ADAA's mandatory minimum
provisions was October 27, 1986).
61.

See L. RALPH MECHAM, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COuRTS 261-62 tbl.D-5 (1986) (noting that about 50.6% of cases
received some term of imprisonment; 37.4% received probation; and 12.0% received fines-only or
other sentences).
62. See supranotes 17-25 and accompanying text.
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By comparison, the modem federal criminal caseload looks
very different 63:
FIGURE 2: FISCAL YEAR 2015 CRIMNAL CASELOAD
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Particularly notable are the significant decreases in property and
economic offenses and traffic or DUI offenses and the significant
increases in immigration and firearms offenses.' Furthermore, a
majority of the federal drug offenses in the guidelines era have carried
65
statutory mandatory minimum penalties created by the ADAA.
In 2015, only one in ten federal offenders received a nonincarceration sentence, and the average term of imprisonment was fiftythree months.66
4. Sentencing Disparities
In addition to the "back-end" disparities resulting from parole and
good time allowances-discussed above-more fundamental disparities
existed at the "front-end" of the sentencing process. First, and most
evident, an offender in one courtroom could receive a particular
sentence, and an offender with a similar offense of conviction and

63.

The pie chart of 2015 cases appears as Figure A in the Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing.

U.S. SENTENCING COMM., SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS fig.A (2015). The

category "[o]ther" is not defined in the Sourcebook but appears to include a wide variety of different
federal offense types not falling into the other listed categories. See id.
64. Id.
65. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MANDATORY MINIMUM
PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 153 (2011) ("Approximately two-thirds

[of] drug offenders in fiscal year 2010 were convicted of an offense carrying a mandatory minimum
penalty.").
66.

See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS

tbls.12 & 14 (2015).
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similar criminal record could, in the very next courtroom, receive a
much different sentence. 67 This inter-judge disparity was highlighted in a
1974 study published by the Federal Judicial Center.68 In the study,
twenty presentence investigation reports ("PSRs") based on actual cases
were presented to fifty federal judges within the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, who were then asked, without any
guidelines and using their traditional sentencing discretion, to impose
hypothetical sentences in these twenty cases. 6 9 The results revealed
significant sentencing disparities.70 For example, in the very first case,71
the sentences ranged from three to twenty years imprisonment, with a
median sentence of ten years. 72 The U.S. Senators who drafted the SRA
cited the Second Circuit study, stating that the "variations in the judges'
proposed sentences in each case were astounding." 73
The Senate Judiciary Committee's report also referenced a 1981
Department of Justice ("DOJ" or "the Department") study in which 208
judges were asked to impose hypothetical sentences in sixteen cases.74
The Committee observed that there was "substantial variation" in the
recommended sentences. In one case, for example, one judge would
have imposed a sentence of just over one year in prison, while another
would have imposed fifteen years, with a mean sentence of eight-andone-half years. 76 The DOJ study "reconfirmed" the sentencing disparities
identified in the Second Circuit study. 77 The Senate Report concluded by
stating that "every day Federal judges mete out an unjustifiably wide
range of sentences to offenders with similar histories, convicted of
similar crimes, committed under similar circumstances." 78
Second, further analysis uncovered geographic differences in
sentencing outcomes. Despite the common expectation that "two persons
with similar criminal records should receive the same sentence if
convicted of any particular federal offense" regardless of where the
67. See MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 7-8, 11, 17-25,
43 (1973).
68. ANTHONY PARTRIDGE & WILLIAM B. ELDRIDGE, FED. JUDICIAL CTR, THE SECOND
CIRCUIT SENTENCING STUDY: A REPORT TO THE JUDGES OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT 5 (1974).

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 5, 9-10.
See id. at 6-7 tbl.1.
See id. at A-4 app. A (describing the first case).
See id. at 5.
S. REP. No. 98-225, at 41.

74. Id. at 41 n.18, 44 (citing INSLAW, INC. ET AL., FEDERAL SENTENCING: TOWARD A MORE
EXPLICIT POLICY OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS, III-4 (1981)).

75.
76.
77.
78.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 41-44, 44 exhibit 111.8, 45 tbl.1, 46.
at 44 exhibit I1.8.
at 44.
at 38.
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sentencing was held, 7 a DOJ study analyzed sentences for six offenses
in five federal districts, and found inter-district disparities for some
offense types. 80 For example, in bank embezzlement cases, judges in.the
Northern District of California and the Middle District of Florida were
more likely to impose a term of imprisonment, whereas judges in the
District of New Jersey and the Northern District of Ohio were less likely
to impose a prison term for the same degree of offense.8 1 Even among
the harsher sentencing judges in the Northern District of California and
the Middle District of Florida, the former would impose a term of
imprisonment only if the amount involved was at least $100,000,
whereas the threshold for the latter judges was only $10,000.82
Finally, it was widely acknowledged by researchers in the early
1980s that demographic factors, particularly race83 and gender,84 also
contributed to sentencing disparities in the United States.s As discussed
more fully below, the original Commission conducted its own multiple
regression study of a sample of federal criminal cases from 1984 to
1985, which showed racial and gender disparities in sentence length. 6
As stated by the original chair of the Commission, Judge William W.

79.

INSLAW, INC. ET AL., supra note 74, at

El-19.

80. Id. at 111-20.
81. Id at E1-21 exhibit 11m.9.
82. Id.
83.

See, e.g., JOAN PETERSILIA, RACIAL DISPARITIES IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 3,

27-28 tbl.3.5, 30-31, 63-66 tbl.5.1, 67-72 (1983) ("[T]here is evidence that, in sentencing and length
of time served, minorities are treated more severely. For the same crime and with similar criminal

records, whites are more likely to get probation, to go to jail instead of prison, to receive shorter
sentences, and to serve less time behind bars than minority offenders."); Gary Kleck, Racial
Discrimination in Criminal Sentencing: A Critical Evaluation of the Evidence with Additional

Evidence on the Death Penalty, 46 AM. Soc. REV. 783, 784-85 (1981); Cassia Spohn et al., The
Effect of Race on Sentencing: A Re-Examination of an Unsettled Question, 16 LAW & SoC'Y REV.

71, 78, 82-83, 86 (1981) (finding that "blacks are 20 percent more likely than [similarly situated]
whites to be incarcerated" as opposed to receiving a non-incarceration sentence).

84.

See, e.g., Ilene H. Nagel & John Hagan, Gender and Crime: Offense Patterns and

Criminal Court Sanctions, in 4 CRIME AND JUSTICE: AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH 129, 131,

133-34 (Michael Tonry & Norval Morris eds., 1983) (concluding that "women receive preferential
treatment" in sentence type (probation versus incarceration) and sentence severity (shorter versus

longer prison terms)).
85. See Dean J. Champion, The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines:A Summary ofSelected Problems
and Prospects, in THE U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES: IMPLICATIONS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 232

(Dean J. Champion ed., 1989) ("We must remember that prior to the implementation of these
guidelines, considerable research existed to show evidence of unfairness, discrimination, and
general sentencing disparities attributable to racial, ethnic, gender, and socioeconomic factors under
the previous federal indeterminate sentencing scheme."); Marvin E. Frankel & Leonard Orland,
Sentencing Commissions and Guidelines, 73 GEO. L.J. 225, 231 (1984) ("When the statistical and
experimental smoke clears, the disparities are confirmed by a multitude of years in court and in
prison. No lawyer who practices criminal law has any doubt on this score.").
86.

See infra Part II.D.
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Wilkins, Jr., and two leading original staff members in 1991: "Suffice it
to say it was against this backdrop of such unfair sentencing practices
that the most recent attempt at sentencing reform was conceived and
developed, culminating in legislation that created the . . . Commission

and the federal sentencing guidelines."8
B.

The Sense of Congress: Undue Leniency

Related to sentencing disparities was Congress's strong concern
that, for some classes of federal offenders, the sentences being imposed
were too lenient." In enacting the SRA, Congress made it clear-in both
the language of the statute and its extensive legislative history-its
general belief that existing federal sentences were often too lenient for
certain types of offenders, including violent offenders, drug trafficking
offenders, and major white-collar offenders.89 The SRA directed the
Commission to "insure that the guidelines reflect the fact that, in many
cases, current sentences do not accurately reflect the seriousness of
the offense."9 0
In the three-year period between the enactment of the SRA and the
original Commission's promulgation of the first set of sentencing
guidelines, Congress went further by enacting a series of federal penal
statutes that carried severe mandatory minimum penalties, including: (1)
five-year, ten-year, twenty-year, and life in prison sentences for many
types of federal drug offenders;91 (2) five-year and ten-year prison
sentences for using or carrying a firearm (depending on the type) during
a federal drug trafficking offense or crime of violence;92 and (3) a
fifteen-year mandatory minimum prison sentence for a felon who
possessed a firearm after having been convicted of three or more
87. William W. Wilkins, Jr. et al., The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984: A Bold Approach to
the UnwarrantedSentencing Disparity Problem, 2 CRIM. L.F. 355, 362 (1991). Senator Kennedy,
the leading sponsor of the SRA, referred to Congress's concern over sentencing disparities as being
"[t]he major impetus for sentencing reform." Kennedy, supra note 57, at 357.
88.

Interview with Ilene H. Nagel, supra note 46, at 4.

89. See infra Part IV.F.l.c.
90. 28 U.S.C. § 994(m) (1988).
91. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1002, 100 Stat. 3207, 3207-3-4
(codified as amended in 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 960). That statute was amended to apply to even more
federal drug offenses (including conspiracy to violate the substantive offense of drug trafficking) in
1988. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 6055, 102 Stat. 4181, 4318.
92. See Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1005(a), 98 Stat.
1987, 2138-39 (codified as amended in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)); see also Pub. L. No. 99-308, § 105, 100
Stat. 449, 459 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)). That statute was subsequently
amended to provide for even more severe penalties, including a term of not less than twenty-five
years for a second or subsequent conviction and thirty years for using or carrying a machinegun. See
18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2012).
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predicate violent offenses and/or drug-trafficking crimes. 93 Other
statutory changes in the late 1980s sent a clear message that Congress
generally believed that significantly more severe federal sentences
should be imposed.94
As a brand new agency to which Congress had delegated
substantial legislative powers concerning federal sentencing," the
original Commission, as both a practical and legal matter, was obliged to
act in a manner consistent with such congressional intent.
C.

Crime and Recidivism Rates in the Mid-1980s

A final aspect of the historical context in which the original
Sentencing Commission operated concerned the crime rate and
recidivism rate in the mid-1980s. The overall crime rate in the United
States had risen dramatically in the 1960s and 1970s, initially peaking in
1980. The rate then declined slightly, but continued to rise and
eventually peaked again in 1991 before beginning a steady decline over
the next two decades.96 Therefore, at the very time that the original
Commissioners were drafting the guidelines, the country was facing the
highest crime rate in its entire history, which looked to only be climbing
even higher. The original Commission "was likely influenced by
contemporaneous reports of crime" in the mid-1980s.97
It was not merely the crime rate that was a serious concern. Data
from the 1980s showed that offenders throughout the country were
recidivating at high levels after being released from prison. 98 In the
93. Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1801, 98 Stat. 1837, 2185
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. app. § 1202(a)); see also Pub. L. No. 99-308, § 104, 100 Stat.
449, 458 (May 19, 1986) (amending the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984); Pub. L. No. 99-570,
§ 1401, 100 Stat. 3207, 3207-39 (Oct. 27, 1986) (same).
94.

For instance, in 1988, Congress raised the statutory maximum for the immigration offense

of illegal reentry by a previously deported felon from two to fifteen years. Pub. L. No. 100-690,
§ 7345(a), 102 Stat. 4470, 4471 (1988) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1326). The current
statutory maximum is twenty years. See 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) (2012).
95. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 379 (1989) ("Developing proportionate penalties
for hundreds of different crimes by a virtually limitless array of offenders is precisely the sort of
intricate, labor-intensive task for which delegation to an expert body is especially appropriate.").
96.

See JUSTICE RESEARCH & STATISTICS ORG., CRIME AND JUSTICE ATLAS 2000, at 36-37,

http://www.jrsa.org/projects/CrimeAtlas_2000.pdf (describing the variation in crime rate from
1933 to 1998 based on the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports). The crime rate has steadily declined
since then but it remains high compared to the crime rate in mid-1900s. See 2014: Crime in the
United States, FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2014/crime-in-the-u.s.-

2014/tables/table-I (last visited Aug. 1, 2017) (showing a decline in crime rate since 1996).
97. Ilene Nagel, Writing the FederalSentencing Guidelines, in PETER H. ROSSI & RICHARD
A. BERK, JUST PUNISHMENTS: FEDERAL GUIDELINES AND PUBLIC VIEWS COMPARED 32 (James D.

Wright ed., 1997).
98.

See, e.g., ALLEN J. BECK & BERNARD E. SHIPLEY, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S.
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decade before the original sentencing guidelines were promulgated,
between 38.0% and 51.4% of federal offenders were rearrested within
three years of their release from federal prison. 99
Just as significant, many in the social science research community
in the 1970s and 1980s were of the opinion that "nothing work[ed]" in
rehabilitating offenders, an opinion generally shared by the members of
Congress who enacted the SRA.Ioo Although the crime rate fell
significantly in the three decades after 1987101 and there currently is a
near consensus among leading social scientists that modem "evidencebased" correctional interventions can reduce recidivism and promote
meaningful rehabilitation,102 such developments were not foreseeable to
most policy-makers and researchers in the mid-1980s.
D.

The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984

Sentencing disparities, coupled with the belief that the existing
sentencing and correctional regimes were not effective in light of rising
crime rates and high recidivism rates, gave rise to the SRA, which
created the Commission and paved the way for the federal sentencing
DEP'T

OF

JUSTICE,

RECIDIVISM

OF

PRISONERS

RELEASED

IN

1983,

at

1-2

(1989),

https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/rpr83.pdf (finding that 62.5% of state prisoners released in
1983 were rearrested for felony or serious misdemeanor offenses within a period of three years).
99.

FED. BUREAU PRISONS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, RESEARCH REVIEw: RECIDIVISM AMONG

FEDERAL OFFENDERS 2 (1986), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/Digitization/102224NCJRS.pdf.
100.

Robert Martinson, What Works? Questions andAnswers About Prison Reform, PUB. INT.,

Spring 1974, at 22, 48-50. The most influential claim that correctional research showed that
"nothing works" appeared in Robert Martinson's article. Id. That sentiment was echoed by the
Congress that enacted the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 366 (noting
that the Senate Judiciary Committee's Report accompanying the SRA "referred to the 'outmoded
rehabilitation model' for federal criminal sentencing, and recognized that the efforts of the criminal
justice system to achieve rehabilitation of offenders had failed") (citing S. REP. No. 98-225, at 40
(1983)); see also Sharon M. Bunzel, Note, The Probation Officer and the Federal Sentencing

Guidelines: Strange PhilosophicalBedfellows, 104 YALE L.J. 933, 951 (1995) ("The legislative
history of the Sentencing Reform Act .. .reveals the abandonment of the rehabilitative model in
favor of the just deserts philosophy."). Despite Congress's general skepticism about rehabilitation
evident in the Senate Judiciary Committee's report, there are passages in the report indicating that

rehabilitation might be an appropriate consideration for certain types of defendants. See, e.g., S.
REP. NO. 98-225, supra note 31, at 172-73 (recognizing that in some cases, the sentencing
guidelines could provide for "probation instead of imprisonment ... if conditions of probation can
be fashioned that will provide a needed program to the defendant and assure the safety of the
community").
101. See 2014: Crime in the United States, supra note 96.

102. See, e.g., Edward J. Latessa & Christopher Lowenkamp, What Works in Reducing
Recidivism?, 3 U. ST. THOMAS L. REv. 521, 521-25, 535 (2006) ("There is now a substantial body
of research on the effectiveness of correctional interventions in reducing recidivism."); Mark W.
Lipsey & Francis T. Cullen, The Effectiveness of Correctional Rehabilitation: A Review of

Systematic Reviews, ANN. REv. L. & SOC. SCI., 2007, at 297, 302-03, 303 tbl.2 (summarizing
studies showing positive effects of modem rehabilitative treatment on recidivism).
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guidelines. Judge Marvin E. Frankel, who served as a federal district
judge in the Southern District of New York, is most credited for calling
sentencing disparities to the attention of Congress and also for
suggesting the remedy of a federal sentencing commission. In the early
1970s, Judge Frankel, the "father of sentencing reform,"10 3 observed that
judges' "substantially unbounded discretion" combined with the varying
backgrounds and perspectives of judges1" to produce "arbitrary,
random, [and] inconsistent" sentencing decisions.10 s His solution was for
Congress to establish a "National Commission" that would study
sentencing'0 6 and develop sentencing criteria-a "checklist of factors,"
including "some form of numerical or other objective grading"' 0 7-to be
used by each federal judge at sentencing. Judge Frankel proposed a set
of "binding" guidelines. 08 Judge Frankel's advocacy was particularly
influential on Senator Edward Kennedy, who began introducing
"sentencing reform" (together with "federal code reform") bills in
the 1970s. 09
Such congressional efforts spanned nearly a decade. With a
bipartisan group of Senators, including Republicans Strom Thurmond
and Orrin Hatch and Democrats Joseph R. Biden, Jr. and Gary Hart,
joining forces with Senator Kennedy-Congress, in a lopsided vote in
both houses,110 ultimately enacted the SRA, which President Reagan
signed into law on October 12, 1984.111

In doing so, Congress followed Judge Frankel's suggestion,
creating a bipartisan Commission of seven full-time voting
Commissioners and two nonvoting members 1 l 2 and directing it to
develop sentencing policies to "avoid[] unwarranted sentencing
103. KATE STITH & Jost CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE
FEDERAL COURTS 35 (1998).

104.
105.
106.

Marvin E. Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1972).
Id. at 46.
Id. at 51.

107.

FRANKEL, supranote 67, at 114.

108.

Id. at 122-23.

109.

SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 37, at 3-6.

110. See id. at 4-7 (noting that the Senate forwarded two measures, passed by votes of 95 to 1
and 85 to 3, to the House, which by motion approved the Senate's comprehensive crime bill by vote
of 243 to 166).
111. Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History of
the FederalSentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223, 264, 266 (1993).
112. 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (1988) ("Not more than four of the members of the Commission shall
be members of the same political party."); see § 992(c) (providing that the initial seven voting
Commissioners were to serve full-time until six years had passed following the promulgation of the
initial guidelines). The two non-voting, ex officio members of the Commission were the Attorney
General (or his or her designee) and the Chair of the United States Parole Commission. See 28
U.S.C. § 991(a); Pub. L. No.98-473, § 235(b) (5), 98 Stat. 1837, 2033 (1984).
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disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found
guilty of similar criminal conduct."' 13 To help ensure uniformity in
sentencing, Congress directed the Commission to decide what offense
and offender characteristics were relevant for sentencing (with several
limitations imposed by the statute) and also to establish corresponding
sentencing ranges.114 The guidelines were to be "mandatory," 1. insofar
as a sentencing judge could not "depart" from the applicable sentencing
range unless either the Commission had explicitly authorized a departure
for a particular reason or the sentencing court found the existence of an
aggravating or mitigating circumstance that was "not adequately taken
into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the
guidelines and that should result in a sentence different from that
described" in the guidelines." 6
The SRA provided numerous general and specific directives to the
Commission, including:
* The Commission was directed to draft guidelines that
"assure[d] the meeting of' the primary purposes of
sentencing-retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and
rehabilitation-and, in particular, "provide[d] certainty and
fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing. "117
* The Commission was directed to draft guidelines that
"avoided unwarranted disparities among defendants with
similar records who have been found guilty of similar
criminal conduct while maintaining sufficient flexibility to
permit individualized sentences when warranted by
mitigating or aggravating factors not taken into account in
the establishment" of the guidelines. 18
113. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B); see id. § 994(f) (1988) (directing the Commission to
promulgate guidelines "with particular attention to the requirements of subsection 991(b)(1)(B)
for . . . reducing unwarranted sentence disparities").

114.
115.

Id. § 994(b)(1), (d), (e).
The term "mandatory" does not appear in the text of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984

but does appear in the Senate Judiciary Committee's report, and the Supreme Court has also

characterized the original guidelines as "mandatory." See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 79 (1983) ("The
Committee has resisted making this attempt [through an amendment] to make the sentencing
guidelines more voluntary than mandatory, because of the poor record of States ... which have

experimented with 'voluntary' guidelines."); see also Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 367
(1989) ("Before settling on a mandatory-guideline system, Congress considered other competing
proposals for sentencing reform.").
116. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b). As noted above, two decades later, the Supreme Court in Booker
held that mandatory guidelines were unconstitutional and, as a remedy, rendered the guidelines
"advisory." United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245-47 (2005).
117. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(A)().
118. Id. § 991(b)(1)(B). The SRA specifically directed the Commission to give "particular
attention" to providing certainty and fairness and avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities. Id.
§ 994(f).
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* The guidelines had to be "entirely neutral as to the race,
sex, national origin, creed, and socioeconomic status of
offenders," and the Commission was further instructed that
the guidelines should make it generally inappropriate for
sentencing judges to consider several specific offender
characteristics associated with socio-economic status,
including "education, vocational skills, employment record,
family ties and responsibilities, and community ties.""'9
* Guideline sentencing ranges had to be narrow, with the
maximum of any guideline range being no more than 25%
of the minimum of such range (or six months, whichever
was greater), except for ranges with a minimum of 360
months or more, which could have life imprisonment as
the maximum. 120
* The guidelines had to provide that it was generally
appropriate to impose non-incarceration sentences for "first
offenders" not "convicted of a crime of violence or
otherwise serious offense."1 2 1
* The guidelines had to provide for sentences "at or near
the maximum term" for offenders sequentially convicted of
three or more felony crimes of violence or drug trafficking
offenses (offenders who the Commission characterized as
"career offenders"). 122
* The Commission had to "insure that the guidelines reflect
the fact that, in many cases, current sentences do not
accurately reflect the seriousness of the offense."12 3
* Before creating guideline sentencing ranges, the
Commission had to "ascertain the average sentences
imposed in [different] categories of cases prior to the
creation of the Commission, and in cases involving
sentences to terms of imprisonment, the length of such terms
actually served." 1 24 This directive noted, however, that
"[t]he Commission shall not be bound by such average
sentences, and shall independently develop a sentencing
range that is consistent with the purposes of sentencing."125
* In drafting guidelines, the Commission had to "take into
account the nature and capacity of the penal, correctional,
and other facilities and services available" and seek "to

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id. § 994(d)-(e).
Id. § 994(b)(2).
Id. § 994(j).
Id. § 994(h).
Id. § 994(m).
Id.
Id.
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minimize the likelihood that the Federal prison population
will exceed the capacity of the Federal prisons. "126
In addition to the many directives set forth in the SRA itself, the
extensive legislative history-in particular, as set forth in the Senate
Judiciary Committee's lengthy 1983 report that accompanied the bill
that eventually was enacted in 1984 127 -Contained a great deal of
additional direction and guidance to the Commission.1 28 Although in the
modem era resort to a federal statute's legislative history is increasingly
disfavored, 129 in the mid-1980s it was considered appropriate, even
necessary, to rely on legislative history, particularly a committee report
from the chamber in Congress in which the bill that ultimately became
law originated.130 Even today, a federal agency's use of legislative
history to interpret its organic statute is considered more acceptable than
a court's use of legislative history to interpret a statute.131
III.

THE COMMISSION'S FIRST EIGHTEEN MONTHS

The Commission's first eighteen months involved inordinate
administrative and substantive challenges. This Part introduces the
original Commissioners and senior staff members; describes the
difficulties that the Commission faced in operationalizing a new agency;
126. Id. § 994(g).
127. See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 50-65 (1983).
128. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 374-77, 376 n.10 (1989) ("[Tjhe legislative
history provides additional guidance for the Commission's

consideration of the statutory

factors.. . . This legislative history [with the statutory language] provide a factual background and
statutory context that give content to the mandate of the Commission.").
129. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 226-28

(1994) (noting the Supreme Court's shift away from legislative history after Justice Scalia joined
the Court in 1986).
130.

See Charles Tiefer, The Reconceptualization ofLegislative History in the Supreme Court,

2000 WIs. L. REv. 205, 214-15 (2000) ("[In] the 1980s, [Supreme Court] opinions from all points
on the ideological spectrum cited legislative history freely and generously, both as support for the
controversial proposition of how to implement a mix of broad congressional purposes absent
specific intent, and as routinely cited support for noncontroversial propositions."); Patricia M. Wald,
Some Observationson the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L.

REV. 195, 195, 203-06, 216 (1983) (observing that "[1]anguage never seems plain enough in its
meaning to forestall the hunt for enlightenment in the legislative context" and that the Supreme

Court has "increasingly" used legislative history); see also Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76
(1984) ("[W]e have repeatedly stated that the authoritative source for finding the Legislature's
intent lies in the Committee Reports on the bill . . . .").
131. See ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES 24-27 (2014); see also Peter L. Strauss,
When the Judge Is Not the PrimaryOfficial with Responsibility to Read: Agency Inierpretationand

the Problem ofLegislative History, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 321, 329-31 (1990) ("Legislative history
has a centrality and importance for agency lawyers that might not readily be conceived by
persons ... accustomed to considering its relevance only to actual or prospective judicial resolution

of discrete disputes.").
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highlights the key aspects of the Commission's decision-making
process; summarizes the evolving drafts that culminated in the original
Guidelines Manual submitted to Congress on April 13, 1987; and
addresses the inter-branch and intra-branch obstacles that the
Commission had to carefully navigate in discharging its responsibilities
under the SRA.
As this overview indicates, the first eighteen months of the
Commission's existence included a significant amount of research,
drafting, and debate among Commissioners and Commission staff. The
Commission's internal deliberations were informed by an enormous
amount of outreach to and feedback from stakeholders in the criminal
justice system. 132
A.

The OriginalCommissioners

Although the SRA was enacted in October of 1984, President
Reagan did not nominate any Commissioners until September of
1985.133 The Senate promptly confirmed the seven nominees on
October 16, 1985.134 Those original seven Commissioners who were
confirmed were:
* United States District Judge William W. Wilkins, Jr., of
the District of South Carolina (confirmed as the first chair of
the Commission). He previously had served as a law clerk
for Chief Judge Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr., of the Fourth
Circuit, a lawyer in private practice, a circuit solicitor (i.e., a
district attorney) in South Carolina, and legal assistant to
Senator Strom Thurmond. 135
* United States Circuit Judge Stephen G. Breyer of the
First Circuit. He was a former Harvard law professor with a
specialty in administrative law who had also served as a
chief counsel to the United States Senate Committee on the

132. See infra Part UE-G.
133. Nomination of Seven Members, and Designation of Chairman, 21 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
Doc. 1066, 1066-67 (Sept. 10, 1985); see also Reagan Names Panel to Standardize Sentencing,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1985, at A2 1; Nomination of Seven Members of the United States Sentencing
10, 1985),
Commission, and Designation of the Chairman, REAGAN LIBR. (Sept.

https://www.reaganlibrary.archives.gov/archives/speeches/1985/91085b.htm.
134. 131 CONG. REc. 27,728 (1985).
135. See Wilkins, William Walter, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/wilkinswilliam-walter (last visited Aug. 1, 2017). Soon after joining the Commission, Judge Wilkins was
elevated to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit-to the seat previously held by Judge
Haynsworth. Id.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol45/iss4/11

22

Newton and Sidhu: The History of the Original United States Sentencing Commission,

2017]

THE ORIGINAL UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMISSION

1189

Judiciary from 1979 to 1980-when Senator Kennedy was
its chair. 13 6
* United States Circuit Judge George E. MacKinnon of the
D.C. Circuit. He previously served as U.S. Attorney for the
District of Minnesota, as a U.S. Congressman, and as a
member of the state legislature, in which he served as
chairman of the judiciary committee.13 7
* Helen G. Corrothers. She previously had served as a
Commissioner on the United States Parole Commission and,
before that, as a prison warden in Arkansas.138
* Dr. Michael K. Block, Ph.D. He was a professor of
economics and management at the University of Arizona.
He had published widely in the field of law and economics,
including on the subject of criminal justice, and had advised
the Arizona legislature concerning the revision of the state's
penal code.139
* Dr. Ilene H. Nagel, Ph.D. She was a non-lawyer
sociologist on the faculty of the University of Indiana
School of Law. Like Block, she also had published in the
field of criminal justice. 14 0
* Professor Paul H. Robinson. He was a law professor at
Rutgers University with an expertise in criminal law and
philosophies of criminal sentencing. He previously had
served as both a federal prosecutor and a congressional
staffer in the Senate (where he worked on federal criminal

136. See Breyer, Stephen Gerald, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fic.gov/history/judges/breyerstephen-gerald (last visited Aug. 1, 2017); see also Previous Committee on the Judiciary,
COMMIrrTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/about/chairman/previous (last
visited Aug. 1, 2017) (noting Senator Kennedy served as chairman of the Senate Judiciary
Committee from 1979 to 1981). After his time on the Commission, Judge Breyer was appointed as
an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States in 1995. See Breyer, Stephen Gerald,
supra.
137. See MacKinnon, George Edward, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/
mackinnon-george-edward (last visited Aug. 1, 2017); see also Interview with George MacKinnon,
Comm'r, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n (Oct. 28, 1994) (on file with authors).
138. CLARICE FEINMAN, WOMEN IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 166 (3d ed. 1994). In
1990, while she served on the Commission, "Corrothers became president of the American
Correctional Association." See id.
139. See Confirmation Hearing on: Michael K. Block, Ilene N Nagel, and Paul H. Robinson
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 311-12, 345 (1985) [hereinafter Hearing]
(statement of Michael Block).
140. See id. at 311-13, 345 (statement of Ilene Nagel).
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code reform), 141 and also had been involved in criminal code
revision projects in two states. 142
A photograph of the original seven voting Commissioners appears as
Appendix B.
The original Commissioners had diverse backgrounds and areas of
expertise-in the courtroom (at both the trial and appellate levels), in
academia (in both social science and law), 4 3 and on Capitol Hill."
According to Commissioner Breyer, "the varying backgrounds" of the
seven original Commissioners complemented each other.1 45 According
to Commissioner Nagel, however, some Commissioners had somewhat
different perceptions about the relative value of other Commissioners'
experiences and professional backgrounds.1 46 The first Commissioners
were a relatively young group-all but one, Judge MacKinnon, were in
their thirties or forties. 147 They also represented all major regions of
the country (the East, West, Midwest, and the South). All were
48
white, except Commissioner Corrothers, who was African American.'
49
They also were a genuinely bipartisan group.' Joining the original
seven appointed Commissioners were two ex officio non-voting
Commissioners, Ronald Gainer (a high-ranking DOJ official who had
worked extensively on the failed cause of "criminal code reform" in the
141. Interview by Michael Courlander, Pub. Info. Specialist, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, & Kent
Larsen, Dir. of Commc'n, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n with Stephen Breyer, Justice, U.S. Supreme
Court in Wash., D.C. 3 (June 13, 1995) (on file with authors) (noting that Paul Robinson had
worked with Senator McClellan from Arkansas on-the original "[federal] criminal code" reform
bill).
142. See Hearing,supra note 139, at 313-14, 345 (1985) (statement of Paul H. Robinson).
143.

Jon 0. Newman, Remembering Marvin Frankel: Sentencing Reform but Not These

Guidelines, 14 FED. SENT'G REP. 319, 320 (2002) (noting that it was a "surprise to the [SRA's]
supporters, [that] President Reagan named three professors to the first Commission, two from fields

other than law").
144. Nomination of Seven Members of the United States Sentencing Commission, and
Designation of the Chairman,supra note 133.
145. Interview by Michael Courlander & Kent Larsen with Stephen Breyer, supra note 141, at

59.
146. See Interview with Ilene H. Nagel, supra note 46, at 82-85 (observing that Commissioner
Block, an economist, "had a very negative attitude towards law and lawyers," while Commissioner
MacKinnon, a federal judge, "was not particularly persuaded about the contribution of [social
science] research").
147. Nomination of Seven Members of the United States Sentencing Commission, and
Designationof the Chairman, supra note 133.
148. ACA Honors Cass Award Winners, CORRECTIONS TODAY, Oct. 1993, at 66.
149. See, e.g., Reagan Names Panel to Standardize Sentencing, supra note 133 ("Kenneth

Feinberg, the chairman of the New York State commission which has drawn up [the] state
sentencing guidelines, said the Administration had selected a balanced group in nominating the
Commission. 'People who know this field will look at these names and say there's no ideological or
political bent,' said Mr. Feinberg, a former Senate Judiciary Committee aide who was involved in
writing the legislation [that created the Commission].").
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1970s and 1980s) as the Attorney General's representative" 0 and
Benjamin F. Baer, the chairman of the U.S. Parole Commission. 51
The original Commissioners, operating under severe time
constraints, decided to proceed with their many tasks through various
committees,15 2 which would report to the full Commission for a vote on
important matters. The primary committees were the Just Deserts
Committee, the Crime Control Committee, and Offense Characteristics
Committee, and the Offender Characteristics Committee.153 Those
committees are discussed in Part IV below.' 5 4 All of the original
Commissioners were appointed on a full-time basis, although some-the
judges and professors-also continued to engage in some amount of
work in connection with their other jobs."' According to Commissioner
Nagel, these competing commitments diminished opportunities for those
Commissioners to engage further with other Commissioners and staff in
between Commission meetings.156
B.

Challenges of Getting off the Ground

The Commissioners first met on October 29, 1985, in a small
borrowed office in the DOJ's main building in Washington, D.C. At the
time, the Commission did not yet have office space of its own and was
forced to use a small office temporarily available at the DOJ.'" Soon
thereafter, Judge Wilkins and several other Commissioners literally
walked the streets of Washington, D.C., looking for office space to rent
for the Commission.' At that time, Congress had not yet appropriated
any money for the Commission, so Judge Wilkins signed the original
lease for office space in his own name.1 5 9

150.

See Interview by Michael Courlander & Kent Larsen with Stephen Breyer, supra note

141, at 2-3; see also Nomination of Seven Members of the United States Sentencing Commission,
and Designation of the Chairman, supranote 133.

151.

Obituary: Benjamin F. Baer, 73, U. S. Parole Chairman, N.Y. TIMEs (Apr. 18, 1991),

http://www.nytimes.com/1991/04/18/obituaries/benjamin-f-baer-73-u-s-parole-chairman.html.
152. At different times in the Commission's meeting minutes and other records, these groups

were called "committees" and "subcommittees." For the sake of consistency, this Article will refer
to them as "committees."

153. See infra Part IV.B.2, C.2.
154. See infra Part IV.B.2, C.2.
155.

See Interview with Ilene H. Nagel, supra note 46, at 12 ("[T]here was an immediate

decision by some members of the Commission not to move [to Washington, D.C.,] full-time at all,
[and] some not to recuse themselves from their cases [or their teaching responsibilities].").
156. Id. at 12 (identifying the fact that some Commissioners did not move to Washington,
D.C., and continued to work elsewhere as a "weakness" of the Commission).

157. Interview with William W. Wilkins, Jr., Judge 2-3 (Sept. 20, 1994) (on file with authors).
158. Id. at 4-5.
159. Id. at 5-6, 8.
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The lack of both its own office space and appropriations in the
early days of the Commission underscores the fact that the Commission
was not merely faced with the difficult task of creating sentencing
guidelines for the federal system. The original Commissioners had to
build an agency from the ground up-including hiring a staff, acquiring
furniture and office equipment, creating office and personnel policies,
and the like. 16 0
Moreover, in 1985, there was no other component of the federal
government from which the Commission could readily draw in terms of
experience and subject matter expertise. The Commission had been
created by Congress as an "independent" policy-making agency located
in the federal judiciary. 16 1 Virtually all federal policy-making agencies
existed in the executive branch, which had its own federal criminal
justice agenda in the mid-1980s (often at odds with the policies adopted
by the Commission, as discussed below). 162 The vast majority of the
federal judiciary concerned itself with litigation, not policy-making. The
only real policy-making unit of the federal judiciary, the Judicial
Conference of the United States, 163 had initially opposed sentencing
guidelines and later, after it appeared that Congress would pass
legislation requiring guidelines, it sought to have Congress delegate
the authority to promulgate the guidelines to the Conference rather
than to an independent sentencing commission located within the
judicial branch. 164

160. Interview with Ilene H. Nagel, supra note 46, at 96 ("As a new agency we had no staff, no
location, no furniture, no history, and no good relations with other agencies .... ).
161. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 384-85 (1989) ("The Sentencing Commission
unquestionably is a peculiar institution within the framework of our Government. Although placed
by the Act in the Judicial Branch, it is not a court and does not exercise judicial power. Rather, the
Commission is an 'independent' body comprised of seven voting members including at least three
federal judges, entrusted by Congress with the primary task of promulgating sentencing
guidelines.").
162. Interview with Ilene H. Nagel, supra note 46, at 65-66.
163.

Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on

the Discretion ofSentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1750 (1992) ("The Judicial Conference is the
governing policy body of the federal court system.").
164. In several earlier versions of the bill that ultimately became the SRA, the Judicial
Conference was given the authority to promulgate sentencing guidelines. See, e.g., Criminal Code
Revision Act of 1981, H.R. 5679, 97th Cong. § 4301; see also Stith & Koh, supra note 111, at 236.
The Judicial Conference supported the provisions of these bills that would place the authority to
promulgate within the Judicial Conference as opposed to an "independent" agency located within
the judiciary. See Stith & Koh, supra note 111, at 254 & n.182, 255-57; see also ADMIN. OFFICE OF
THE U.S. COURTS, REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES 28-29 (1983); ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 87-88 (1982); ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS,
REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 10-11 (1976).
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Another significant obstacle-as both a source of personal and
institutional stress as well as an eventual distraction-that the original
Commission faced was inevitable constitutional challenges to both the
Commission itself and the guidelines that it would promulgate.' 6 5 The
Commissioners were well aware from the outset of their service on the
Commission that both the agency and its eventual guidelines would be
challenged as soon as they went into effect in cases in which the offense
was committed on or after November 1, 1987.166 Unlike most other
federal agencies-whose administrative regulations are subject to
challenge as soon as they are promulgated or even beforehandl 6 7-the
Commission had to wait until both Congress had an opportunity to
review (and not reject) the original guidelines (during a period of 180
days after the original guidelines were promulgated in the spring of
1987) and also the additional time that it would take the federal courts to
rule on cases in which the guidelines applied.' 68 That did not occur until
early 1988.169 Ultimately, over 200 federal district judges ruled that the
Commission and its guidelines were unconstitutional-typically on the
grounds that the Commission's placement in the federal judicial branch
violated the separation-of-powers doctrine or that the SRA's delegation
of legislative authority to the Commission was improper-while only
165. See, e.g., United States v. Arnold, 678 F. Supp. 1463, 1464 (S.D. Cal. 1988). The original
Commission was actively involved in monitoring legal challenges to the Commission and its
guidelines and, through its general counsel's office, it filed amicus curiae briefs and appeared as
amicus counsel at oral arguments in pending federal criminal cases in which the guidelines were
challenged. Id. at 1464 (noting that the Commission's general counsel, John R. Steer, appeared on
behalf of the Commission as amicus curiae).
166. See, e.g., Nancy Lewis, Suit Seeks to Overturn Sentencing Guidelines: Separation-ofPowers Doctrine Violated, Public Defenders Say, WASH. POST, Nov. 24, 1987, at A6 (quoting
Chairman Wilkins, "[a]ny major piece of legislation is going to be challenged.... The filing of this
lawsuit was inevitable, expected and is necessary"). Even before the guidelines went into effect,
legal scholars had published legal arguments challenging the Commission and its guidelines. See,
e.g., Lewis J. Liman, The ConstitutionalInfirmities of the United States Sentencing Commission, 96
YALE L.J. 1363, 1369-76 (1987) (contending that the Commission and any guidelines that it
promulgated were unconstitutional on both separation of powers and improper delegation grounds).
167. For example, regulations adopted by the Securities and Exchange Commission carry the
force of law without needing congressional approval. See 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (2012). Moreover,
agency regulations can be reviewable upon promulgation. See, e.g., Columbia Broad. Sys. v. United
States, 316 U.S. 407, 408, 425 (1942) (concerning Federal Communications Commission's
regulations).
168. See, e.g., Fed. Defs. of San Diego v. United States Sentencing Comm'n, 680 F. Supp. 26,
27-32 (D.D.C. 1988). An attempt by federal defender organizations from different parts of the
country in November of 1987 to obtain a nationwide injunction from a federal district court in
Washington, D.C., was rejected because there was no "standing" to bring such a lawsuit. Id. at 2732.
169. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 686 F. Supp. 847, 865-70 (D. Colo. 1988) (holding that
the Commission was invalid on separation of powers grounds); Arnold, 678 F. Supp. at 1465, 146972 (invalidating the Commission and guidelines on separation of powers grounds).
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120 judges upheld the constitutionality of the Commission and the
guidelines.170 It was not until 1989 that the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the Commission and the guidelines. 17 1
C.

HiringStaff

A key part of building a federal agency was hiring staff members.
As its first Staff Director, 172 the Commission hired Kay A. Knapp, who
previously had served as the Director of the Minnesota Sentencing
Commission." In 1978, Minnesota became the first state to create a
commission charged with promulgating sentencing guidelines. 1 74 Other
key members were added to the new federal Sentencing Commission's
staff in the comings months:
* Denis J. Hauptly was the Commission's first General
Counsel. He had served as a Senior Staff Attorney for the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Boston (on
5
which Judge Breyer then served). 17
* John Steer was hired as Deputy General Counsel. He
previously had served as Chief of Staff for Senator
Thurmond and would succeed Hauptly as the Commission's
General Counsel in 1987. Eventually, Steer would be
appointed as Vice Chair of the Commission in 1999.'

* Russell Ghent originally was hired as Chairman
Wilkins's law clerk, but eventually was promoted to serve
as Deputy General Counsel. He played an active role in the
early phases of the guidelines drafting process. He formerly
was a state prosecutor in South Carolina. 17 7
170.

Ilene H.

Nagel, Structuring Sentencing Discretion: The New Federal Sentencing

Guidelines, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 883, 906-11 (1990).
171. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 374 (1989).
172. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 provides for the Commission to hire a "Staff
Director," who in turn would appoint staff for the Commission. 28 U.S.C. § 996 (1988).
173. Kay A. Knapp & Dennis J. Hauptly, State and FederalSentencing Guidelines: Apples and
Oranges, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 679, 679 n.* (1992).
174.

See MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE 1

(2008) ("In 1978, the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission (MSGC) was established, and
Minnesota became the first state to implement a sentencing guidelines structure.").
175. OFFICE OF THE PRESS SEC'Y, President Names Denis J. Hauptly as Chairman of the

Special Panel on Appeals, WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 4, 1995), https://clinton6.nara.gov/1995/01/1995-0104-hauptly-named-chairman-of-special-panel-on-appeals.html.
176. Interview by The Champion with John R. Steer, Former Vice Chair of the Sentencing
Comm'n, in CHAMPION, Sept. 2008, at 40, 40; Interview with John Steer (Oct. 2, 1995) (recorded
interview on file with authors).
177. See Meeting Minutes, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n 10-12 (Apr. 1, 1986) (on file with
authors) [hereinafter Meeting Minutes, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n (Apr. 1, 1986)]; Meeting Minutes,
U.S. Sentencing Comm'n 5-6 (Jan. 21, 1987) (on file with authors) [hereinafter Meeting Minutes,
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* David Lombardero served as Chief Counsel and played
an active role in the guidelines drafting process. He
was an attorney with a background in mathematics
and econometrics who had conducted criminological
research with Commissioner Block before coming to
the Commission.178
* Dr. William Rhodes, Ph.D., an economist, was the
Commission's first Director of Research. He had previously
worked as a criminology professor as well as a researcher
with two leading social science research organizations, the
Institute for Law and Social Research ("INSLAW") and Abt
Associates.17 9 Dr. Rhodes was in charge of the
Commission's "past practice" and "prison impact" data
analyses discussed below. 80
* Dr. Peter Hoffman, Ph.D., a criminologist, was hired as a
Senior Research Associate, but eventually became the
Principal Technical Advisor (i.e., the primary drafter of the
guidelines). Before he came to the Sentencing Commission,
he had been the Director of Research at the United States
Parole Commission (and, in view of his experience drafting
the parole guidelines, he would work with Lombardero in
drafting the original sentencing guidelines)."s'
* Phyllis Newton, a criminologist, was hired as a Senior
Research Associate and was the primary researcher for the
Commission's demographic disparity study of 1985 federal
U.S. Sentencing Comm'n (Jan. 21, 1987)]; see also List of Commission Staff: 1985-1987, Office of
Human Res., U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, (noting Ghent's title as Deputy General Counsel) (on file
with authors).
178. See DAvID A. LOMBARDERO ET AL., BURGLARY AND ROBBERY CASES IN CALIFORNIA
1973: A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE DISPOSITION OF CRIMINAL
CASES AND SELECTED SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND CRIMINAL CHARACTERISTICS OF DEFENDANTS 2-3,

7-9, 12 (1976) (discussing criminological research).
179. Dr. William Rhodes, ABT AssoCS., http://www.abtassociates.com/About-Us/OurPeople/Associates/Dr-William-Rhodes.aspx (last visited Aug. 1, 2017).
180.

See SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 37, at 55-56. Rhodes previously had advocated

for sentencing guidelines that considered both offense severity and an offender's criminal history.
See Brian Forst et al., Sentencing and Social Science: Research for the Formulation of Federal

&

Sentencing Guidelines, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 355, 367-70, 372 (1979) (contending that sentencing
guidelines should be structured "around two well-established sets of determinants-characteristics
of the offense (crime seriousness) and the defendant's observed criminal propensity (likelihood of
recidivism)"). Regarding the first factor, Rhodes and his co-authors contended that the guidelines
should be "based on actual sentencing decisions." Id. at 371-72.
181. Peter B. Hoffman & Lucille K. DeGostin, An Argument for Self-Imposed Explicit Judicial
Sentencing Standards, 3 J. CRIM. JUST. 195, 195 (1975). Like Rhodes, Hoffman had previously
advocated for sentencing guidelines that considered both offense severity and an offender's risk of
recidivism (primarily measured by his or her criminal history). See id. at 199, 200 tbl. 1, 201; Peter
B. Hoffman & Barbara Stone-Meierhoefer, Application of Guidelines to Sentencing, 3 LAW
PSYCHOL. REv. 53, 53, 62-64, 65 tbl.1 (1977).
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cases (discussed below). She would eventually become
Staff Director.182
* L. Russell ("Rusty") Burress originally came to the
Commission on a detail from his position as a United States
Probation Officer in the District of South Carolina, but
eventually became the Principal Training Advisor. He
served as the primary guidelines trainer and liaison to the
federal probation officer community.183
* Paul K. Martin, a former journalist from South Carolina,
was hired as the Commission's Communications Director
(and, after obtaining a law degree, eventually became the
Deputy Staff Director). He coordinated the Commission's
extensive public outreach during its first eighteen months
and also played a role in editing the original guidelines.184
Excluding administrative assistants and other clerical personnel, the total
number of full-time staff employed by the Commission during the first
eighteen months was approximately two dozen-roughly evenly divided
between attorneys and social scientists." Most of those staff members
did not begin their employment until different points in 1986.186
In the Commission's early years, there was significant turnover
among senior staff members. 187 Most significantly, Knapp and Hauptly
left after a year or so. Both were highly critical of the original
Commission's policy decisions and believed that the federal guideline
system should have resembled simpler state guideline systems like
Minnesota's." Knapp was succeeded by Suzanne Conlon (although the
latter took the title "Executive [D]irector" rather than Staff Director), a

182. See Meeting Minutes, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n 1 (Dec. 15, 1986) (on file with authors).
Co-author Brent E. Newton is unrelated to Phyllis Newton.
183. See Meeting Minutes, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n (Jan. 21, 1987), supra note 177, at 2; see
also Interview with Ilene H. Nagel, supra note 46, at 125-26; Interview with William W. Wilkins,
Jr., Judge, supranote 157, at 3-4, 30-3 1.
184. Paul K. Martin, NASA Inspector General, NASA (Dec. 8, 2009), https://www.nasa.gov/
about/highlights/martin bio.html.
185. See Interview with Ilene H. Nagel, supranote 46, at 12.
186. See List of Commission Staff: 1985-1987, supra note 177.
187. Lowell Dodge, Dir., Administration of Justice Issues, U.S. Sentencing Commission:
Changes Needed to Improve Effectiveness, Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice
Committee on the Judiciary U.S. H.R., Gen. Accounting Office 14-16 (Mar. 7, 1990).
188.

See MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING FRAGMENTS: PENAL REFORM IN AMERICA, 1975-

2025, at 111 (2016) (discussing Knapp's and Hauptly's criticisms of the federal sentencing
guidelines compared to simpler state guidelines); see also Kay A. Knapp, Allocation of Discretion
andAccountability within Sentencing Structures, 64 U. COLO. L. REv. 679, 679-85, 687-89, 695-98
(1993) ("[N]o state [sentencing] commission has been so foolish as to adopt the highly complex and
mechanistic federal sentencing policy that has incurred the wrath of the federal community.").
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federal prosecutor from Illinois who would be appointed to the federal
bench in 1988.189
In addition to these staff members, the Commission was also aided
by a handful of paid and unpaid consultants (who served independently
of the advisory groups with whom the Commissioners and staff
conferred in 1986 and 1987).190 Among them were Kenneth R. Feinberg
(particularly as an advisor to Commissioner Breyer)'91 and Professor
Stephen Schulhofer.1 92

D.

Building an EmpiricalBasisfor the Guidelines

Before drafting sentencing guidelines, the original Commission
engaged in an extensive study of the existing state guidelines
(in particular, the guidelines in Minnesota, Pennsylvania, and
Washington),193 the federal parole guidelines, as well as a large body of
criminological literature relevant to the issues that the SRA required the
Commission to address in creating guidelines (such as offender and
offense characteristics). 194 However, for the majority of the issues
relevant to the federal guidelines, the original Commission ultimately
relied on its own original data analyses using a large number of cases
from the 1980s.1' In particular, the Commission examined data from
nearly 100,000 federal cases from 1983 to 1985, which were included in
a large computer file provided to the Commission by the Administrative
189.

Conlon, Suzanne B., FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/conlon-suzanne-

b. (last visited Aug. 1, 2017).
190.
191.

See infra notes 418, 545-46 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Public Hearing Before the U.S. Sentencing Comm'n on Revised Draft of

Sentencing Guidelines 258 (Washington, D.C., Mar. 11, 1987) [hereinafter Public Hearing]
(statement of William W. Wilkins, Jr., Chairman, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n) (thanking Feinberg for
his "interest and the great assistance that you have given us over the life of this commission") (on
file with authors). Feinberg was the Senate staffer primarily responsible for drafting the SRA. See
William K. Sessions III, At the Crossroads of the Three Branches: The U.S. Sentencing
Commission's Attempts to Achieve Sentencing Reform in the Midst of Inter-Branch Power

Struggles, 26 J.L. & POL. 305, 309 n.26 (2011) (referring to Feinberg as "the primary drafter of the
Sentencing Reform Act"); see also Stephen G. Breyer & Kenneth R. Feinberg, The Federal
Sentencing Guidelines: A Dialogue,26 CRIM. L. BULL. 5, 5 (1990).
192. See infra notes 546-48 and accompanying text. Schulhofer, then a law professor at the
University of Chicago, was a paid consultant to the Commission who was primarily responsible for
drafting the provision of the initial Guidelines Manual that concerned sentencing for multiple counts
of conviction. See infra notes 546-48 and accompanying text. He also worked closely with
Commissioner Nagel concerning her study of plea bargaining practices under the initial guidelines.
See Schulhofer & Nagel, supra note 13, at 256-86.
193.

Interview by Michael Courlander & Kent Larsen with Stephen Breyer, supra note 141, at

58.
194. See id. at 58; Interview with Ilene H. Nagel, supra note 46, at 15-16; see also
SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supranote 37, at 25-26.
195. SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 37, at 16-17, 21.
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Office of the United States Courts ("AO").1 9 6 Of those cases, the
Commission focused on a representative sample of approximately
10,500 felony and Class A misdemeanor cases from 1984 to 1985.197
The Commission enlisted the services of federal probation officers
around the country to code their presentence reports for numerous
offense and offender characteristics.'" That data was merged with
corresponding data from the BOP and the United States Parole
Commission, which allowed the Commission to determine (or, in cases
where offenders were still serving prison sentences, estimate) the actual
amount of imprisonment served by those offenders for whom the district
court imposed a sentence of imprisonment.' 99
The robust dataset produced by the Commission allowed it to
undertake three main data analyses. First, using a multiple regression
computer analysis, the Commission was able to identify a wide variety
of aggravating and mitigating factors that had influenced federal
sentencing decisions in the pre-guidelines era.200 The Commission used
that data analysis in drafting guidelines for each type of offense. In the
words of Judge Wilkins, it enabled the Commission to create guidelines
that would be "applied in a manner similar to the thought process of a
judge determining an appropriate sentence."20 1 In a related manner, the
Commission was able to estimate average sentences for a wide variety of
federal offense types (for example, homicide, assault, rape, kidnapping,
burglary, robbery, theft, counterfeiting, and fraud), including for
different gradations of the same offense types (for example, assault
causing bodily injury, assault causing serious bodily injury, and assault
causing permanent bodily injury).202 Those estimates included both the
percentage of offenders committing a particular offense type who were
sentenced to some term of imprisonment (as opposed to an alternative to
incarceration) and also the average length of prison time actually served
for those offenders sentenced to a term of imprisonment (in view of the
existing parole and good-time allowances practices). Except for federal
196. Id. at 21. The data concerning those nearly 100,000 cases was obtained from the Federal
Probation Sentencing and Supervision Information System ("FPSSIS"). Id. at 16, 21.
197. Id. at 21.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 22-24, 35-39 tbl.1(b).
201. William W. Wilkins, Jr., Plea Negotiations, Acceptance of Responsibility, Role of the
Offender, and Departures:Policy Decisions in the Promulgationof FederalSentencing Guidelines,

23 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 181, 185 (1988). Chairman Wilkins, who had himself handled at least
300 federal criminal cases as a federal district judge at the time of his appointment to the
Commission, believed in a guideline system based on the actual thought processes of sentencing
judges. Interview with William W. Wilkins (July 13, 2016) (no recorded transcript).
202. See SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supranote 37, at 27-34 tbl.1(a).
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drug cases and certain white-collar and violent offenses, the Commission
generally set penalty levels in the sentencing guidelines based on
the pre-guidelines average sentences for the different federal
offense types. 203
Second, using the same dataset of 10,500 cases, the Commission
engaged in a multiple regression study to determine whether
demographic factors (in particular, race and gender) and geographical
factors (e.g., region of the country) were associated with differences in
sentence length. 2 1 The Commission's findings-of both types of
demographic disparity as well as geographic disparities in sentencingwere presented to Congress in the summer of 1987, after the
Commission had promulgated the initial Guidelines Manual, but
before the conclusion of Congress's 180-day review period under
28 U.S.C. § 994(p).205
Finally, the Commission used the same dataset, together with
additional data obtained from the AO, BOP, and Parole Commission, to
engage in a "prison impact" analysis that estimated growth in the federal
prison population over the following fifteen years (based on both the
advent of the guidelines as well as statutory mandatory minimum
sentencing provisions enacted by Congress from 1984 through 1986).206
E.

Evolving Drafts of the Guidelines Manual

The Commission's key policy decisions concerning the initial
guidelines resulted from an iterative process, in which the Commission
issued a series of "preliminary" draft guidelines, sought public comment
on them (including through a series of public hearings), and later refined
subsequent drafts based on that feedback and also based on the data
analyses discussed above.207 The first draft guidelines were produced by
Commissioner Paul Robinson's Just Deserts Committee and informally
circulated to select stakeholders for comment in the spring and summer
of 1986.208 After that draft received negative feedback from its
reviewers, the Commission subsequently produced two "preliminary"

203.

See id. at 16-19; see also infra notes 744-53 and accompanying text.

204.

See SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 37, at 21.

205. See Sentencing Guidelines:Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the H
Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 661-686 (1987) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of
Commissioner Ilene Nagel).
206. See SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 37, at 53-66, 67 fig.1, 70 fig.2, 71 tbl.4, 72
fig.3, 73 tbl.5, 74 fig.4, 75 tbl.6; see also infra notes 913-18 and accompanying text.
207. See Hearings, supranote 205, at 661 (statement of Commissioner Ilene Nagel).
208. United States Sentencing Commission Proposed Sentencing Guidelines Manual (July 10,
1986) (unpublished tentative draft) (on file with authors).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2017

33

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 4 [2017], Art. 11

1200

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:1167

drafts published for public comment in the Federal Register. The first
was prepared in September 1986 and published on October 1, 1986,209
and the second, revised preliminary draft was prepared in January 1987
and published on February 6, 1987.210 Because of perceived problems
with the January 1987 draft, significant modifications were made. The
next draft, informally known as "Draft X," evolved into the Guidelines
Manual submitted to Congress on April 13, 1987.211 On May 1, 1987,
the Commission also sent a lengthy package of "technical, conforming,
and clarifying amendments" to Congress.212 On November 1, 1987, the
April 1987 manual, as amended by the May 1987 amendments, became
effective when the time for congressional review passed without
affirmative legislation disapproving of the manual.2 13
1. Original "Just Deserts" Draft
Within a few months after the Commission first convened,
Commissioner Robinson's Just Deserts Committee began drafting the
first prototype of federal sentencing guidelines. 214 By mid-1986, his
committee had produced a lengthy and well-developed draft guidelines
manual. That draft, which was based primarily on a retributivist
philosophy of sentencing,2 15 sought to account for "all of the injuries and
harms, personal and socittal, tangible and intangible, that are
attributable, directly or indirectly, to the offender and could have been
foreseen." 216 The draft "assign[ed] a 'harm value' to each such harm [or
unrealized harms that were threatened or risked] that will reflect the
209. Preliminary Draft of Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 51 Fed. Reg. 35,080,
35,080 (Oct. 1, 1986). This Article will refer to this draft as the "September 1986 Draft" based on
the date on the document.

210. Proposed Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 52 Fed. Reg. 3920 (Feb. 6,
1987). This Article will refer to this second draft as the "January 1987 Draft" based on the date on
the document.

211. See infra notes 246-48 and accompanying text.
212. Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 52 Fed. Reg. 18,046, 18,046 (May 13,
1987); SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 37, at i. The initial Guidelines Manual was not
actually published in the Federal Register until May 13, 1987. 52 Fed. Reg. at 18,046.
213. 28 U.S.C. § 994(p) (1988).
214. See Memorandum from Paul H. Robinson, Comm'r, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, to
Commissioners, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n (Nov. 25, 1985) (on file with authors). As early as
November 25, 1985-less than one month after their first Commission meeting-Commissioner
Robinson submitted a lengthy memorandum to his fellow Commissioners to which was attached
several "preliminary research papers" that he and some staff members (together around 200 pages)
put together, addressing a wide variety of issues related to offense and offender characteristics
potentially to be resolved by the Commission when formulating sentencing guidelines. See id.
at 2-4-6, 4-21-22.
215. See infra notes 391-92 and accompanying text.
216. United States Sentencing Commission Proposed Sentencing Guidelines Manual, supra
note 208, at 4.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol45/iss4/11

34

Newton and Sidhu: The History of the Original United States Sentencing Commission,

2017]

THE ORIGINAL UNITED STA TES SENTENCING COMMISSION

1201

seriousness with which society views such harmful conduct or result." 2 17
The draft then considered harm together with other factors relevant to an
offender's culpability, such as his state of mind, role in the offense (if it
involved multiple actors), and criminal history, to come up with "[t]he
offender's total sanction units," which corresponded to a particular
sentencing range (in months). 218 The draft also based penalty levels on
an offender's "real offense" conduct-that is, all criminal conduct that
occurred during the offense of conviction or "in some other way related
to it," whether committed by the defendant or a "co-actor[]" if
"reasonably foreseeable and in furtherance of the crime of
conviction." 2 19 With respect to a standard of proof at sentencing, the
draft provided that "[t]he Court may find that a harm element exists or
an adjustment factor applies if there exists any reasonable evidence to
support such harm or adjustment." 22 0
The draft's sentencing calculus was extremely complex and
mathematical. For instance, for property crime cases, the guideline
instructed users to engage in a multistep formula that considered not
only monetary loss amounts, but also the number of criminal
transactions and victims involved. The reader was referred to a complex
monetary table with very precise (yet also seemingly arbitrarily-derived)
ranges of loss amounts and even suggested use of a calculator whereby
sanction units could be determined through a mathematical calculus
using quadratic roots. That table appears below as Appendix C.
The just deserts draft was not published in the Federal Register for
public comment-as two subsequent draft guideline manuals were.
Instead, the draft was circulated to key stakeholders, including select
judges, officials within the DOJ, and key congressional staffers during
the spring and summer of 1986.221 Except for the DOJ, which favored
the draft as a prototype of federal sentencing guidelines, the vast
majority of reviewers reacted negatively to the draft.222 Typical of the
negative reactions was that of Judge Jon Newman of the Second Circuit,
a supporter of the concept of sentencing guidelines,22 3 who stated:

217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

Id.
Id. at 4-5, 15 tbl.1.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 6.
Nagel, supranote 170, at 918-21.

222.

Id. at 919-20; see Interview by Gen. Accounting Office with Stephen G. Breyer, supra

note 1, at 9-10 (noting that ex officio commissioner Gainer and the DOJ generally "were pushing
the Robinson approach").
223. See Jon 0. Newman, A Better Way to Sentence Criminals, 63 A.B.A. J. 1562, 1564, 1566
(1977) (supporting the creation of federal sentencing guidelines).
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My first point challenges a basic assumption that underlies the entire
proposal-the idea that every increment of harm that can possibly be
measured should be reflected in an increment of additional
punishment. I seriously doubt that there is moral validity to this
idea. ... The proposed system requires a precise determination of
every factual aspect of the criminal conduct because every factual
aspect plays a part in determining the precise numerical score to be
used ultimately in determining sanction units.

. .

. The complexity of

the proposed system will create enormous grounds for error
in application of the guidelines and appeals to challenge the sentence.
This is the inevitable consequence of a system that tries for
ultimate precision. If everything matters, then every statement of
definition must be interpreted, with inevitable mistake and subsequent
legal challenge.224
Such resounding criticism caused the majority of the Commission-over
Commissioner Robinson's objection-to abandon the just deserts draft
and move to a modified guidelines model.225
2. September 1986 Preliminary Draft
After abandoning the just deserts draft in the late-summer of 1986,
the Commission scrambled to put together a more palatable set of
guidelines by the end of September 1986 for public comment-this time
published in the Federal Register and to be followed by a series of public
hearings.226 Commissioner Nagel described the next iteration:
[T]he draft ...was first and foremost an attempt to rid the [just] desert
based draft of July, 1986 of its most unacceptable aspects-such as the
cumulative . . . theory of harms, and impractical provisions-such as

elaborate [fact-finding] hearings for scores of guideline factors-while
preserving its basic tenets and format[,] such as grouping similar
crimes into broad like categories." 227

224. Nagel, supra note 170, at 919-20 n.203 (quoting Letter from Judge Jon Newman to Judge
William Wilkins (Sept. 3, 1986)).
225. Meeting Minutes, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n 2 (Sept. 23, 1986) (on file with authors)
(noting Robinson's objection to modifying his just deserts draft).
226. See Proposed Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 52 Fed. Reg. 3920, 3921
(Feb. 6, 1987); see also SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 37, at 11 (noting the series of public
hearings related to that draft, which were held in six cities during the fall of 1986).
227. Nagel, supra note 170, at 921. A prime example of the simplification was seen the loss
table for property crimes. As demonstrated in Appendix C at the end of this Article, the loss table in
the just deserts draft was extremely complex. The loss table in the September 1986 was noticeably
less complex-with only eleven incremental penalty levels compared to the 143 levels in the just
deserts draft. See Proposed Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 52 Fed. Reg. 3920,
3931-32 (Feb. 6, 1987).
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A majority of the Commission recognized that it had to "ensure that
its guidelines were not so detailed that they [would] reintroduce[]
disparity through inconsistent application."22 8 Just as with the just
deserts draft, the September 1986 draft's penalty levels were essentially
placeholders, insofar as the Commission had not yet created an empirical
basis for setting penalty levels.229
The reaction to the September 1986 draft was not as resoundingly
negative as the feedback about the just deserts draft, but it remained
critical overall. For instance, Judge Frankel, the originator of the federal
guidelines concept, criticized the draft's continued complexity:
I find this draft incredibly complex for an initial cut at a problem of
such enormous difficulty as initiating the guidelines on the road to
rational sentencing. I would have thought that you'd have started from
the opposite end of the telescope, that you'd have started with a very
simple document and a very simple set of guidelines that judges, brand
new to this and wholly unaccustomed to it, and their probation officers
as well, would not view with a kind of fright that I think this
preliminary set will engender.230
Although the DOJ was generally supportive of the September 1986
draft, it offered diametrically opposed criticism concerning the draft's
level of complexity. 231' Echoing Commissioner Robinson's positionreflected in the earlier just deserts draft-the DOJ contended that the
draft did not allow for consideration of enough "real offense" aspects of
a defendant's criminal conduct-in particular, that it did not account for
enough actual or intended harms.2 32 Finally, the DOJ objected to the
228 Congressional Oversight, 2 FED. SENT'G REP. 210, 216 (1990) (quoting from Chairman
Wilkins's testimony before the Subcommittee on Crime, Judiciary Committee, House of
Representatives, on March 9, 1990).

229.

Interview by Gen. Accounting Office with Stephen G. Breyer, supra note 1, at 16-17

("[ln the September draft, . . . the numbers were made up.").

230.

Public Hearing Before the U.S. Sentencing Comm'n 4-5 (N.Y. City, Oct. 21, 1986)

(statement of Honorable Marvin Frankel, former U.S. Dist. Judge) (on file with authors). Frankel

recommended that the federal guidelines be modeled after existing state sentencing guidelines. See
id at 6 ("[I] prefer to see, a set of grids that look like the Minnesota and Washington efforts, grids
that a judge can take out case by case, crime by crime, and apply with relatively simple arithmetic,
free of combinations of additions, subtractions, multipliers and fractions that I don't think are going
to work.").
231. Public Hearing, supra note 191, at 61-65 (statement of Stephen S. Trott, Assoc. Att'y
Gen., U.S. Dep.'t of Justice); Public HearingBefore the U.S. Sentencing Comm'n on Revised Drafti

ofSentencing Guidelines 61-65 (Wash., D.C., Dec. 2, 1986) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of
Stephen S. Trott, Assoc. Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice) (on file with authors).
232. Hearing,supra note 231, at 65-66 (statement of Stephen S. Trott, Assoc. Att'y Gen., U.S.
Dep't of Justice). Associate Attorney General Trott testified the following:
In the Department, we believe that it is absolutely critical that the criminal justice system

assure and be clearly perceived by the public to assure that every additional harm caused
by an offender in the course of an offense will result in some degree of increase in the
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draft's requirement that prosecutors had to prove aggravating factors by
a preponderance of the evidence and, instead, suggested that a lesser
"some evidence" standard was appropriate.2 33
3. January 1987 Revised Preliminary Draft
The next iteration of the guidelines manual was guided by the
Commission's decision in December 1986 to adopt "Principles
234
Governing the Redrafting of the Preliminary Guidelines." Despite the
criticisms of the September 1986 draft as still being too complex, and
despite the Commission's stated intention to "simplify the September
draft considerably," 235 the Commission did not greatly simplify the next
iteration of the guidelines, which was completed in late January 1987
and published in the Federal Register for public comment in early
February 1987.236
A primary difference between the September 1986 draft and the
January 1987 draft was that the latter first introduced a biaxial
sentencing grid (called a "Sentencing Table")-with one axis based on
offense level and the second axis based on criminal history-while the
former had simply added more "sanction units" based on an offender's
sentence. I guess one way to describe this is to say that "every harm must count."

For this reason, we agree with the Commission that some form of modified real
offense sentencing is the most appropriate predicate for sentencing guidelines.
However, in view of our beliefs that the sentence for any offense should reflect both
the harms resulting from the offense conduct and the conduct related to the offense as
well as the relative criminality of the offender, the system outlined in the draft, in our
view, will need substantial modification before it will result in sentences that accurately
reflect how much harm resulted from an offender's conduct and how serious a criminal
committed the offense.

. . .We recommend that the guidelines provide a sentence enhancement for all conduct,
either in furtherance of or otherwise related to the offense of conviction and all resulting
harms - accomplished, risked or intended.
. . . We recognize that the recommendations that we are making .. . the modified real

offense system employed by the guidelines somewhat closer to a pure real offense
system.

Id. at 63, 66-67.
233. Id. at 73-74.
234.

See Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises upon

Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1, 17-18, 18 n.90, 47-50 app. B (1988) (setting forth the
Commission's December 1986 Drafting Principles). Those drafting principles are further discussed
below; see also infra notes 453-621 and accompanying text.

235. Id. at 48 app. B.
236. See Proposed Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 52 Fed. Reg. 3920, 3921
(Feb. 6, 1987). The January 1987 draft occupied 66 pages in the Federal Register. See id at 392086. Conversely, the September 1986 draft was 51 pages. See Preliminary Draft of Sentencing
Guidelines for United States Courts, 51 Fed. Reg. 35,080-133 (Oct. 1, 1986). The bound hard copies
of the two drafts were 170 pages minus appendices (September 1986 draft) and 201 pages minus
appendices (January 1987 draft). Copies of the bound volumes are on file with the authors.
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criminal record.2 37 As discussed below, the biaxial grid and the criminal
history calculus first appearing in the January 1987 draft were
contributions of Commission staff member Peter Hoffman. 238 The
penalty levels in the January 1987 draft were, like the September 1986
draft, not based on any empirical study of federal sentencing.23 9
Commissioner Robinson responded with a lengthy written dissenting
opinion, in which he faulted the other Commissioners for not basing the
latest draft on a "coherent, articulated sentencing philosophy"-in
particular, for not addressing enough harms in accordance with the just
deserts philosophy-and also for allowing for too much sentencing
discretion, which, in turn, he asserted, would result in unwarranted
sentencing disparities.2 40
The Commission conducted two days of public hearings in order to
receive feedback about the January 1987 draft. 241 A significant objection
to the draft came from the DOJ, which contended that the draft vested
too much discretion in sentencing judges with respect to "specific
offenses characteristics."2 42 In several places in the January 1987 draft
guidelines, judges were given total discretion to add different numbers
of offense levels within a specified range for certain types of aggravating
factors. For instance, in the guideline for robbery, judges were given
discretion to increase the base offense level "by 3 to 6 levels depending
on the use made of [a] weapon" during the robbery-without providing
for specific criteria for three to six level enhancements.24 3 The
Department contended that the discretionary nature concerning the
number of levels of enhancement in these provisions in effect allowed
for broad guideline ranges greatly in excess of the limited sentencing
ranges permitted by the SRA's "25-percent rule." 2" Second Circuit
Judge Newman was the leading voice against the DOJ's position.245
237. Compare Proposed Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 52 Fed. Reg. 3920,
3926-27 (Feb. 6, 1987), with Preliminary Draft of Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts,
51 Fed. Reg. 35,080, 35,120-21 (Oct. 1, 1986) (displaying the sanction unit model).
238. See infra notes 899-903 and accompanying text.
239. See Interview by Gen. Accounting Office with Stephen G. Breyer, supra note 1, at 29
("The numbers [were] not very good in the January [1987] Draft because the numbers [did] not yet
reflect the [past-practice] data.").
240. Dissenting View of Commissioner Paul H. Robinson, 52 Fed. Reg. 3986-88 app. A (Feb.
6, 1987).
241.

SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 37, at 11.

242. Letter from Stephen S. Trott to William W. Wilkins, Chair, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, at 2
(Apr. 7, 1987) (on file with authors).
243. See Proposed Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 52 Fed. Reg. 3920, 3933.
244. See Letter from Stephen S. Trott to William W. Wilkins, supra note 242, at 2. In his
testimony before the Commission, Trott proposed the following solution:
The solution, . . . we believe, l[ies] in ranges of graduated increases or decreases,
appropriately keyed to the particular facts of the case. It is the keying the guideline
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4. "Draft X"

Concern existed among Commissioners Breyer, Block, and Nagel
that the January 1987 draft needed significant revision-particularly
concerning penalty levels-to be a viable guidelines system in time for
the April 13, 1987 statutory deadline. In the late winter, those three
Commissioners-working together primarily with staff members
Hoffman and Lombardero-began drafting what they referred to as
246
Draft X (apparently intended to be somewhat tongue-in-cheek).
According to Commissioner Breyer, "Draft X . . really became the
uniform draft into which other things were melded-not a new draft but
a creation out of former parts, which would resolve issues in a
systematic and consistent way."24 7 As discussed further below, with the
exception of drug offenses, certain white-collar, and violent offenses, the
penalty levels in Draft X were largely based on "past practice" data and,
24 8
to a lesser degree, penalty levels in the parole guidelines.
5. The Initial Guidelines Manual
As the clock wound down to April 13, 1987, a majority of the
Commission agreed that Draft X was the best model to fulfill the many
directives in the SRA. The Commission also voted to sustain the
objection of the DOJ to the January 1987 draft concerning the
2 49
discretionary enhancements in the specific offense characteristics. As
ranges to the facts of the case that, in our view, would make them workable. A judge
would be directed to pick the description that most closely approximated the case at
hand, interpolating between the two descriptions, if necessary, and then applying the
point value that the identified description would carry.

Public Hearing,supra note 191, at 7-8 (statement of Stephen S. Trott, Assoc. Att'y Gen., U.S.
Dep't of Justice).
245. Public Hearing, supra note 191, at 312-14) (statement of Jon 0. Newman, U.S. Court of
Appeals, 2d Circuit) (arguing against the Department's view on the 25% rule and that "you ought
not to risk injustice just because there's a possibility of a legal challenge"). Judge Newman's
position was later adopted by the Criminal Law Committee of the Judicial Conference. See Letter
from Honorable Maryanne Trump Barry, Chair, Comm. on Criminal Law of the Judicial
Conference, to Honorable Richard P. Conaboy, Chairman, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n (July 27, 1995)
(on file with authors) (attaching Memorandum from Catherine M. Goodwin, Assistant Gen.

Counsel, to Chair and Members of the Judicial Conference Committee on Criminal Law (July 27,
1995)); AO Gen. Counsel's Office, Memorandum Opinion of the General Counsel of the
Administrative Office of United States Courts: Interpretation of 28 US.C. § 994(b)(2), the "25%
Rule," and Analysis of its Effects on the FederalSentencing Guidelines Interpretationand Analysis
ofSection 994(b)(2), 8 FED. SENT'G REP. 110, 115-117 (1995).

246. Interview by Gen. Accounting Office with Stephen G. Breyer, supra note 1, at 30-31, 35.
A document entitled, "Unofficial Draft 'X,"' dated March 23, 1987, appears in the Commission's
records. Draft 'X', (Mar. 23, 1987) (unpublished draft) (on file with authors).
247. Id. at 35.
248. See id at 37-39; see also infra Part IV.F. 1.
249. See Interview by Gen. Accounting Office with Stephen G. Breyer, supra note 1, at 51; see
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a result, differing levels of enhancement became tied to specific factfindings made by sentencing judges-such as different levels of
enhancement for the manner in which a defendant used a dangerous
weapon during a robbery.250
The meeting minutes and internal Commission records from the
spring of 1987 show that the Commissioners and staff were working
feverishly and around the clock to complete the manual by the statutory
deadline of April 13, 1987.251 As April 10 turned to April 11, the
Commission voted six to one to promulgate a polished version of Draft
X.25 2 Commissioner Robinson voted against promulgation and later
published a lengthy written dissent,253 to which the other six
Commissioners responded (among other things, referring to
Commissioner Robinson's preferred approach as "a kind of academic
fantasy").254 Commissioner Robinson's primary complaint was that the
initial guidelines were "neither comprehensive nor binding"-insofar as
they did not provide enough penalty levels for differing degrees of harm
and also provided for too many departure provisions. 255 Although he was
a non-voting ex officio member of the Commission, Commissioner
Gainer objected to the promulgation of the initial Guidelines Manual for
the reasons set forth by Commissioner Robinson.256 Despite Gainer's
objection as the ex officio Commissioner representing the Attorney
General, the DOJ publicly supported the initial Guidelines Manual.257

also SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 37, at 14-15.

250.

Compare Proposed Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 52 Fed. Reg. 3920,

3933 (Feb. 6, 1987), with SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3,

§ 2B3.1.

251. See, e.g., Meeting Minutes, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n 4 (Mar. 10, 1987) (on file with
authors); Meeting Minutes, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n 2 (Jan. 30, 1987) (on file with authors)
[hereinafter Meeting Minutes, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n (Jan. 30, 1987)]; Meeting Minutes, U.S.
Sentencing Comm'n 2-4 (Jan. 28, 1987) (on file with authors) [hereinafter Meeting Minutes, U.S.
Sentencing Comm'n (Jan. 28, 1987)]; Meeting Minutes, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n 3 (Jan. 14, 1987)
[hereinafter Meeting Minutes, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n (Jan. 14, 1987)] (on file with authors);
Meeting Minutes, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n 3-8 (Jan. 13, 1987) (on file with authors) [hereinafter
Meeting Minutes, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n (Jan. 13, 1987)].
252. Interview with William W. Wilkins, Jr., Judge, supra note 157, at 22 (noting that the final
vote occurred at midnight).

253. Dissenting View of Commissioner Paul H. Robinson on the Promulgation of Sentencing
Guidelines by the United States Sentencing Commission, 52 Fed. Reg. 18,121 (May 13, 1987).
254. Preliminary Observations of the Commission on Commissioner Robinson's Dissent, 52
Fed. Reg. 18,133, 18,133-34 (May 13, 1987).
255. 52 Fed. Reg. 18,125 ("The guidelines ignore many factors important to sentencing. . . and
provide extensive invitations-indeed, directions-to judges to depart from the guidelines.").

256.

Meeting Minutes, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n 9-10 (Apr. 10, 1987) (on file with authors).

257. See States Likely to Look Anew at PretrialDetention, NAT'L L.J., June 8, 1987, at 5
(discussing Attorney General Edwin Meese's speech to the American Law Institute, in which he

echoed Gainer's criticisms yet said the DOJ would not oppose the guidelines going into effect
because the Commission had the opportunity to correct the perceived deficiencies in them); see also
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The Commission requested that Congress "enact legislation staying
the implementation . . for an additional nine-month period until August
1, 1988."258 The Commission believed that such a nine-month delay
would allow the Commission to train judges, probation officers, and
practitioners and also to conduct field testing of the guidelines with a
variety of groups; "the limited time for preparing the guidelines did not
permit the Commission to field test them to the degree the Commission
would have desired." 25 9 Such field-testing would permit the Commission
to "prepare any necessary technical and substantive amendments" that
could go into effect on August 1, 1988.260
After lengthy congressional hearings about the initial guidelines
during the summer and fall of 1987,261 Congress opted not to reject the
Guidelines Manual, but also did not enact legislation delaying the
guidelines' implementation. The guidelines thus went into effect under
the operation of law on November 1, 1987.262
The initial Guidelines Manual contained seven chapters:
* Chapter one, "Introduction and General Principles,"
provided an overview of the "major issues" addressed in the
manual and also addressed several important rules for
26 3
guideline sentencing, including "relevant conduct."
* Chapter two, "Offense Conduct," included approximately
168 separate guidelines that covered all major federal
offense types and many less common ones, with statutory
references to the guidelines in Appendix A, which included
around 800 statutory provisions.2" A typical guideline had
both a "base offense level" (the least aggravated form of the
offense) and one or more "specific offense characteristics"
(aggravating and mitigating factors that commonly occurred
2 65
in the commission of that particular offense type).
Sentencing Commission Guidelines: Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 131

(1987) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of William F. Weld, Assistant Att'y Gen.) (expressing
"strong support" for the initial guidelines).
258. Letter from William K. Wilkins, Chairman, to President of Senate and Speaker of the
House, at 2 (Aug. 13, 1987).
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. See, e.g., Hearing, supra note 257 (containing 543 pages of written and oral testimony);
Sentencing Guidelines Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,

100th Cong. (1987) (containing 983 pages of written and oral testimony).
262. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(p) (1988).
263.

See SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3,

§§

1B1.3-.5.

264. See id, app. A, §§ 2Al.1-2X5.1. Chapter two also included guidelines concerning
defendants convicted of inchoate offenses-such as aiding and abetting, attempted offenses,
solicitation, and conspiracy-as well as "[o]ther" offenses. Id §§ 2X1.1-2X5.1.
265. See, e.g., id. § 2B3.1 (including a base offense level of 18 and several specific offense
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* Chapter three, "Adjustments," included guidelines
addressing a variety of aggravating and mitigating factors
associated with federal offenses generally-including
obstruction of justice, acceptance of responsibility, and the
defendant's role in the commission of the offense relative
to codefendants.266
* Chapter four, "Criminal History and Criminal
Livelihood," contained the rules for calculating a
defendant's criminal history points to be used in placing the
defendant in the applicable criminal history category on the
Sentencing Table.26 7 Chapter four also contained provisions
for "career offenders."268
* Chapter five, "Determining the Sentence," contained the
Sentencing Table (as a biaxial grid) as well as the rules for
determining various aspects about a defendant's sentence,
including numerous provisions governing departures from
the applicable guideline ranges.2 69
* Chapter six, "Sentencing
Procedure and Plea
Agreements," contained guidelines about sentencing
procedure and non-binding "policy statements" concerning
courts' acceptance or rejection of plea agreements.270
* Chapter seven, "Violations of Probation and Supervised
Release," contained brief policy statements concerning
offender's violations of the conditions of their supervision
and the responses that courts should take.271
Consistent with Congress's intent, the original Commission
envisioned the sentencing guidelines as an evolving set of rules
lcsi in the
h
concerning sentencing procedures and practices. 272 Several places
original manual stated the Commission's intention to amend the
guidelines in response to data analysis of cases in the future in which the
courts would apply the guidelines.2 73

characteristics for robbery, such as aggravating factors for the amount of money stolen, possession
or use of a dangerous weapon, and causing bodily injury).

266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.

See id. §§ 3A1.1-3E1.L.
See id. §§4A1.1-.3.
See id. 4B1.1.
See id. §§ 5B1.1-5C2.1, 5K1.1-5K2.14.
See id., §§ 6A1.1-6B 1.4.
See id. §§ 7Al.1-.4.
See id. ch.1, pt.A.5; see also 28 U.S.C.

§ 994(o)

(1988) ("The Commission periodically

shall review and revise, in consideration of comments and data coming to its attention, the

guidelines promulgated pursuant to the provisions of this section.").
273.

See, e.g., SENTENCINGi GUIDELINES MANUAL, supranote 3, ch. 1, pt. A.2; ch. 4, pt. A.
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F. Between Rocks andHard Places
A recent Chair of the Commission observed that the Commission
has faced "enormous challenges in its mission to serve as the neutral
expert at the intersection of the three branches regarding federal
sentencing policy."2 74 This observation is particularly true for the
original Commission. It was pulled in three different directions by
powerful forces in each of the three branches of the federal government
and attempted to accommodate all three in developing the initial set of
sentencing guidelines.
1. Legislative Branch
First and foremost, the original Commission had received very
clear and comprehensive directions from Congress, both in the SRA and
the legislative history, regarding the path that the Commission had to
follow. The SRA was enacted by a near unanimous vote in the Senate
and a lopsided vote in the House.2 75 Three of the original Commissioners
had worked as staffers for powerful Senators who were key sponsors of
the legislation, and the Senate Judiciary Committee had made it clear
that it intended to stay in close contact with the Commissioners as they
created the sentencing guidelines.276
Regarding the SRA, Commissioner MacKinnon noted that he had
"followed legislation for over 60 years" as a Congressman, a United
States Attorney, and a federal judge and that the SRA "was the most
complete set of legislative directives that I have ever seen in a
statute."2 7 7 Similarly, Chairman Wilkins stated that "we were told to
develop this new system of justice, yet the statute told us how to do

274.

Sessions, supra note 191, at 308.

275. See supra note 110 and accompanying text (noting that the Senate voted 91 to I and 85 to
3, while the House voted 243 to 166).
276. Hearing, supra note 139, at 330 (statement of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy). Indeed, Senator
Kennedy went so far as to state the following at the 1985 confirmation hearing for the original
Commissioners:
[W]e are going to try to maintain close communication with the Commissioners as the
Sentencing Commission works its way through its responsibilities under the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984. Ultimately we are aware that down the road, the Congress will
review and shape the Commission's recommendations and I think that it would be very,
very helpful for all of us, at least on the Judiciary Committee, to keep in as close
communication as we can during the deliberations.
Id.; see also Letter from Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Minority Member, U.S. Senate, to William W.
Wilkins, Jr., Judge, U.S. Dist. of S.C. 2 (Oct. 3, 1985) ("I would. . . like to ensure that an ongoing
working relationship is established with the Commission throughout its tenure and I will ask Scott
Green of the minority staff to work as a liaison with the Commission so that I can be kept abreast of
the Commission's work.").

277.

Interview with George MacKinnon, supra note 137.
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it." 2 7 8 In a co-authored article, Commissioner Breyer and Kenneth
Feinberg, who both helped draft the SRA when they were staffers for
Senator Kennedy, also wrote that the original Commission's many
policy decisions "reflect the mandate of the statute creating the
Commission and authorizing the Commission to promulgate the
Guidelines." 2 79 "[T]here were occasions when difficult decisions were
made by the Commission," they added, and "[o]ften these decisions
reflect a statutory mandate requiring the Commission to act in a
particular way."280 Even one of the federal sentencing guidelines' most
ardent critics, Professor Kate Stith,281 has stated that "by and large, the
Commission ... implemented the Sentencing Reform Act in a manner
consistent with legislative intent."282
The statutory directives in the SRA were fleshed out by an
exhaustive legislative history, one that was nearly a decade in the
making. 283 Moreover, key members of the original Commission and its
staff-including Commissioner Breyer and General Counsel John
Steer-had worked as staffers for the leading Senators who shepherded
the legislation through Congress and, thus, were intimately familiar with
Congress's intent. 284 The Commission has recognized that the SRA's
"legislative history is extensive-especially a detailed Senate Report that
accompanied the legislation." 285 The Commission pointed out that "[t]he
sentencing reform portion of this Report is over 150 pages long and
includes 430 footnotes." 286 This legislative history is not only copious,
278. Interview with William W. Wilkins, Jr., Judge, supra note 157, at 2.
279. Breyer & Feinberg, supranote 191, at 6.
280. Id.
281. See, e.g., KATE STITH & JOSt A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES
IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 82-83 (1998).

282. Stith & Koh, supra note 111, at 284. Also notable is that both Marvin Frankel, the "father
of sentencing reform," and Kenneth Feinberg, the main drafter of the SRA, agreed that the initial
"Sentencing Commission closely adhered to its statutory mandate in developing and issuing
sentencing guidelines." Brief for Joseph E. DiGenova et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Affirmance at 21, United States v. Mistretta, 486 U.S. 1054 (1988) (No. 87-1904, 87-7028), 1988
WL 1026043, at *12 (Frankel and Feinberg joined DiGenova and others as amicus curiae); see
supranotes 103, 190 and accompanying text.

283.

See Stith & Koh, supra note 111, at 230-81 (tracing the legislative history of the SRA).

284.

See Stephen Breyer, Federal Sentencing GuidelinesRevisited, 11 FED. SENT'G REP. 180,

180 (1999) ("I worked for the Senate Judiciary Committee [as Chief Counsel under Senator
Kennedy] when Congress considered sentencing reform."); Press Release, U.S. Sentencing
Comm'n, Judge Murphy Named to Chair United States Sentencing Commission (Nov. 12, 1999),
(noting that Steer served as
http://www.ussc.gov/about/news/press-releases/november-12-1999
legislative director for Senator Thurmond and counsel for the Senate Judiciary Committee).
285. Simplification Draft Paper: Departures and Offender Characteristics, U.S. SENT'G

ColMissioN, http://www.ussc.gov/research/research-and-publications/simplification-draft-paper-2
(last visited Aug. 1, 2017).
286. Id.
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but was deemed authoritative when the original Commission was
seeking to discern congressional intent from it. The interpretive value of
legislative history, especially a report from the committee responsible
for drafting the bill that ultimately was adopted, was generally accepted
as compelling evidence of congressional intent in the 1980s, in particular
for a federal agency.28 7 Although some had argued that the Commission
had the authority to ignore Congress, the Commission unanimously
rejected this suggestion.28 8 Commissioner MacKinnon, for example,
observed "that the 'policy' of the Commission is in the statute [i.e., the
SRA]." 28 9 He also noted that "[m]uch of the legislative intent is
hidden in the congressional report [i.e., the 1983 Senate Judiciary
Committee Report]."290
In addition to Congress itself, an independent agency located within
the legislative branch, the General Accounting Office ("GAO"), also
sought to influence the Commission's deliberations.29 1 The SRA
required the GAO to conduct a study of the guidelines within 150 days
of the publication of the Guidelines Manual,2 92 and to conduct another
study at the four-year mark.293 During a meeting with the original
Commissioners in April 1986, GAO officials made suggestions for
potential Commission action regarding certain key policy issues,
including regulating plea bargaining practices and "real offense"
sentencing.294 In other words, officials who would be formally
assessing the Commission were offering substantive policy advice to
the Commissioners.295
2. Executive Branch
A second strong influence on the Commission came from the
Executive Branch, especially the DOJ. The Department-not only
through its ex officio Commissioner, but also through high-level
officials, including the Attorney General himself9'6 -had a strong
287.

See supra notes 127-31 and accompanying text.

288. Interview with Ilene H. Nagel, supra note 46, at 42-43 (noting that this suggestion was
raised multiple times and on each occasion was rejected unanimously as "simply ... not an option"
available to the Commission).
289. Meeting Minutes, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n 4 (Mar. 10, 1986) (on file with authors).
290. Id.
291. Meeting Minutes, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n 12 (Apr. 29, 1986) (on file with authors).
292. Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 235(a)(1)(B)(ii)(II), 98 Stat. 1837, 2031-32 (1984).
293. Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 236 (a)(1), 98 Stat. 1837, 2033 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 994).
294. See Meeting Minutes, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, supra note 291, at 14-19.
295. The substantive positions of GAO officials arguably were inconsistent with GAO
standards. See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GOVERNMENT AUDITING STANDARDS 36-37,

197 app. 1(2011) (noting that an auditor's preconceived ideas threaten his independence).
296. Interview with Ilene H. Nagel, supra note 46, at 65 ("The Department of Justice played a
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motive to seek to influence the Commission,2 97 as the guidelines
would inform general prosecutorial policies and would be used by
line prosecutors in federal cases with respect to charging and plea
bargaining decisions.
The Department's engagement triggered hard choices for the
Commission, a fact perhaps best exemplified by the subject of the death
penalty. After Congress failed to enact a post-Furman298 federal capital
sentencing statute as part of the larger crime and sentencing legislation
that included the SRA, the Department saw the Commission as a
fallback option for resurrecting the federal death penalty. In multiple
memoranda, the Department contended that the Commission not only
possessed the legal authority to promulgate guidelines on the death
penalty,2 99 but also had the statutory duty to issue such policy.3" The
Commission initially agreed, by a four to two vote (on the motion of
Commissioner Block, with Commissioners Breyer and Corrothers voting
against), to allow its staff to proceed with drafting guidelines on the
death penalty. 3 01 Thereafter, the Commissioners agreed unanimously, on
Commissioner Block's motion, to hold a public hearing on the topic. 3 02
But on March 10, 1987, the Commission voted four to three (on the
motion of Commissioner MacKinnon, with Chairman Wilkins and
Commissioners Breyer and Corrothers voting affirmatively and
Commissioners Block, Nagel, and Robinson voting against) not to
address capital punishment in the initial Guidelines Manual.303
Commissioner Breyer, the most vocal proponent for the Commission not
to take a position on capital punishment, stated that the Commission
major role in that they made proposals [as the drafts of the guidelines were emerging] all the time.
Every unit in the Department actively was making proposals. We had enormous amounts of contact
with the Deputy Attorney General, the Attorney General, the head of the Criminal Division, and the

Associate Attorney General.").
297. See id. at 65-66 (explaining that the Commission, on a weekly basis, would hear from
some unit within the DOJ concerning different guideline issues).

298. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); see also United States v. Kaiser, 545 F.2d 467,
470-71 (5th Cir. 1977) (noting that Furman rendered the federal death penalty scheme then in
existence facially unconstitutional).
299. See Interview by Michael Courlander & Kent Larsen with Stephen Breyer, supra note

141, at 47-50. The Department envisioned the Commission's promulgating aggravating and
mitigating factors that would satisfy the Supreme Court's post-Furman Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence. Id.

300. See, e.g., Letter from Charles J. Cooper, Assistant Att'y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel,
U.S. Dep't of Justice, to William W. Wilkins, Jr., Chairman, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n 3 (Dec. 15,
1986) (on file with authors); Letter from William F. Weld, Assistant Att'y Gen., Crim. Div., U.S.
Dep't of Justice, to William W. Wilkins, Jr., Chairman, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n 3 (Dec. 15, 1986)
(on file with authors).
301. Meeting Minutes, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n 6 (Dec. 16, 1986) (on file with authors).
302. Meeting Minutes, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n 4 (Jan. 20, 1987) (on file with authors).
303. Meeting Minutes, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n 4 (Mar. 10, 1987) (on file with authors).
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could not make a bigger mistake than to promulgate death penalty
guidelines because, even if the Department's legal view on Commission
authority was correct, from a political standpoint the Commission's
addressing such a controversial topic would likely result in Congress's
rejection of the entire guidelines.30 4 Then-Chairman of the Senate
Judiciary Committee, Senator Biden, concurred with Commissioner
Breyer's assessment.30 5
The Department weighed in on other major issues as well,
sometimes with success and sometimes without success.306 For instance,
the Department objected to the January 1987 draft guidelines, which
afforded district judges discretion in deciding how many levels of
enhancement to apply for many specific offense characteristics, 30 7 on the
ground that it violated the 25% rule.308 In particular, Associate Attorney
General Stephen S. Trott noted that, while the Department supported the
concept of differing levels of enhancement, the 25% rule required that
specific offense characteristics direct a sentencing judge to a particular
level for particular conduct-not a range of levels from which to choose
one level in the court's discretion.30 9 The initial Guidelines Manual
acceded to the Department's view, acknowledging that "a range of
increases in offense levels [with a sentencing judge having discretion to
choose any level within the range] may violate the statute's
25 percent rule."3 10
3. Judicial Branch
The Commission faced opposition from multiple components of the
judicial branch. As noted above, the Judicial Conference of the United
304. Addendum to Meeting Minutes, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n (Dec. 16, 1986), at 7-8 (on file
with authors).
305. Howard Kurtz, Sentencing PanelBars Death Penalty; Hill Rejection of ProposalFeared;
Justice Dept. Is Rebuffed, WASH. POST, Mar. 11, 1987, at A17 ("Senate Judiciary Committee
Chairman Joseph R. Biden Jr. (D-Del.) warned last week that the commission would be 'dead' if it
voted to revive the death penalty.").
306. See Interview with Ilene H. Nagel, supra note 46, at 65-66. Commissioner Nagel thought
it was "a myth is that [the Department's regular proposals and contact with the Commission]
became policy." Id. Even a strong critic of the Commission acknowledged that the Commission-in
particular, Chairman Wilkins-showed independence from the Department. See Albert W.
Alschuler, The Selling of the Sentencing Guidelines: Some Correspondence with the US.
Sentencing Commission, in THE U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES: IMPLICATIONS FOR CRIMINAL

JUSTICE, supra note 85, at 49, 91-92 n.8 (observing that Chairman Wilkins "exhibited independence
from the Department of Justice").
307. See, e.g., Proposed Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 52 Fed. Reg. 3920,
3929, 3931 (Feb. 6, 1987) (noting the levels ranging from one to four, one to five, and one to six).
308. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(2) (1988).
309. See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
310.

SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3, ch. 1, pt. A.
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States had opposed having an independent judicial agency promulgate
sentencing guidelines and, instead, wished to have Congress delegate
that authority to the Conference."' Countless individual federal judges
also expressed their displeasure with the Commission and its work
creating guidelines,3 12 sometimes directly to the Commission. They
complained about the proposed guidelines' complexity, perceived
severity, and usurping judicial discretion. 3 13
Federal public defenders, also within the judicial branch, shared
judges' general hostility to the guidelines. As a representative example, a
federal public defender wrote to Chairman Wilkins to note that he found
the draft guidelines "very disturbing," because the guidelines' ranges
were "extremely harsh," they "[divested] the court of its discretion and
its traditional role in the sentencing process," and they would make the
sentencing process "far more complicated." 3 14 Moreover, he asserted, the
Commission's approach to acceptance of responsibility "formulate[s] an
incentive for pleading guilty" and a "disincentive or even punishment for
going to trial," which he deemed "simply repugnant to the way we like
to think our judicial system operates." 3 15
Resistance to the Commission also came from the AO and the
Federal Judicial Center ("FJC"), which were the Conmmission's oldersister agencies in the federal judiciary.3 16 According to Commissioner
Nagel, the AO and the FJC perceived the Commission as a "threat from
the beginning," and as "intruders and interlopers."3 17 As an example, the
311.

See supranote 164 and accompanying text.

312.

See, e.g., Interview with Ilene H. Nagel, supra note 46, at 8-11, 108-09, 119 (discussing

the very strong and widespread resistance to the original Commission's creation of sentencing
guidelines by federal judges); see also Sentencing Guidelines: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on

CriminalJustice ofthe H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 482 (1987) (noting the testimony of
Judge Newman) ("As far as the guidelines themselves, . . . you have heard in the past and you will
hear in the future considerable criticism of the guidelines from judges. I don't think you ought to be

the least bit surprised that judges are critical of the guidelines.

. .

.And I think the reason is quite

clear. Sentencing judges have been sentencing with unfettered discretion. The guidelines structure

their discretion. There is no exerciser of discretion I know who prefers to have his or her discretion
in any way limited.").

313. See, e.g., Letter from Clarence A. Brimmer, Chief Judge, U.S. Dist. Court, Dist. of Wyo.,
to William W. Wilkins, Jr., U.S. Circuit Judge, 4th Cir. (Nov. 7, 1986) (attaching Remarks at the
Hearing of the U.S. Sentencing Commission 1-8 (Nov. 5, 1986) (on file with authors)); Letter from
William C. Lee, Judge, U.S. Dist., N. Dist. of Ind., to Comm'rs, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n 1-3 (Mar.
13, 1987) (on file with authors).
314. Letter from Michael G. Katz, Fed. Pub. Def., Office of the Fed. Pub. Def., Dist. of Colo.,
to William W. Wilkins, Jr., Chairman, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n 1-3 (Oct. 30, 1986) (on file with
authors).

315.
316.
317.

Id. at 3.
See Interview with Ilene H. Nagel, supra note 46, at 98.
Id. at 98; see Interview with William W. Wilkins, Jr., Judge, supra note 157, at 31-32

(noting that the FJC "saw us [as] . . . intruding into their area of training" and there "was a lot of
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SRA empowered the Commission to hold "seminars and workshops
providing continuing studies for persons engaged in the sentencing
field" and "periodic training programs of instruction in sentencing
techniques for judicial and probation personnel and other persons
connected with the sentencing process."3 18 Training in the federal
courts, however, had been a traditional function of the FJC.319 In an
effort to broker shared understanding on their respective roles, the
Commission held a meeting with the FJC and five judges, on
March 10, 1986, to discuss how the two agencies could coordinate in
guidelines education.320
Despite the widespread resistance within the judiciary to the
Commission in its early years, there was one segment of the judicial
branch that proved to be a critical ally of the Commission-United
States Probation Officers. The launch of the guidelines experiment
hinged on probation officers, because they were responsible for PSRs,
the epicenter of the sentencing process. Indeed, these PSRs contained
virtually all relevant sentencing information, including guidelines
calculations.3 21 Were it not for the probation officers' knowledge of the
guidelines and their support for this system, the guidelines may have
faltered at the outset. Rusty Burress, the original Commission's primary
trainer and liaison to the federal probation officer community-himself
a former federal probation officer-is credited with educating
the probation officers about the guidelines and securing their
critical buy-in. 32 2
friction with the FJC and lack of cooperation").
318. 28 U.S.C. § 995(a)(17)-(18) (1988).
319. Id. § 620(a), (b)(3) (establishing the FJC, in part, "to stimulate, create, develop, and
conduct programs of continuing education and training for personnel of the judicial branch of the
Government and other persons whose participation in such programs would improve the operation

of the judicial branch").
320. Meeting Minutes, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, supra note 289, at 1-8. Ultimately, because
of the two agencies' inability to coordinate education of judges concerning sentencing, in 1991, a
report by the Committee on Appropriations provided the following admonition:
[T]he Committee expects the Federal Judicial Center, the Sentencing Commission, and
the Administrative Office to coordinate more closely efforts to accomplish training
objectives. For example, the Commission, with its expertise in the subject matter should
be utilized for assigning faculty responsibility for planning and instruction for Centersponsored conferences for Court personnel, while the Center can focus its efforts on
those areas for which it has acknowledged expertise, i.e. conference logistics and
training program production.
H.R. REP. No. 102-106, at *62 (1991).
321. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32. Notably, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32 was amended in
1987, in conjunction with the promulgation of the original Guidelines Manual, to require federal
probation officers to include a detailed calculation of the defendant's sentencing guideline range. Id.
32(d)(1)(C).
322. See Interview with Ilene H. Nagel, supra note 46, at 125-26 (praising the training staff,
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4. On an Island
As various entities in the three branches of the federal government
exerted pressure on the Commission, and as these entities possessed
varied and often conflicting interests, the Commission faced a
formidable challenge. Commissioner Nagel indicated that Congress was
aware that the Commission would be making unpopular decisions, most
notably the curbing of judicial discretion and raising penalties for at least
some offenders, but that Congress deliberately established the
Commission to "take all the heat."3 23 As the Commission was
independent and yet pushed and pulled in different directions by
multiple governmental actors, she aptly likened the Commission's
position to being an "island."3 24
It may have been unavoidable for the Commission to be in this
tenuous position. The Commission was an entirely new agency that had
to establish itself with other agencies and actors that had existed and that
had been working together for decades. That is, the Commission lacked
these prior institutional relationships, and the creation of a new agency
would upset the prevailing order of things.325
The Commission was not only new, but also unknown or, worse,
misunderstood. Even those in high levels of the federal government
generally possessed little understanding of the Commission in the early
years.326 The Commission appeared to be sensitive to the need to educate
others about its purpose and work. Chairman Wilkins identified such
education as a priority.3 27 But there are doubts as to whether the
Commission succeeded in this mission. Commissioner Nagel, for
example, opined that, as the Commission was creating the initial
guidelines, the Commission erred in not building better relationships
with Congress, the judiciary, and the public.3 28

and singling out Burress as "sensational"); see also Interview with William W. Wilkins, Jr., Judge,

supra note 157, at 30-31 (stating that "[he] was firmly convinced that education [about how the
guidelines worked] was the key to success" and praising Burress for his role in educating probation
officers).
323. Interview with Ilene H. Nagel, supra note 46, at 7-9.
324. Id. at 8-10.
325. See id at 98 (noting that the Commission had "no history or working relations on which
you could build").
326. See id. at 96.
327. William W. Wilkins, Jr., Chairman, Sentencing Policy, Guidelines, and Procedures
(undated) (on file with authors).
328. Interview with Ilene H. Nagel, supra note 46, at 103-04, 108-11.
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Transparencyand PublicInput

The Commission was able to meet the daunting statutory mandate
of developing guidelines within an eighteen-month window due to a
process characterized by prolific production, regular discussions, and
broad-based engagement. To begin with, the Commission scheduled
standing meetings to occur every other week.3 2 9 Between their first
meeting on October 29, 1985, and the promulgation of the technical,
clarifying, and conforming amendments to the first Guidelines Manual
on May 1, 1987, the Commission held at least forty business
meetings,330 some of which lasted two or three days 33' and occasionally
would go well into the evening hours.332
At their very first meeting, the Commissioners resolved that,
whatever their substantive decisions, their deliberative process would be
open.333 Accordingly, anyone with an interest in the Commission's work
could attend and take part in its business meetings.334 At the April 1,
1986, meeting, the Commission decided to adopt, in response to a rumor
that some Commission meetings were "secret," a formal policy that
would encourage public attendance and participation. 3 In particular, the
Commission unanimously agreed to post public notices of its meetings,
to do so by noon every Friday before the following week's meeting, and
to publish this posting procedure in the Federal Register.33 6
The Commission also sought out the expertise of myriad others in
the sentencing community. Commissioner Breyer recalled that, at their
very first meeting, the Commission determined to "solicit points of
view" that were "far and wide" on possible approaches and to receive
reactions to Commission proposals.337 This outreach took several forms.

329. Meeting Minutes, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n (Apr. 1, 1986), supra note 177, at 6.
330. The authors' review of the Commission's records has identified no less than forty
different meeting minutes from October 1985 through April 1987. Some minutes refer to meetings
on dates for which no minutes can be located in the Commission's records, so the actual number of

Commission meetings in the first eighteen months was likely more than forty.
331. See, e.g., Meeting Minutes, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n (Jan. 30, 1987), supra note 251, at
1-4; Meeting Minutes, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n II (Jan. 29, 1987) (on file with authors); Meeting
Minutes, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n (Jan. 28, 1987), supra note 251, at 1-4.
332.

See Interview by Michael Courlander & Kent Larsen with Stephen Breyer, supra note

141, at 36 (noting that "we'd go through meetings late at night"); Interview with William W.
Wilkins, Jr., Judge, supra note 157, at 16 (noting that the Commissioners and staff
"worked ...

weekends, long hours, late at night, [and] back the next morning").

333. Interview by Gen. Accounting Office with Stephen G. Breyer, supra note 1, at 1-2.
334. See id. at 2-3 (noting that, at the very first Commission meeting, the original
Commissioners made a decision to have meetings open to the public).

335. Meeting Minutes, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n (Apr. 1, 1986), supranote 177, at 6-7.
336. Id.
337. Interview by Gen. Accounting Office with Stephen G. Breyer, supra note 1, at 2.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol45/iss4/11

52

Newton and Sidhu: The History of the Original United States Sentencing Commission,

2017]1

THE ORIGINAL UNITED STA TES SENTENCING COMMISSION

1219

For example, the Commission established, and regularly met with,
several advisory and working groups. There were three groups of federal
judges, as well as groups that included federal probation officers, federal
prosecutors, state prosecutors, federal public defenders, and leading
academics, among others.338 The Commission also received briefings
from officials with various government agencies, including the DOJ, the
BOP, and the GAO.33 9 In between these formal meetings, the
Commissioners informally visited and shared guideline drafts with many
others, including judges, academics, and executive officials.3 40 in
addition, the Commission distributed a questionnaire on offense
seriousness to judges, practitioners, and even members of the press.3 4 1
Moreover, the Commission held thirteen public hearings during the
relevant eighteen-month span, at which it received oral testimony from
213 witnesses and written testimony from more than 1020 individuals
and groups.342 Six of the thirteen hearings focused on particular
343

offender characteristics, 3

"

substantive areas: offense characteristics,

corporate sanctions,3 45 sentencing options,34 6 plea agreements, 347 and the
death penalty. 348 The Commission held some hearings following the
release of draft guidelines, in order to receive feedback on the drafts. In
particular, six hearings were held following the publication of the
September 1986 draft, and two days of public hearings following the
publication of the January 1987 draft.34 9 To facilitate that feedback, the
Commission distributed over 5500 copies of the September 1986 draft
guidelines to all Article III judges, and to many practitioners,
researchers, and other interested persons, and engaged in a similar
process for the revised draft.35 o
338.

See Meeting Minutes, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n 2 (May 13, 1986) (on file with authors);

see also SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 37, at 9. The Research Advisory Committee included

Gary Becker, William Landes, Norval Morris, Don Gottfredson, and Michael Tonry. Meeting
Minutes, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, supranote 291, at 19-20.
339. SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 37, at 9.

3 4 0. Id.
341. Memorandum from Paul K. Martin, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, to Comm'rs & Staff Dir.,
U.S. Sentencing Comm'n (Mar. 24, 1986) (attaching U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, Offense
Seriousness Questionnaire 2-3 (1986)) (on file with authors).
342.

SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 37, at I1.

343.
344.

Meeting Minutes, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, supra note 291, at 2.
Meeting Minutes, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n (Apr. 15, 1986) (on file with authors);

Meeting Minutes, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, supra note 291, at 2.
345. Meeting Minutes, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, supranote 291, at 2.

346. Meeting Minutes, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n (Apr. 15, 1986) (on file with authors).
347. See id.; Meeting Minutes, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, supra note 225.
348. Meeting Minutes, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n 3-4 (Jan. 20, 1987) (on file with authors).
349.

SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 37, at 11.

350.

Id at 10-11.
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The extent to which the Commissioners actively sought external
feedback is reflected in the beginning of the draft guidelines. In an
"Open Letter" at the outset of the September 1986 preliminary
guidelines, the Commission noted that the draft was "an excellent
vehicle for public comment" and added that the Commission "[sought]
your critical analysis."3 51 Similarly, on the very first page of the January
1987 revised draft, Chairman Wilkins stated that the Commission
benefited from the public input on the initial draft and that, as a result,
the Commission again "seek[s] your critical analysis and comments" on
the subsequent draft.3 52
The Commissioners' interest in outreach took them across the
country. The Commission held public hearings in Chicago, New York
353
The
City, Atlanta, Denver, San Francisco, and Washington, D.C.
(including
at
conferences
presented
and
attended
also
Commissioners
Sentencing Institutes), toured three correctional facilities,3 54 and met
with officials from several states concerning their sentencing guidelines
and sentencing programs.' Two Commissioners went to Chicago to
meet with leaders in the law and economics school of thought, including
Judges Easterbrook and Posner.35 6
The caliber of those from whom the Commission received input
cannot be overstated. The Commission engaged with a veritable "who's
who" of federal sentencing theory and practice. Judges Frankel and
Newman-the two federal judges who helped make the strongest case
for a federal sentencing commission and guidelines in the 1970sregularly conferred with the Commissioners.35 7 Other prominent federal
judges, such as Jack Weinstein and Abner Mikva, also contributed to the
Commission's deliberations, as did leading academics, such as
Professors Albert Alschuler, John C. Coffee, Jr., Charles Ogletree, and
Stephen J. Schulhofer; influential public officials, such as Kenneth
Feinberg (then-Chair of the New York Sentencing Commission),
Douglas Ginsburg (later appointed to be a D.C. Circuit Judge), and
William F. Weld; leaders in the criminal defense community, such as
Judy Clarke and Terence F. MacCarthy; and representatives from major
organizations, such as the American Bar Association, American Civil
351.
35,080,
352.
(Feb. 6,

See Preliminary Draft of Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 51 Fed. Reg.
35,080 (Oct. 1, 1986).
Proposed Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 52 Fed. Reg. 3920, 3920-21
1987).

353.

SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 37, at 11.

354.

Meeting Minutes, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, supranote 177, at 1.

355.

SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 37, at 10.

356.

See infra notes 426-27 and accompanying text.

357.

SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 37, at 4 app. A.
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Liberties Union, Fraternal Order of Police, NAACP Legal Defense
Fund, National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, and National
Rifle Association.358
IV.

KEY POLICY DECISIONS OF THE ORIGINAL
SENTENCING COMMISSION

The previous two Parts of this article have discussed the historical
context in which the original Commission operated and the processes it
created to build a federal sentencing guideline system.3 59 This Part
discusses the key substantive policy decisions of the original
Commission, namely:
* whether to model the structure of the federal guidelines
on existing state guidelines;
* whether the guidelines should be prescriptive (i.e.,
embodying a particular sentencing philosophy as a uniform
national sentencing policy) or descriptive (i.e., reflecting
existing sentencing practices);
* how
the
guidelines
should
regulate
judges'
sentencing discretion;
* whether the federal guidelines should account solely for
the nature of the offenses of conviction or, instead, more
broadly account for offenders' related conduct for which
they were not convicted;
* how to set guidelines penalty levels based on a variety of
different factors, including Congress's creation of new drug
and firearms offenses carrying statutory mandatory
minimum sentences in the mid-1980s;
* how to account for offender characteristics, including
personal
characteristics
and criminal
history
(or
lack thereof);
* how to structure the Sentencing Table (the biaxial
grid accounting for both offense severity and criminal
history); and
* the extent to which considerations of prison capacity
should affect the Commission's policy decisions reflected in
the guidelines.

3 5 8. Id.
359. See supra Parts 11-111.
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Rejecting State Guidelines as a Modelfor the FederalSystem

At the time that the original Commission first met in October 1985,
several state sentencing commissions, most notably in Minnesota and
Washington, already had promulgated sentencing guidelines that were
being implemented by their state courts.360 These state guidelines
generally were similar to each other in that the applicable guideline
ranges were based on the offense of conviction and had one severity
361
The state
level for each offense type reflecting the "usual case."
perceived
by
types
offense
different
the
ranked
sentencing commissions
guidelines
state
severity and, like their eventual federal counterpart, the
each had a biaxial Sentencing Table-with the vertical axis of the
Sentencing Table accounting for offense seriousness and the horizontal
36 2
Certain severity
axis accounting for an offender's criminal record.
Washington's
in
(e.g.,
levels comprised more than one offense type
guidelines, offense severity level nine included robbery, manslaughter,
363
statutory rape, and certain types of drug trafficking offenses).
Unlike the federal guidelines that went into effect in 1987-which,
for each offense type, provided for a "base offense level" (generally
reflecting the least aggravated version of offense type) and "specific
offense characteristics" that distinguished among offenses of the same
general type (based primarily on different aggravating factors)-the state
3
guidelines were relatively simple in nature. " The state guidelines did
provide for a limited number of aggravating and mitigating factors, but
those factors usually were only relevant for deciding whether to depart
from guideline ranges for "usual" offenses. Otherwise, the state
guidelines did not follow the modified real offense approach of the
360. See Kay A. Knapp & Denis J. Hauptly, U.S. Sentencing Guidelines in Perspective: A
Theoretical Background and Overview, in THE U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES: IMPLICATIONS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 85, at 1, 7-8; see also Knapp & Hauptly, supra note 173, at 684-85,

687.
361.
90.

See Knapp & Hauptly, supra note 360, at 8-9; Knapp & Hauptly, supranote 173, at 689-

362. See, e.g., WASHINGTON SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL I-11-12 tbl.3 (WASH.
SENTENCING COMM'N 1986, amended 2016) [hereinafter WASHINGTON SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL].

363. See id. at 1-3 tbl.2.
364. See, e.g., MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND COMMENTARY 32 (MINN.
SENTENCING COMM'N 1986, amended 2016); WASHINGTON SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL,
supra note 362, at 1-2 tbl.1. For instance, the 1986 version of the Minnesota Guidelines Manual had
ten offense severity levels and six criminal history categories, for a total of sixty different cells in

the sentencing table ("Sentencing Guidelines Grid"). See id at 32. Washington had fourteen
severity levels and nine criminal history categories, for a total of 126 different cells in the
sentencing table. See WASHINGTON SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 362, at 1-2 tbl.1.
By contrast, the federal sentencing table had forty-three offense levels and six criminal categories,
for a total of 258 cells. See SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supranote 3, ch. 5, pt. A.
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federal guidelines and, instead, were primarily based on the offense of
conviction rather than what a defendant actually did in committing an
offense.365 In addition, some state sentencing commissions, such as
Minnesota's Commission, had explicit instructions from their state
legislatures to factor in prison capacity into their decisions about
setting guideline penalty levels, with the result being that some state
guidelines were amended to reduce penalty levels when state prisons
became overcrowded. 36 6
The original federal Commission made a deliberate decision to
reject existing state sentencing guideline systems as a model for the new
federal guidelines. That decision, however, was not made until after
the Commission had carefully considered the existing state systems
as potential models-by studying state guidelines and corresponding
state penal codes and hearing directly from commissioners or senior
staff of all of the main state sentencing commissions then in
existence.3 67 Furthermore, the Commission demonstrated its interest in
seriously considering state guidelines by hiring, as its original Staff
Director, Kay Knapp, the executive director of the Minnesota
Sentencing Commission.368
The original federal Commission decided not to model the federal
sentencing guidelines after the existing state guidelines for three main
reasons. First, the SRA and its legislative history contained many
directives that were simply incompatible with the existing state
guidelines. 3 69 Second, federal penal statutes-unlike the state penal
codes that were largely based on the Model Penal Code ("MPC"), with a
much smaller number of offenses 37 0-did not provide a meaningful
statutory base on which the construct sentencing guidelines tied to a
defendant's offense of conviction.37 1 Rather than being a well-organized

365.
366.
367.

See Knapp & Hauptly, supranote 173, at 683-85.
Meeting Minutes, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n 4-5 (June 15, 1986) (on file with authors).
See Meeting Minutes, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n (Jan. 21, 1987) supra note 177, at 9-10;

see also Interview by Michael Courlander & Kent Larsen with Stephen Breyer, supra note 141, at
58; Interview with Ilene H. Nagel, supra note 46, at 53-54.
368. See supranotes 172-74 and accompanying text.

369. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(2) (1988); see infra notes 505-10 and accompanying text
(discussing the 25% rule); see also S. REP. No. 98-225, at 169 (1983) (summarizing the SRA and
instructing the Commission to create "detailed and refined" sentencing guidelines that "reflect every
important factor relevant to sentencing"). In a similar vein, the Senate Report also specifically noted
that Congress expected sentencing guidelines "considerably more detailed than the existing parole

guidelines." S. REP. No. 98-225, at 168.
370. Breyer, supra note 234, at 3. For example, at the time that the Commission drafted the
federal sentencing guidelines, the two leading state guideline jurisdictions-Minnesota and

Washington-had a total of 251 and 108 different statutory offenses, respectively. See id.
3 7 1. Id.
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and logical system like the MPC, federal criminal offenses numbered in
the thousands,372 were spread throughout dozens of titles in the United
States Code having been enacted in different decades, included a vast
array of disproportionate statutory ranges of punishment, and often were
broad and vague offense types that encompassed an endless variety of
different means of criminal conduct-such as the Hobbs Act or the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.3 73 Third, in order
to reduce sentencing disparity based on prosecutorial charging decisions,
the Commission decided that a modified real offense system--one that
considered not only the offense of conviction but also "relevant
conduct"-was the best means to equalize sentences for offenders who
engaged in similar criminal conduct, but who were charged in disparate
manners as the result of prosecutorial idiosyncrasies or other reasons
74
unrelated to the seriousness of the offense or offender.3
B.

A Philosophicalor EmpiricalApproach in
CreatingGuidelines-orBoth?

1. Four Main Purposes of Punishment
The SRA required the Commission, in developing sentencing
375
guidelines, to "assure the meeting of the purposes of sentencing"
37 6
retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.
In Western thought and throughout American history, these four
theories have traditionally served as legitimate justifications for criminal
punishment.3 77 First, the retributive theory of punishment seeks to hold
the offender accountable for the harm he has caused or attempted to
372. Meeting Minutes, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n 6 (Mar. 12, 1986) (on file with authors)
(noting that Justice Breyer stated that General Counsel Hauptly had identified "several thousand"
different offenses in the U.S. Code); see also Ronald L. Gainer, Report to the Attorney General on

Federal Criminal Code Reform, 1 CRIM. L.F. 99, 110 (1989) ("[A]pproximately 3,000 separate
provisions that carry criminal sanctions for their violation."). Not all of these offenses were
prosecuted on a regular basis, as the original Guidelines Manual dealt with about 800 federal
statutes "cover[ing] almost all federal prosecutions." Sentencing Guidelines: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Crim. Justice of the Comm. on the H. Judiciary, 100th Cong. 62 (1987) (statement of

Stephen G. Breyer, Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ist Circuit).
373.

See Breyer, supra note 234, at 3-4.

374.
375.
376.

See infra notes 632-33 and accompanying text.
28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(A) (1988); see also id. § 994(a)(2), (f), (m).
Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319, 325-26 (2011) (discussing 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a)(2)).

Congress listed the four purposes in that order in section 35533(a)(2).
377. See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the CriminalLaw, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401,

401 (1958) (identifying the purposes of punishment as the (1) "deterrence of offenses," (2)
"rehabilitation of offenders," (3) "disablement of offenders," and (4) "sharpening of the
community's sense of right and wrong [as well as] satisfaction of the community's sense of just
retribution").
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cause to specific victims and to society, reflecting the offender's
blameworthiness and the consequent need for his just deserts in
proportion to his culpability.17 1 Second, under deterrence theory,
punishment should be calculated to effectively discourage the offender
(specific deterrence) and others (general deterrence) from committing
offenses in the future.3 79 Third, incapacitation theory provides that an
offender should be removed from society for as long as necessary to
prevent him from engaging in any additional criminality. 80 Fourth,
under the doctrine of rehabilitation, punishment affords the offender
with an opportunity to be "corrected" such that, with this personal
development, the offender subsequently will be able to avoid criminal
behavior.38 1 The first, backward-looking "just deserts" justification
may be contrasted with the remaining three purposes of punishment,
which are
focused prospectively
on utilitarian
or "crime
control" considerations.3 82
Because the SRA directed the Commission to assure that the
guidelines would meet the purposes of sentencing, Chairman Wilkins
wrote his fellow Commissioners shortly after their first meeting that, to
satisfy congressional intent, the Commission had to focus on this
philosophical task as a threshold matter.3 83 Because the purposes of
punishment are often conflicting3 84 and also because Congress did not
clearly state a preference for any particular purpose385 (and even

378. See IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAw 195 (W. Hastie, B.D. trans., T. & T.
Clark 1887) (1796) (stating that punishment "must in all cases be imposed only because the
individual on whom it is inflicted has committed a Crime").
379. See JEREMY BENTHAM, THE RATIONALE OF PUNISHMENT 19-21 (1830) ("[Punishment
involves both] [p]articularprevention, which applies to the delinquent himself; and general
prevention, which is applicable to all the members of the community without exception.").
380. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *362-63 (noting that punishment may
prevent future crime by "depriving the party injuring of the power to do future mischief').

381. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248-49 (1949) (likening rehabilitation to the
"belief that by careful study of the lives and personalities of convicted offenders many could be less
severely punished and restored sooner to complete freedom and useful citizenship.").
382.

HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMrrs OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION

11 (1968) ("The

retributive view is essentially backward-looking; it regards the offense committed by the criminal as
crucial, and adjusts the punishment to it. The utilitarian view is forward-looking; it assesses
punishment in terms of its propensity to modify the future behavior of the criminal and ...
who might be tempted to commit crimes.").

383.

of others

Memorandum from William W. Wilkins, Jr., Chair, to the Commissioners, Dec. 17, 1985,

at 4 (on file with authors).

384. See, e.g., United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 189-90 (2d Cir. 2008) (acknowledging
that there are "various, often conflicting, purposes of sentencing").
385. Kenneth R. Feinberg, The Federal Guidelines and the Underlying Purposes of

Sentencing, 3 FED. SENT'G REP. 326, 326-27 (1991) ("Congress was ambivalent about the
prioritization of purposes and largely fudged the issue in drafting the underlying enabling
legislation. . . ."). As noted above, as a Senate staffer (and colleague of Commissioner Breyer when
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recognized that some purposes may not apply in particular cases),386 the
Commission's task was a difficult one.
2. Two Committee Strategy: Just Deserts and Crime Control
At its meeting on March 12, 1986, the Commission developed a
strategy in response to its statutory mandate to create guidelines that
implemented the purposes of punishment. Commissioners Block and
Nagel "wanted to create a model using crime control [i.e., incapacitation
and deterrence] as the sole factor determining the guidelines,"387 while
Commissioner Robinson wanted guidelines primarily to reflect "just
deserts." 388 The Commission decided to form two committees: a "Just
Deserts" committee to be chaired by Commissioner Robinson, and a
"Crime Control" Committee to be chaired by Commissioner Block and
joined by Commissioner Nagel.389 Commissioner Gainer, the ex officio
Commissioner representing the Attorney General, was part of the
just deserts group. Commission staff made up the rest of the
two committees.3 90
The two committees reflected the personal ideologies of their two
leaders: Commissioner Robinson, a prolific law professor, strongly
aligned himself with the retributivist3 9 1 or "just deserts" school of
he was chief counsel to the Senate Judiciary Committee), Feinberg was the primary drafter of
the SRA.
386. See 18 U.S.C. § 3551(a) (1988) ("[A] defendant who has been found guilty of an offense
described in any Federal statute, ... shall be sentenced in accordance with the provisions of this
chapter so as to achieve the purposes set forth in subparagraphs (A) through (D) of section
3553(a)(2) to the extent that they are applicable in light of all the circumstances of the case."); S.
REP. No. 98-225, at 77 (1983) ("In setting out the four purposes of sentencing, the Committee has
deliberately not shown a preference for one purpose of sentencing over another in the belief that
different purposes may play greater or lesser roles in sentencing for different types of offenses
committed by different types of defendants. The Committee recognizes that a particular purpose of

sentencing may play no role in a particular case."); see also S. REP. No. 98-225, at 76 n.166 ("It is
understood, of course, that if the Commission finds that the primary purpose of sentencing in a
particular kind of case should be deterrence or incapacitation, and that a secondary purpose should
be rehabilitation, the recommended guideline sentence should be imprisonment if that is determined
to be the best means of assuring such deterrence and incapacitation, notwithstanding the fact that

such a sentence would not be the best means of providing rehabilitation. A balancing of competing
interests is necessary.").
387. Meeting Minutes, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, supranote 372, at 12.
388. Id. at 13.
389. See Interview by Gen. Accounting Office with Stephen G. Breyer, supra note 1, at 6-7;
Interview with Ilene H. Nagel, supra note 46, at 20, 23.
390. Meeting Minutes, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, supranote 372, at 15-16.
391. See Hearing, supra note 139, at 328 (statement of Paul H. Robinson) ("I think that many
people distinguish just deserts from a retributive philosophy, where there is this notion of the wrath,
the anger of God, and sin. I think the modem just deserts philosophy is somewhat more akin to
notions of doing justice. Nothing more, nothing less."). He made the same point during a
Commission meeting in 1987. Meeting Minutes, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n 3 (Jan. 29, 1987) (on file
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thought,3 92 while Commissioner Block, an economist who focused on
the legal system, was a devotee of the emerging "law and economics"
school.393 According to Commissioner Nagel, the philosophical divide
between the two camps was stark at the very outset: at the
Commissioners' very first meeting, held at the DOJ, Commissioner
Robinson observed that the Department is called "Department of
Justice," not the "Department of Maximizing Social Utility," to which
Commissioner Block responded that the SRA is part of the
Comprehensive Crime Control Act, not the "Comprehensive Justice and
Fairness Act."394
The charge of each committee was to develop draft guidelines
grounded purely in their respective sentencing philosophies.39 5 The
Commissioners could then, in receipt of these drafts, consider the
advantages and disadvantages of the submitted drafts in the hopes of
melding their positive attributes into one guidelines manual. 396 The
Commissioners agreed that ultimately the work of the committees would
be "consolidate[d]" and the two draft guidelines would be "merge[d]." 3 97
The Commissioners resolved that the two committee drafts would be
submitted by the summer of 1986.398

with authors). However, many others-including the Supreme Court-have equated the two. See

Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319, 325-26 (2011) (equating just deserts in the SRA with
"retribution").

392. See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson, A Brief History of Distinctions in Criminal Culpability, 31
HASTINGS L.J. 815, 818-21 (1980); Paul H. Robinson, A Theory ofJustification: Societal Harmas a
Prerequisitefor Criminal Liability, 23 UCLA L. REv. 266, 273-78, 280-87 (1975). After leaving the
Commission, Professor Robinson has continued to write extensively about "just desert" topics. See,
e.g., PAUL H. ROBINSON, INTUITIONS OF JUSTICE AND THE UTILITY OF DESERT 6-12 (2013).

Professor Robinson has not only argued that just deserts should be the only purpose of punishment,
but he also contends that a focus on just deserts will have the effect of controlling crime. See, e.g.,
Paul H. Robinson, EmpiricalDesert, in CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS 29, 29-38 (Robinson et al.

eds., 2009).
393. See, e.g., Michael K. Block & Robert C. Lind, An Economic Analysis of Crimes
Punishable by Imprisonment, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 479, 480-90 (1975); Michael K. Block & Robert C.
Lind, Crime and Punishment Reconsidered, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 241, 241-45 (1975). The Journal of
Legal Studies was started in 1972 by then-Professor (and future Judge) Richard Posner at the
University of Chicago. Journal of Legal Studies, UNIV. CHI.: LAW SCH., http://www.law.uchicago.

edu/coase-sandor/joumals/jls (last visited Aug. 1, 2017).
394.

Interview with Ilene H. Nagel, supra note 46, at 84.

395.
396.
397.
398.

Id. at 19-20.
See Nagel, supra note 170, at 918; Interview with Ilene H. Nagel, supra note 46, at 21.
Meeting Minutes, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n 4 (May 7, 1986) (on file with authors).
See Nagel, supra note 170, at 918.
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a. Just Deserts Approach
The Just Deserts Committee worked through the spring and early
summer of 1986 to produce a well-developed draft guidelines manual by
July 10, 1986.399 That draft grouped federal offenses into several larger
categories, such as "death and personal injury," "theft and property
destruction," and "unlawful drug trafficking." 40 The draft also required
a sentencing court to identify all actual or intended harms, "personal and
societal," attributable to the defendant-whether caused "directly or
indirectly"-and to aggregate the numerical "harm values" assigned to
each identified harm. 4 01 These harm values were designed to "reflect the
seriousness with which society views such conduct or result." 40 2
The just deserts draft included complex formulas for determining
harm values for drug offenses and economic offenses.403 In particular,
the draft included elaborate quantitative tables, such as the "Property
Harms Table" and "Drug Units Harm Values Table," that drew myriad
distinctions between drug quantities and financial loss amounts. 4 04 The
raw harm values for each offense type were to be adjusted according to
several aggravating and mitigating circumstances, such as the
defendant's mental disability or his role in the offense, which had
specific multipliers that could either increase or decrease the harm
values. 40 5 The final computation of "harm values" was to be translated to
"sanction units." 406 The sanction units then could be increased by a
defendant's criminal record and decreased by a guilty plea or
cooperation with the authorities.40 7 Formulas translated the final sanction
units into forms of punishment, such as fines, probation, and
imprisonment, or a mixture of multiple forms of punishment.40 8
In June 1986, an advisory group of federal district court judges held
a meeting at the Commission's offices in which they discussed the just
deserts concept for a sentencing guidelines system. 409 Those judges-

399. United States Sentencing Commission Proposed Sentencing Guidelines Manual, supra
note 208.
400. See id. at 4, 8, 19.
401. See id. at 4-5.
402. Id at 4.
403. Id at 18-21, 39.
404. See, e.g., id at 15 tbl.1, 25-27 tbl.2B. The Property Harms Table is reproduced in
Appendix C at the end of this Article.
405. United States Sentencing Commission Proposed Sentencing Guidelines Manual, supra
note 208, at 50-58.
406. Id. at 4.
407. Id. at 58 tbl.A, 58-59.
408. Id.
409. See Meeting Minutes, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n (June 10, 1986) (on file with authors).
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who are not named in Commission records-generally supported the just
deserts model.410 The DOJ also supported the just deserts draft.4 11
Chairman Wilkins initially supported it as well, because the draft was
something to build on and nothing had been produced by the efficient
Crime Control Committee.4 12
Support quickly waned, however. Commissioner Nagel expressed
concern that the draft's determinations of harm seriousness were
seemingly based on Commissioner Robinson's subjective judgments and
not on empirical data or other objective sources, such as public opinion
surveys.4 13 Commissioner MacKinnon, a former United States Attorney
for nearly a decade and a federal circuit judge since 1969,414 complained
that the complex draft could not be easily understood and applied by
busy judges.415 Commissioner Breyer described the draft as a "very
major contribution" 4 16 and a "serious intellectual effort," but also
deemed it "not workable."4 17
In their attempt to convince the Commissioners who supported the
just deserts draft that it was not viable, Commissioner Breyer and
Kenneth Feinberg, who had helped draft the SRA as a staffer for Senator
Kennedy, arranged a meeting with three influential judges (two active
and one retired) who were strong supporters of the concept of federal
sentencing guidelines: U.S. District Judges Harold Tyler and Marvin
Frankel (the latter had retired from the bench) and United States Circuit
Judge Jon Newman. 4 18 According to Commissioner Breyer, these judges
persuaded Chairman Wilkins that the just deserts draft simply would not
work in practice.419 Chairman Wilkins became convinced to "[pull] the
410.

See id. at 2 ("[T]he working group of federal judges who had met with the Commissioner

earlier that week supported the concept.").
411. See Interview by Gen. Accounting Office with Stephen G. Breyer, supra note 1, at 9; see
also Interview with Ilene H. Nagel, supra note 46, at 76-77.
412. See Interview by Michael Courlander & Kent Larsen with Stephen Breyer, supra note

141, at 16.
413. See Nagel, supra note 170, at 918.
414. Interview with George MacKinnon, supra note 137.
415. Id. at 2, 4.
416. Interview by Gen. Accounting Office with Stephen G. Breyer, supra note 1, at 12-13
(adding that the just deserts draft helped identify the "most important elements" in criminal law,

"organize [the] subject," and "flag[] a number of important issues").
417. See Interview by Michael Courlander & Kent Larsen with Stephen Breyer, supra note
141, at 14-15; see also Interview by Gen. Accounting Office with Stephen G. Breyer, supra note 1,
at 7.
418. See Interview by Michael Courlander & Kent Larsen with Stephen Breyer, supra note
141, at 16-17. Judges Frankel and Newman had been instrumental in making the case for federal

sentencing reform and their push helped give rise to the SRA and the Commission. See supra notes
103-09, 221-24 and accompanying text; see also Interview with Ilene H. Nagel, supra note 46, at

76-77.
419.

See Interview by Michael Courlander & Kent Larsen with Stephen Breyer, supra note
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plug" on Commissioner Robinson's just desert guidelines project by the
end of the summer of 1986.420
b. Crime Control Approach
On April 1, 1986, Commissioner Block reported that he had been
working with a fellow economist, Mark Cohen, a Senior Research
Associate on staff, to "clarify and solidify" the conceptual framework
for crime control guidelines.4 2' Commissioner Block reported that his
committee's goal was to translate the theoretical work of Professors
Gary Becker, A. Mitchell Polinsky, and Steven Shavell-early leaders in
the law and economics school4 2 2-into guidelines capable of producing
"efficient sentences" that would deter criminal conduct.423 While
Commissioner Block, together with Mark Cohen, developed the
conceptual framework for the model, Commissioner Nagel assumed
responsibility for the empirical side of the group's work.424
Commissioner Nagel sought reliable data on various issues, including
the "costs of the harm" caused by crime, the "rate of detection and rate
of conviction," and deterrence resulting from criminal punishment.425
In the spring of 1986, Commissioners Block and Nagel, along with
Research Director William Rhodes, met with leading figures of the law
and economics school: two economics professors, Gary Becker and Bill
Landes, as well as two former law professors, Judges Frank Easterbrook
and Richard A. Posner. 42 6 At the meeting, these experts expressed
concerns about the difficulties of implementing a crime control model in
practice.427 Ultimately, the Crime Control Committee's efforts were
thwarted by a lack of data and time.4 28 As Commissioner Nagel later
stated, "the principles of crime control, however well developed [in
141, at 17-18. If Commissioner Robinson was the leading proponent for complex guidelines
accounting for every harm, then Commissioner Breyer was the leading proponent for sentencing

guidelines on the simpler end of the spectrum. As he stated in 1987, "[m]y personal view, which is
not necessarily shared by the Commission . . [is that the Commission should have] take[n] the
Minnesota Guidelines and Parole Guidelines and improve[d] them." Interview by Gen. Accounting
Office with Stephen G. Breyer, supra note 1, at 4.
420. Interview with William W. Wilkins, Jr., Judge, supranote 157, at 12.
421. Meeting Minutes, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n (Apr. 1, 1986), supranote 177, at 7.
422. Id. at 8. The leading theoretical work advocating an "economic approach" to determining
criminal punishment was Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J.

POL. EcoN.169 (1968).
423. Meeting Minutes, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n (Apr. 1, 1986), supranote 177, at 8.
424. Id
425. Id at 8-9.
426. Meeting Minutes, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, supra note 338, at 3-4.
427. Id. at 4.
428. Nagel, supra note 170, at 918-19.
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theory], did not easily translate into empirically verifiable
specifications" for sentencing guidelines that would produce sentences
that could efficiently promote deterrence.4 29 She stated that
"[u]ltimately, [at] the end of the day . . . there were no data to support
this theory." 43 0
3. Evolution in the Drafts Away from a Pure Just Deserts Model
The Commission's strategy to build, from the work of the Just
Deserts and Crime Control Committees, a coherent philosophical
approach to sentencing did not go as planned. But their interest in
harmonizing the purposes of punishment remained. On July 28, 1986,
the Commissioners began discussing the perceived need to produce a
"statement of purposes" in which the four purposes "should not be on an
equal footing in all kinds of cases ... rehabilitation, in particular,"
should have less influence because it was "qualified twice in the
[SRA]." 431 They referred to positions in the SRA stating that it is
generally inappropriate to impose "imprisonment for the purpose of
rehabilitating the defendant,"43 2 and further that "[r]ehabilitation of the
defendant alone shall not be considered an extraordinary and compelling
reason" for a sentence reduction.4 33
With the clock running, Chairman Wilkins and a few staff members
scrambled to put together a new draft guidelines manual that could be
published for public comment in the Federal Register by the end of
September 1986.434 They attempted "to rid the [just] desert based
draft . .. of its most unacceptable aspects," 435 although the version they
produced resembled the just deserts draft in many ways.436 As
Commissioner Breyer observed, the Commission needed a "vehicle for
43 7
people to comment," even if the public "would comment negatively."
429. Id.
430.

Interview with Ilene H. Nagel, supranote 46, at 28.

431. Meeting Minutes, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n 4 (July 28-29, 1986) (on file with authors).
432. 28 U.S.C. § 994(k) (1988).
433. Id. § 994(t).
434. See Interview with William W. Wilkins, Jr., Judge, supra note 157, at 14-15; see also
Interview by Michael Courlander & Kent Larsen with Stephen Breyer, supra note 141, at 20.
435. See Nagel, supra note 170, at 921.
436. For example, although considerably less complex in nature than the just deserts draft, the
September 1986 draft included a "Property Table" (with increasing "offense values" based on the
amount of loss). Preliminary Draft of Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 51 Fed. Reg.
35,080, 35,094 (Oct. 1, 1986). It also included a Drug Quantity Table (with increasing "offense
values" based on drug quantity and weight). Id. at 35,098. Moreover, like the just deserts draft, it
included myriad offense guidelines in chapter two and several "adjustments" for factors like
acceptance of responsibility, obstruction of justice, and criminal history in chapter three. Id. at
35,088-119.
437. Interview by Gen. Accounting Office with Stephen G. Breyer, note 1, at 14.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2017

65

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 4 [2017], Art. 11

1232

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:1167

This "preliminary draft," which was completed in late September
and published in the Federal Register shortly thereafter, 438 "adopt[ed] no
single, overriding purpose for or theory of sentencing" 4 3 9-reflecting the
fact that the SRA provided that sentencing guidelines should further
each of the purposes of sentencing." 0 Nevertheless, the preliminary draft
deemphasized rehabilitation. In the draft's commentary, the Commission
explained that rehabilitation "must be secondary" to the other purposes
of punishment, "especially that of protecting the public.""' Because
rehabilitation cannot be furthered by imprisonment under the SRA,
"rehabilitation can be a primary sentencing consideration only for
relatively minor offenses where other statutory considerations do not
mandate imposition of a substantial penalty," the Commission added.44 2
As with the earlier just deserts draft, the preliminary draft assigned
numerical values, based largely on the Commission's judgment, rather
than based on data, to the offense of conviction and to aggravating or
mitigating circumstances.443 These values-and the corresponding
sentencing ranges-were "highly tentative" and that draft was solely
intended to elicit public comment and did not yet reflect the definitive
policy position of the Commission." 4 The Commission thereafter held
six public hearings and received hundreds of written comments on
the preliminary draft."' Commissioner Breyer observed that "we
had . . learned quite a lot.""'
On December 15, 1986, Commissioner Nagel circulated a
memorandum that memorialized a majority of the Commissioners'
views as to how the purposes of punishment could be coordinated."
Under this "amalgam approach"-a term used initially by Commissioner
438.

See SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 37, at 11.

439. Preliminary Draft of Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 51 Fed. Reg. 35,080,
35,084.
440. Id.
441. Id.
442. Id. at 35,085.
443. See id at 35,084.
444. Id. at 35,081 ("[T]he Commission voted to publish a preliminary working draft of
sentencing guidelines well in advance of any required publication date in order to provide a vehicle
for critical analysis and public comment. While these guidelines do not reflect the views of all
Commissioners, the Commission voted for publication to provide a means for identifying the issues
that must ultimately be resolved."); see id. at 35,089 ("Offense values rest on preliminary research

results and initial efforts to reflect appropriate sentences for different forms of criminal conduct.
Due to the Commission's desire to obtain early comment, the published numerical values must be
treated as highly tentative, preliminary, and subject to change.").
445.

See SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supranote 37, at 11.

446. Interview by Gen. Accounting Office with Stephen G. Breyer, supra note 1, at 17-18.
447. Memorandum from Ilene H. Nagel, Comm'r, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n,
Commissioners & Executive Director of the Commission (Dec. 15, 1986) (on file with authors).
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t
guidelines should consider both retributive and
MacKinnon" -the
utilitarian considerations," but when they conflict, the unifying
principle is that "crime control paradigm will prevail."4 5 0 The tie should
go to crime control for three reasons: "crime control is the underlying
justification for punishment;" crime control "provided the initiative" (as
the SRA was part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act); and "crime
control incorporates the retributivist objectives of just punishment."45 1
Around the same time, Commissioner Breyer prepared principles
for redrafting the preliminary guidelines, which were adopted by the
Commission on December 16, 1986.452 His document began by stating
that "[t]he Guidelines seek to insure that [all] sentences imposed will
fulfill the purposes of sentencing mandated by Congress."45 3 Next, the
document declared, consistent with crime control considerations, that the
"[g]uidelines seek to insure that [all] sentences convey the fact that
crime does not and will not pay."454 Moreover, "the Guidelines seek to
increase the degree to which punishments are commensurate with the
seriousness of the offense and the offender's blameworthiness" to ensure
proportionality in sentencing, which are retributive considerations. 45 5 It
continued by stating that "[t]he overall purpose of the institution of

punishment . . . is to control crime."456 Commissioner Robinson moved

to delete this overall purpose statement, but the motion failed for a lack
of a second. 457 The document further noted that punishment must be
distributed in a manner that "efficiently decrease[s] the level of crime
through deterrence and incapacitation," and that is "commensurate with
the seriousness of the offense and the offender's blameworthiness."45 8 In
the event of a conflict between crime control and retributive
considerations, the document answers that "the resolution of the conflict
will be based on the principles of crime control unless a specific decision

448. Interview with Ilene H. Nagel, supra note 46, at 19.
449. Memorandum from Ilene H. Nagel, supra note 447, at 1-2.
450. Id at 4.
451. Id.
452. U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, Principles Governing the Redrafting of the Preliminary
Guidelines (Dec. 16, 1986) (on file with authors); see also Interview by Gen. Accounting Office
with Stephen G. Breyer, supra note 1, at 17-18 (noting that commissioner Breyer had drafted some
principles for redrafting).
453. U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, Principles Governing the Redrafting of the Preliminary
Guidelines, supra note 452.
454. Id.
455. Id.
456. Id.
457. Meeting Minutes, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, supra note 301, at 3-4.
458. U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, Principles Governing the Redrafting of the Preliminary
Guidelines, supranote 452.
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to the contrary is made by the Commission." 459 Commissioner Robinson
moved to amend this provision to state that, "Where the principles of
just punishment and crime control conflict, the Commission shall be so
informed."46 0 The motion failed for lack of a second.4 6
Despite the Crime Control Committee's inability to produce a set of
draft guidelines, Commissioner Block still advocated for a primary
emphasis on general deterrence. On January 8, 1987, he distributed to
his fellow Commissioners a memorandum, entitled "Optimal Sentence
Structure," in which he contended that offenders place greater weight on
the immediate loss of liberty and correspondingly diminishing weight on
subsequent loss of liberty.4 62 He asserted that, for this reason, there
would be little to be gained from a deterrence perspective in imposing a
prison sentence beyond ten or fifteen years for the vast majority of
offenders. 463 He added that "optimal sentence lengths for deterrence
purposes will be moderate." 4 Furthermore, he expressed doubt that the
purpose of incapacitation could justify a sentence beyond what was
supported by the deterrence principle. 46 5 Although he was advocating
against lengthy prison sentences, Commissioner Block also contended
that probation would be "wasteful," because it would not be an adequate
substitute for imprisonment from a deterrence perspective.466
In January 1987, the Commission finished a "revised draft" of the
preliminary guidelines manual first published in the prior fall.4 67 The
revised draft provided that a sentence generally should further the four
purposes of punishment, but also stated that "the fundamental objective
of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act [of 1984] is to prevent crime
and protect the public from criminal activity."4 68 If the retributive and
crime control goals conflict, the draft noted, "justice for the public is the
overreaching goal." 4 6 9 The January 1987 draft was similar to the
September 1986 draft in many respects-including primarily basing
penalty levels on drug type and weight in drug cases 47 0 and monetary
459. Id.
460. Meeting Minutes, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, supra note 301, at 5.
461. Id.
462. See Memorandum from Michael K. Block, Comm'r to All Comm'rs (Jan. 8, 1987) (on
file with authors).
463. Id.
464. Id.
465. Id.
466. Id.
467. Proposed Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 52 Fed. Reg. 3920, 3920-21
(Feb. 6, 1987).
468. Id. at 3923.
469. Id.
470. Id. at 3920, 3938-39 tbl.1.
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loss in theft and fraud cases 4 7 -but did include a new biaxial
Sentencing Table that accounted for offenders' criminal history on a
separate axis based on a complex set of rules. 4 72 As discussed below,
that criminal history calculus was based in significant part on utilitarian
considerations, such as risk assessment.4 7 3 The Commission held two
additional public hearings on the revised draft manual, and received
additional feedback.4 74
On April 13, 1987, the Commission submitted to Congress, for its
180-day review, the first Guidelines Manual. 475 The first chapter,
authored by Commissioner Breyer, acknowledged that the Commission
confronted a "philosophical problem" in trying to "reconcile the
differing perceptions of the purposes of criminal punishment."4 76 While
"[m]ost observers of the criminal law agree that the ultimate aim of the
law itself, and of punishment in particular, is the control of crime,"4 7 7 the
Commission faced a "profoundly difficult" choice between retribution
and crime control as the relevant distributive principle. 4 78 A pure
retributive model is wanting, he explained, because there is no "moral
consensus" as to how much punishment an offender "deserved" for a
particular crime. 4 79 At the same time, there was no reliable data to
determine how punishment can be best calibrated to control crime.480
Over Commissioner Robinson's vigorous dissent, the Commission
ultimately decided to avoid making one sentencing philosophy
predominant and instead adopted an empirical approach whereby the
majority of the guidelines were based on "past practice" data.4 8 1
4. Empirical Approach
Taking its cue from Congress, and running out of time, the
Commission adopted an "empirical approach" as a means to resolve the
problem of giving effect to the four purposes of punishment in the
guidelines.482 Congress had required the Commission, "as a starting
471. Id. at 3931, 3945.
472. Id. at 3926-27, 3973.
473. See infra notes 860-62 and accompanying text.
474.
475.

SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supranote 37, at 11.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3, ch. 1, pt. A; see 28 U.S.C.

§ 994(p)

(1988) (setting forth Congress's 180-day review period).
476.

SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3, ch. 1, pt. A.

477.
478.
479.
480.
481.

Id.
Id.
See id.
See id.
See infra Part IV.B.4.

482.

See SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3, ch. 1, pt. A.3; see also Interview

with Ilene H. Nagel, supra note 46, at 92-93, 96 ('Tast practice suddenly carries the day because
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point in its development of the initial sets of guidelines ... [to] ascertain
the average sentences imposed" for different offense types. 483 The
Commission therefore obtained extensive information on current
sentencing practices and used this data as the anchor for its sentencing
benchmarks for most offense types.4 84 Past sentencing practices were not
necessarily devoid of principle, as the average sentences could be said to
embody the varying sentencing philosophies. 485 Aware of the importance
of buy-in from judges tasked with applying the new guidelines,
Commissioner Breyer took the position that "it was easier to defend the
guidelines based on imperfect data than on subjective choice" about
sentencing philosophy.4 86 Moreover, retributivist and utilitarian
approaches to sentencing appeared to provide overlapping justifications
for sentencing outcomes, leaving little actual difference between the
two. 487 In the end, the debate between the competing purposes
of punishment was seen by the Commission to be "more symbolic
than pragmatic."48 8
Not all Commissioners agreed with the empirical approach
ultimately taken. In particular, Commissioner Robinson agreed that the
SRA did not "adopt a particular distributive principle or combination of
distributive principles" and that it did not "define the interrelationship
between the four traditional purposes of sentencing." 489 But Congress
expected the Commission to give coherence to the four purposes, he
contended. 490 According to Commissioner Robinson's dissent from the
promulgation of the initial Guidelines Manual, the Commission had
failed to meet this goal.491 If one judge sentences for deterrence reasons
now it[']s getting late."); Breyer, supra note 234, at 17 ("Faced, on the one hand, with those who

advocated 'just deserts' but could not produce a convincing, objective way to rank criminal
behavior in detail, and, on the other hand, with those who advocated 'deterrence' but had no
convincing empirical data linking detailed and small variations in punishment to prevention of
crime, the Commission reached an important compromise.
primarily upon typical, or average, actual past practice.").

It decided to base the Guidelines

§ 994(m) (1988).

483.

28 U.S.C.

484.

See infra notes 724-42 and accompanying text.

485. See Nagel et al., supra note 43, at 1837 ("[A]ll sentences in the past reflected concerns for
deterrence, concerns for crime control, and concerns for just punishment for the offense.").
486. Meeting Minutes, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n 6 (Apr. 3, 1987) (on file with authors).
487. See SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3, ch. 1, pt. A.3; see also
SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 37, at 15-16 (noting that the two philosophies are "generally
consistent with the same result").
488. SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supranote 37, at 16.

489. Paul H. Robinson, A Sentencing System for the 21st Century?, 66 TEX. L. REv. 1, 7 n.31
(1987).
490. Id. at 7-8 n.31.
491. See Dissenting View of Commissioner Paul H. Robinson on the Promulgation of
Sentencing Guidelines by the United States Sentencing Commission, 52 Fed. Reg. 18,121, 18,12122 (May 13, 1987).
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and another for rehabilitative reasons, for example, an average may to
some degree contain both those philosophies, he conceded.492 But
mathematical averages do not express how the purposes of punishment
are to be harmonized, producing, in Commissioner Robinson's words,
sentences that are irrational and "bastardized." 493
C.

RegulatingJudicialDiscretion in Sentencing

In place of the standardless pre-guidelines sentencing regime that
produced significant sentencing disparities, the SRA erected a broad
structure, to be built upon by the Commission, to regulate and
standardize judges' sentencing discretion. In accordance with that
congressional directive, the original Commission made several policy
decisions that removed a large extent of traditional sentencing discretion
possessed by federal judges.
1. Guidelines Designed to Produce Similar Sentences for
Defendants with Similar Criminal Records Who Committed
Similar Offenses
Congress wrote into the SRA several provisions designed to
promote consistency in sentencing decision-making in order to avoid
"unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar
records who have been found guilty of similar criminal conduct."4 94 For
example, the SRA's "25% rule" directs the Commission to establish
sentencing ranges "for each category of offense involving each category
of defendant," and further specifies that, for sentences including
imprisonment, "the maximum of the range established for such a term
shall not exceed the minimum of that range by more than the greater of
25 percent or 6 months." 4 95 In addition, the SRA also prescribed the
limited circumstances in which a judge may depart from the applicable
sentencing range. In particular, the SRA authorized a judge to depart if
492. Robinson, supranote 489, at 15.
493. Id. Although Commissioner Block voted to promulgate the initial Guidelines Manual,
after resigning from the Commission, he criticized the initial Commission for failing to adopt a
particular sentencing philosophy in the guidelines (although his preferred philosophy, as noted
above, was not the same one shared by Commissioner Robinson). See Jeffrey S. Parker & Michael
H. Block, The Limits of FederalSentencing Policy; or, Confessions of Two Reformed Reformers, 9

GEo. MASON L. REv. 1001, 1011-12, 1014-16 (2001) ("While there is much to be said for the
empirical approach of the initial guidelines, ultimately such an approach cannot substitute fully for
the development of sound sentencing principles, if sentencing reform is to progress toward its
ultimate goal of creating a measurably more effective system of criminal punishment.").
494. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (1988); see id. § 994(f).
495. Id § 994(b)(2) (noting that the one recognized exception to the 25% rule is that "if the
minimum term of the range is 30 years or more, the maximum may be life imprisonment").
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the prosecution moved the court for a departure to reflect the defendant's
"substantial assistance" to authoritieS 496 or if the judge found an
aggravating or mitigating circumstance not adequately taken into.
account by the guidelines, because the circumstance is a "rarity" or is
present in an "extreme" form. 49 7 The SRA also required a judge who
departed from the applicable guidelines range to state on the record the
reasons for the departure, for both sentencing transparency and to
facilitate potential appellate review.4 98 Moreover, the SRA prohibited
judges from considering the "race, sex, national origin, creed, and
socioeconomic status of offenders" in imposing an appropriate
sentence 4 99 and also noted the general inappropriateness of considering
the "education, vocational skills, employment record, family ties and
responsibilities, and community ties of the defendant" for purposes of
determining whether, or how long, a defendant may be imprisoned."
Building from this blueprint, the initial Commission created a
guidelines system with 170 generic categories meant to cover the most
commonly used statutory provisions out of the the approximately 3000
offenses in the United States Code in the mid-1980s.so1 Offenders
convicted of the same type of offense would receive the same "base
offense level" as the starting point for their sentence, while increases or
decreases in the base offense level would be made by way of relevant
"specific offense characteristics" (in chapter two) and "adjustments" (in
chapter three) with specific offense levels.50 2 While base offense levels
were generally to be determined through the offense of conviction, the
specific offense characteristics and adjustments were typically to be

496.
497.

§ 3553(a)

Id. § 994(n); see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (1988).
18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1); see S. REP. No. 98-225, at 78-79 (1983). Although 18 U.S.C.
listed a variety of factors for a sentencing court to consider in imposing a sentence,

including the "nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the
defendant," § 3553(b) specifically required the court to impose a sentence within a properly
calculated guideline range unless the guidelines authorized a departure or the court found the

existence of "an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately
taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should
result in a sentence different from that described." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)-(b); see United States v.
DeRiggi, 45 F.3d 713, 716 (2d Cir. 1995) ("Notwithstanding that the Guidelines appear to be but
one of several factors to be considered by a sentencing court, the statute goes on to say that the court
'shall impose a sentence of the kind, and within the [Guidelines] range ... unless the court finds
that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately

taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission . . . .' 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b). Thus, although
subsection (a) fails to assign controlling weight to the Guidelines, subsection (b) does so.").
498. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2).
499. 28 U.S.C. § 994(d)(l1).
500. Id. § 994(e).
501.
502.

See supra notes 372-743 and accompanying text.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supranote 3, ch. 2, introductory cmt.
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determined through uncharged relevant conduct found by a sentencing
judge based on evidence with "sufficient indicia of reliability to support
its probable accuracy."o3 Criminal history would be calculated in the
same manner for all offenders based on a comprehensive set of rules.5 0 4
Finally, the 'Sentencing Table would help ensure that similar offenders
with similar criminal records would receive a sentence selected from a
range not to exceed 25%, and the Sentencing Table's zones would help
ensure that offenders would receive a similar type of sentence.os Several
of these aspects of the federal sentencing guidelines can be traced to
Commissioner Robinson's initial just deserts draft.
The impact of the SRA's 25% rule on the initial Commission's
creation of the guidelines is worth highlighting in terms of its significant
effect in limiting judges' sentencing discretion. As the Commission
interpreted that directive in the SRA, it limited judges' discretion in two
different manners. First, because the maximum of a sentencing range
could not be more than 25% of its minimum, the availability of
probation-treated as zero months-was limited to the lower echelons
of the Sentencing Table. If probation were an option in the higher
ranges, it would run afoul of the 25% rule-for instance, a range of
twelve to eighteen months could not include probation as an option since
it effectively would render the range zero to eighteen months. 506
Second, as discussed above, the Commission, agreeing with the
Justice Department's objection to the January 1987 draft guidelines,
interpreted the 25% rule to mean that the guidelines must prescribe a
single recommended level, not a variable range of levels to be selected
within a court's discretion, for each category of offense and offender.507
This interpretation not only placed into sharp focus a particular
sentencing level with a corresponding, narrow sentencing range, but also
recognized as a "departure" any sentence outside of that particular
range. 0 s Furthermore, the Commission carefully limited the permissible

503. Id. at § 6Al.3(a); see infra notes 640-59 and accompanying text (discussing "relevant
conduct"). Notably, the original Guidelines Manual did not expressly provide that disputed factors
had to be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. For a discussion of Supreme Court precedent,
see McMillian v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 90-91 (1986), expressly setting forth the
preponderance standard that was added to the commentary following § 6A1.3(a) in 1991. See
United States Sentencing Guidelines, App. C, amend. 387.
504.

See infra Part IV.G.

505.

See infra Part IV.H.

506. Sentencing Commission Guidelines. Hearing on the Guidelines Drafted by the US.
Sentencing Commission Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 43, 55 (1987)
(statement of Stephen Breyer, Comm'r., U.S. Sentencing Comm'n).
507. See supra notes 242-44 and accompanying text.
508. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supranote 3, ch. 1, pt. A.
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reasons to depart. 509 The practical effect of the 25% rule therefore would
be to draw the sentencing judge to the recommended narrow range based
on the facts found-which, when considered with limited grounds
for departures, would thereby avoid disparities among similarly
situated offenders.
2. Offender Characteristics
The Commission also decided to regulate sentencing discretion by
limiting judges' consideration of offender characteristics, with the
1
primary exception of criminal history, as discussed below. o
Instead, the Commission decided to focus the guidelines on offense
characteristics. The SRA informed the Commission's broad view on the
relative importance of offender characteristics, compared to offense
characteristics, and also directed the Commission to assess the relevance
of particular offender traits."' In general, the Commissioners seized on
the text and legislative history of the SRA to emphasize the primary role
of offense characteristics in sentencing determinations, in order ensure
that the balance of sentencing considerations was not tipped too heavily
in favor of individualized offender characteristics such that sentencing
disparities would arise.512 Commissioner MacKinnon put it this way:
"Congress has decreed that the sentence shall fit the crime," not that "the
sentence should fit the individual."' Commissioner Nagel echoed that
view of the SRA: "Congress very specifically says in the statute that the
sentence shall be based primarily on the offense rather than the offender
which is a complete reversal from what it used to be pre-guidelines[,]
[resulting in] a de-emphasis on offender based characteristics."514 She
added that 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) "specifically eschews the words
just punishment for the offender and uses instead the words just
515
punishment for the offense."

509. See infra notes 526-33 and accompanying text.
510. See infra Part IV.G.
511. 28 U.S.C. § 904(d) (1988).
512. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A), (6) (1988) (stating that a sentence must "reflect the
seriousness of the offense" and "provide just punishment for the offense" (emphasis added)); see
also S. REP. No. 98-225, at 75-76 (1983) ("This purpose . .. is another way of saying that the
sentence should reflect the gravity of the defendant's conduct. From the public's standpoint, the
sentence should be of a type and length that will adequately reflect, among other things, the harm
done or threatened by the offense, and the public interest in preventing a recurrence of the offense.
From the defendant's standpoint the sentence should not be unreasonably harsh under all the
circumstances of the case and should not differ substantially from the sentence given to another
similarly situated defendant convicted of a similar offense under similar circumstances.").
513. Interview with George MacKinnon, supra note 137, at 10.
514. Interview with Ilene H. Nagel, supra note 46, at 17-18.
515. Id. at 18.
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The SRA instructed the Commission to determine whether, and to
what extent, judges should consider the eleven specific offender
characteristics. 16 An offender characteristics committee, chaired by
Commissioner Block and aided by Commissioner Robinson, listed and
categorized potential offender characteristics, drawing on state
guidelines and discussions with DOJ personnel and other Commission
staff.' After holding public hearings and reviewing public comment on
the subject, the Commission, largely following the lead of the Parole
Commission in its guidelines,"' concluded that nine of the offender
traits in the SRA-age, education, vocational skills, mental and
emotional condition, physical condition, employment, family ties and
responsibilities, role in the offense, and community ties-are "not
ordinarily relevant" for sentencing purposes.51 9
The original Commissioners understood that many of these
offender characteristics-employment record and vocational skills,
education, family and community ties-were potentially relevant as
aggravating or mitigating factors, but that their consideration would
potentially benefit white offenders and wealthy offenders more than
minority offenders and poor offenders.520 The SRA specifically
516. 28 U.S.C. § 994(d).
517. Meeting Minutes, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n (Jan. 21, 1987), supranote 177, at 7-9, 13.
518. Breyer, supra note 234, at 19-20 ("[T]he Commission decided to write its offender
characteristics with an eye towards the Parole Commission's previous work in this area."). The
Parole Guidelines then in effect only considered two characteristics in addition to an offender's
criminal record-age and drug dependence. Id. at 19 & n.97. As noted above, the Sentencing
Commission went further and decided that those two factors were ordinarily not relevant.
519. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3, §§ 5H1.1-.7; William W. Wilkins, Jr.,
The FederalSentencing Guidelines:Striking an Appropriate Balance, 25 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 571,
581-82 (1992). The inclusion of the word "ordinarily" has been attributed to U.S. District Judge
Jack Weinstein. See Symposium, Alternative Punishments Under the New Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 1 FED. SENT'G REP. 96 (1988) (noting statements of Kenneth Feinberg). Regarding drug
or alcohol addiction, the guidelines provided that such addiction was not a basis to depart in any
case because "[s]ubstance abuse is highly correlated to an increased propensity to commit crime."
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3, § 5f1.4. The Senate Judiciary Committee's
report had generally recommended against consideration of an offender's substance abuse history as
an aggravating or mitigating factor. See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 173 (1983) ("Drug dependence, in
the Committee's view, generally should not play a role in the decision whether or not to incarcerate
the offender.").
520. See, e.g., Memorandum from Stephen Breyer, Comm'r to Chairman Wilkins 6 (Sept. 3,
1986) (explaining that an offender's "past employment record" was relevant to predicting whether
the offender would recidivate, but that the Commission chose not to include that factor in the
guidelines "because of his high correlation with race, a correlation that reflects diminished
economic opportunity"). Similar concerns were raised by a leading expert in criminology, Professor
Alfred Blumstein of Carnegie-Mellon University, who wrote to Commissioner Block. Letter from
Alfred Blumstein, Professor, Carnegie-Mellon Univ., to Michael K. Block, Chairman, Offender
Characteristics Subcomm., U.S. Sentencing Comm'n (Feb. 6, 1986) (on file with authors) ("[T]here
is widespread concern that the invoking of socioeconomic variables (many of which we know to be
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prohibited the guidelines from considering an offender's race and socioeconomic status and also discouraged the consideration of other offender
characteristics that could serve as "proxies" for race and socio-economic
status. 52 1 The Commissioners also understood that some of the offense
characteristics-such as an offender's youth and drug addiction-were
"two-edged swords,"5 22 insofar as they could be mitigating from a
retributivist standpoint, but at the same time could be aggravating from a
utilitarian perspective.5 23
For all these reasons, the Commissioners created a guidelines
manual that limited consideration of age, education, vocational skills,
mental and emotional condition, physical condition, employment, family
ties and responsibilities, and community ties.5 24 The Commission
permitted consideration of a defendant's mental or emotional condition
that rose to the level of "diminished capacity," but only in a non-violent
case and only if the defendant did not have a serious criminal record.5 25
3. Limiting Judges' Departures from the Applicable
Guidelines Ranges
The SRA contained two main provisions relevant to judges' ability
to depart from the sentencing guidelines to be promulgated by the
Commission: (1) it directed the Commission to draft guidelines that have
"sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentences when warranted
by mitigating or aggravating factors not taken into account in the
establishment of [the guidelines] ;"1526 and (2) it directed sentencing
correlated with race in the general population) in sentencing will serve as a proxy for the race

variable.").
521. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 376 (1989) ("Congress also prohibited the
Commission from considering the 'race, sex, national origin, creed, and socioeconomic status of
offenders,' § 994(d), and instructed that the guidelines should reflect the 'general inappropriateness'
of considering certain other factors, such as current unemployment, that might serve as proxies for

forbidden factors, § 994(e).").
522. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 323-24 (1989) ("Penry's mental retardation and
history of [child] abuse is thus a two-edged sword: it may diminish his blameworthiness for his
crime even as it indicates that there is a probability that be will be dangerous in the future.").
523. See, e.g., Interview with Ilene H. Nagel, supra note 46, at 24-26 (explaining that an
offender's youth or drug addiction made him less culpable but also made him more likely to
recidivate).
524.

SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3,

§§

5H1.1-.6 (providing that such

offender characteristics were "not ordinarily relevant" in deciding whether to depart from the
applicable guideline range).
525.

SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3,

§ 5K2.13

("If the defendant committed

a non-violent offense while suffering from significantly reduced mental capacity not resulting from
voluntary use of drugs or other intoxicants, a lower sentence may be warranted to reflect the extent
to which reduced mental capacity contributed to the commission of the offense, provided that the

defendant's criminal history does not indicate a need for incarceration to protect the public.").
526. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (1988).
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courts to impose a sentence within the applicable guideline range "unless
the court finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating
circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into
consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the
guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that [called for
by the guidelines] ."527 These two related provisions authorized the
Commission to include as many aggravating and mitigating factors as it
deemed appropriate in the guidelines and, to the extent that the
Commission did not include such factors, a sentencing court could
depart from the applicable guidelines range only to the extent that the
Commission had not "adequately" considered them in formulating the
guidelines. In Commissioner Breyer's words, "the [SRA] states that the
Commission has the authority to limit departures."S28
Exercising its statutory authority, the original Commission created
a guidelines scheme that required, allowed, limited, or prohibited
consideration of a wide variety of aggravating and mitigating factors
identified at various places in the 268 pages long 1987 Guidelines
Manual-in chapter two offense guidelines,529 in chapter three
"adjustments,"5 30 or "departure" provisions in chapters four and five.53 1
In section 5K2.0, the Commission provided that a court had "discretion"
to depart from the applicable sentencing range if the court determined
that the Commission had not "given adequate consideration" to a
particular aggravating or mitigating factor or a particular "guideline
level attached to [a particular] factor is inadequate" in view of "unusual
circumstances" in a case.532 It further provided that "[w]here the
applicable guidelines, specific offense characteristics, and adjustments
do take into consideration a factor listed in this part, departure from the
guideline is warranted only if the factor is present to a degree

527.
528.

18 U.S.C. § 3553(b).
Breyer & Feinberg, supranote 191, at 18.

529. See, e.g., SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3, § 2B3.1(b)(2)(A) (noting that
a robbery guideline required an increase of three to five levels in a defendant's offense level

depending on how a dangerous weapon or firearm was used); id. § 2K2.1 (prohibiting persons who
possessed firearms providing for a decrease by four levels in the defendant's offense level "[i]f the
defendant obtained or possessed the firearm solely for sport or recreation").
530. See, e.g., id §§ 3B1.1-.2 (providing for two to four level increases or decreases-in the
aggravating and mitigating role provisions-in a defendant's offense level based on the role played
in an offense vis-d-vis codefendants).
531. See, e.g., id §4Al.1; id. §§ 5K2.12-.13 (allowing downward departures based on
coercion, duress, or defendant's diminished capacity); id. §§ 5H1.1-.6 (noting provisions limiting or
prohibiting departures base on certain offender characteristics).
532. Id. § 5K2.0.
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substantially in excess of that which ordinarily is involved in the offense
of conviction." 53 3
4. Accounting for Multiple Offenses or Multiple Harms
One of the most challenging issues in the Commission's attempt to
regulate judicial discretion concerned sentencing of offenders who
committed multiple distinct offenses or caused multiple harms (whether
or not charged as separate offenses), either at one fell swoop or
sequentially on separate occasions. A closely related issue was whether
sentences for multiple convictions should run concurrently or
consecutively to each other. The SRA provided little guidance
concerning these issues, other than the general directive that the
Commission "shall insure" that the guidelines reflect "incremental
[penalties]" for cases in which an offender is convicted of "multiple
offenses committed at different times."534 State practices did not offer a
satisfactory solution, as some states simply left it up to the sentencing
judge's discretion to run multiple counts concurrently or
consecutively-which resulted in sentencing disparities-while others
provided "that sentences for property offenses [were to] run concurrently
and sentences for offenses against the person were to run
consecutively[,]" which could result in disproportionately low sentences
for the former and disproportionately high sentences for the latter.535 The
federal parole guidelines also did not provide a model, because they did
not address the issue in any meaningful way.536

533. Id.
534. 28 U.S.C.

§ 994(1)(1)(B)

(1988). That section of the SRA also directed the Commission to

provide for incremental penalties for multiple offenses when at least one was prosecuted in federal

court under federal "ancillary jurisdiction." See id. § 994(1)(1)(A); Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v.
Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 375-76 (1978) (using the term ancillary jurisdiction in the context of federal
civil cases concerning the exercise of jurisdiction over related state law civil causes of action).
Apparently, that provision was an accidental vestige of an earlier version of the bill containing the

SRA when Congress was also considering enacting a sweeping federal "code reform" bill, which,
among other things, would have created ancillary jurisdiction in federal criminal cases over related
state law offenses. Gainer, supranote 51, at 97-98, 100-01.
535. Breyer & Feinberg, supra note 191, at 26.
536. See Interview by Gen. Accounting Office with Stephen G. Breyer, supra note 1, at 64.
The version of the parole guidelines in effect when the Commission was initially drafting the
Sentencing Guidelines simply provided that "[i]f an offense behavior involved multiple separate
offenses, the severity level may be increased" to reflect "the overall severity of the underlying
criminal behavior." 28 U.S.C. § 2.20, chpt. 13 (1982). In 1986, the parole guidelines were amended
to provide for more guidance about multiple offenses and multiple counts. For drug and property
offenses, "the total amount of the property or drugs involved is used as the basis for the offense
severity rating," while for other offense types the parole guidelines provided a chart with
recommended incremental enhancements in severity level depending on the number of separate
offenses committed. See 28 U.S.C. § 2.20, chpt. 13 (1988).
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This issue presented not only theoretical concerns over what
constitutes a single crime and how a sentence should properly increase
in proportion to multiple harms,537 but also practical concerns about
disparities. Senator Kennedy, one of the framers of the SRA, had
commented on the "glaring disparities" stemming from the "unfettered
discretion" given to judges in imposing concurrent or consecutive
sentences in pre-SRA cases in which defendants were convicted of
multiple offenses."' Commissioner Breyer warned that, if the
Commission did not create a guideline that governed sentencing in
multi-count cases, a "gigantic loophole" would exist in the guidelines'
regulation of sentencing discretion.539 He highlighted the difficulty of
this issue, noting "[w]e have not found any perfectly satisfactory way of
treating multiple harms and multiple (related) convictions."54 0
Commissioner Breyer initially proposed rules that would aggregate
loss amounts for economic crimes committed in the same "course of
conduct," would provide incremental penalties for separate counts of
conviction that were not part of the same course of conduct, and would
instruct the judge to select the crime with a "higher harm value" where
multiple offenses of conviction overlapped.5 41 Chairman Wilkins
similarly suggested that, for property or financial crimes, the total loss
amount be added for multiple related offenses, and further proposed that,
for other types of offenses, the count of conviction that "generates the
highest total offense level" be recognized as the "primary count," which
could be supplemented by incremental increases in the penalty level
based on additional convictions.54 2
Eventually, the Commission settled on a complex set of rules that
usually turns on the nature of the multiple offenses committed by
537.

See, e.g., Stephen G. Breyer, Difficult Guideline Issues 25 (Sept. 15, 1986) (unpublished

manuscript on file with authors) (posing the question of "how to treat the bank robber who pistol
whips three (or ten) tellers, the conman who sends 10,000 letters defrauding each recipient of $10,

and the drug dealer who shoots a policeman, while endangering several others"); Stephen J.
Schulbofer, Professor, Univ. of Chi. Law Scb., Statement Before the U.S. Sentencing Commission 8
(Mar. 12, 1987) ("There are many possible standards for the consecutive sentencing question,

focusing on such elements as the number of distinct transactions, objectives or victims .....
538. See Kennedy, supra note 57, at 260-61, 353 n.2, 357-58, 366-67.
539. Interview by Gen. Accounting Office with Stephen G. Breyer, supra note 1, at 64-65.
540. Breyer, supra note 537, at 30; see Breyer, supra note 234, at 25-28 (describing the
treatment of multiple counts as an "intractable sentencing problem" that "is so complex that only a
rough approach to a solution is possible" and arguing that the widely held perception that more
severe punishment is warranted for each additional unit of harm inflicted, but that the corresponding
increase should not be strictly proportional, "make it difficult to write rules that properly treat
'multiple counts').
541. Breyer, supra note 537, at 26-28.
542. Memorandum from William W. Wilkins, Jr., Determining the Sentence 2 (Feb. 26, 1987)
(on file with authors).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2017

79

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 4 [2017], Art. 11

1246

HOFSTRA LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 45:1167

"

defendants. For most federal offense types, such as drug trafficking and
economic offenses, the Guidelines Manual provided that, with respect to
multiple harms caused by a defendant, all harms that occurred as "part of
a single criminal episode" or "a single course of conduct with a single
criminal objective" would be "grouped" together for a single guidelines
calculation, regardless of the number of counts of conviction or number
of different victims.5 43 For certain other offense types, such as crimes of
violence, the Guidelines Manual required that a defendant's offense
level generally be increased incrementally based on the number of
counts of conviction rather than aggregating all harms resulting from
multiple distinct offenses into a single guidelines calculation, even if the
harms occurred as part of single course of conduct (for example, a spree
of bank robberies occurring during a short time period). 5
The Commission's policy concerning sentencing for a defendant
convicted of multiple offenses is primarily attributable to Professor
Stephen Schulhofer, a consultant retained by the original Commission,
who proposed a solution that the Commission ultimately adopted.5 45 His
multi-count approach is reflected in provisions in both chapters three and
five of the initial Guidelines Manual.54 6
The Commission's multi-count policy was not based on its analysis
of "past practice" data. Instead, it was a policy decision made by the
Commission.5 47 Commissioner Breyer observed that "the Commission's
rules produce a highly approximate solution[]" to the problem of
creating a rational sentencing regime for multiple counts.5 48 "Yet, the

543.

SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supranote 3,

§ 3DI.2,

cmts. n.3 & 4.

544. Id. pt. D, cmt. ("Some offense guidelines, such as those for theft, fraud and drug offenses,
contain provisions that deal with repetitive or ongoing behavior. Other guidelines, such as those for
assault, robbery, and bribery, are oriented more toward single episodes of criminal behavior.

Accordingly, different rules are required for dealing with multiple count convictions involving those
two different general classes of offenses."); see also id. § 3D1.2, cmt. 6 (giving as an example: "The
defendant is convicted of three counts of bank robbery. The counts are not to be grouped together,

nor are the amounts of money involved to be added [in a single guideline calculation]").
545. See Meeting Minutes, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, supra note 256, at 5 (noting that
Professor Schulhofer drafted this portion of the Guidelines Manual); Interview by Michael
Courlander & Kent Larsen with Stephen Breyer, supra note 141, at 27-28 (crediting Schulhofer

with helping create the multiple count provision); see also Multiple Counts: Concurrent and
Consecutive Sentences of Imprisonment 1-2 (undated memorandum) (on file with authors).
546. SENTENCING COMM'N GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3, §§ 3D1.1-.5,

5G1.2.

Professor Bennardo has succinctly summarized those complex rules. See Kevin Bennardo, A
Quantity-Driven Solution to Aggregate Grouping Under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual, 40
FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 791, 794-95 (2013).

547. Interview by Gen. Accounting Office with Stephen G. Breyer, supra note 1, at 64-66.
548. Breyer, supra note 234, at 27-28.
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rules represent a compromise preferable to the alternatives-doing
nothing or adopting yet more arbitrary rules."549
5. Plea Bargaining
Despite all of the efforts made by the original Commission to
regulate sentencing discretion, there remained another potential loophole
that potentially threatened to undermine the new guidelines system's
goal of avoiding unwarranted disparity and providing for proportionate
5
' Before the SRA, it was widely recognized
sentences: plea bargaining.o
that that variations in plea bargaining practices caused sentencing
disparities, often undermined the extent to which a sentence would
reflect the offender's real offense conduct, and threatened the extent to
which the purposes of punishment would be furthered. 5 1 The exercise of
federal prosecutors' plea bargaining power was extremely common in
pre-guidelines sentencing-occurring in over three-quarters of all
federal cases.552
Congress was well aware of the possibility that plea bargaining
could subvert the primary goal of the SRA, namely the reduction of
unwarranted disparities. The Senate Judiciary Committee's report
acknowledged concerns that a "prosecutor will use the plea bargaining
process to circumvent the guidelines recommendation if he doesn't agree
with the guidelines recommendation."' The report further noted that
unchecked prosecutorial decisions "could effectively determine the
range of sentence to be imposed, and could well reduce the benefits
otherwise to be expected from the [SRA's] guideline sentencing

549. Id at 28.
550. See Interview with Ilene H. Nagel, supra note 46, at 6-7 ("[W]hile Congress recognized
that plea bargaining was separate [from judicial sentencing disparities] and that the Commission

should try . . .to do something about it, I think that they underestimated the degree to which [plea
bargaining] would basically have the potential to completely gut the [guidelines] system.").
551. S. REP. No. 98-225, at 63 n.245 (1983) (citing STEPHEN SCHULHOFER, 1 PROSECUTORIAL
DISCRETION AND FEDERAL SENTENCING REFORM 62-65, 68-72 (1979)).

552. See Memorandum from Debbie Lister to Michael K. Block, Comm'r, U.S. Sentencing
Comm'n (Mar. 5, 1987) (on file with authors) (noting that from a sample of 450 cases, 366, or
81.3%, were resolved by guilty pleas and 349, or 77.6% of all cases, were resolved through plea
agreements). The incidence of plea bargains had increased substantially since the 1970s, when the
Supreme Court finally gave its blessing to the practice. See Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 76
(1977) ("Only recently has plea bargaining become a visible practice accepted as a legitimate
component in the administration of criminal justice. For decades it was a sub rosa process shrouded

in secrecy and deliberately concealed by participating defendants, defense lawyers, prosecutors, and
even judges. Indeed, it was not until our decision in Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 that
lingering doubts about the legitimacy of the practice were finally dispelled."); see also Santobello v.
New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971) (recognizing that guilty pleas are both an "essential" and
"highly desirable" part of the criminal process).
553. S. REP. No. 98-225, at 63.
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system."55 4 The SRA thus directed the Commission to issue "policy
statements" that would help judges decide whether to accept or reject a
5
plea agreements.
" This guidance, the report explained, would assist
judges in "mak[ing] certain that prosecutors have not used plea
bargaining to undermine the sentencing guidelines."556 The report added
that this "judicial review of plea bargaining" could "alleviate any
potential problem in this area."s5 7

The initial Commission faced a dilemma: how to regulate a
pervasive and heretofore entirely unregulated practice in the federal
sentencing system without jeopardizing the acceptance of the guidelines
in the field?.5 . This difficulty is reflected in the Commissioners'
deliberations. For example, Commissioner MacKinnon asserted that,
under the SRA, "one of the Commission's primary duties is to stop U.S.
Attorneys from plea negotiations" that would undermine the effect of the
new guidelines, while Commissioner Breyer countered that "plea
bargaining could not be abolished."' The question thus became how far
the Commission was willing to go in attempting to regulate plea
bargaining without endangering essential support from key actors in the
federal sentencing arena.
The Commission was required to consider two main types of plea
bargain practices-"charge bargaining" and "sentence bargaining."5 1
Although Congress wanted sentencing judges to "review chargereduction plea agreements to ensure that such agreements do not result
in undue leniency or unwarranted sentencing disparities," 6 1 realistically
courts had no power to control what charges were brought in the first
place and had virtually no power to control a prosecutor's decision
outside the plea bargaining process to dismiss an existing charge and
bring a different, superseding charge.562 That meant the primary issue for
the Commission was how to regulate "sentencing bargains."5 63
554. Id.
555. 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(2)(E) (1988).
556. S. REP. No. 98-225, at 63.
557. Id.
558. See Schulhofer & Nagel, supra note 13, at 242-43 (observing that the Commission did not
want to risk losing the support of key players in the federal criminal justice system but also
understood that the status quo in plea bargain practices threatened to undermine the guidelines).
559. Meeting Minutes, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, supra note 291, at 13-19; see Meeting
Minutes, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, supranote 289, at 8.
560. Schulhofer & Nagel, supra note 13, at 252-56.
561. S. REP. No. 98-225, at 167.
562. See FED. R. CIM. P. 48(a) (noting that a prosecutor may obtain "leave of court" to
dismiss a pending charge). Obtaining leave of court, however, served to protect defendants. See
United States v. Salinas, 693 F.2d 348, 351 (5th Cir. 1982) ("[T]he leave of court requirement was
added to allow the courts to exercise discretion over the propriety of a prosecutorial motion to
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On September 23, 1986, the Commission held a public hearing on
plea negotiations.5 64 In his written testimony submitted on behalf of the
DOJ at the Commission's hearing, Assistant Attorney General William
Weld stated that:
We do not believe that the Sentence Reform Act eliminates "sentence
bargaining" . . . The prosecution and the defendant should still be able
to agree that a particular sentence is appropriate.

. .

. [T]he agreed-upon

sentence must be one which, based upon the facts and circumstances of
the offense and the defendant's background, is within the permissible
range of sentences under the guidelines, or the plea agreement must set
forth some justification for going outside the guidelines.565
The September 1986 preliminary draft guidelines published shortly
thereafter recognized that the federal criminal justice system "relies
heavily" on plea bargains.56 6 The preliminary draft also acknowledged
that, from an administrative perspective, any drastic changes to plea
bargaining practices, in light of the percentage of criminal cases
disposed by way of guilty pleas, "would likely require a considerable
increase in federal judicial resources," insofar as more cases could end
up going to trial. 67 The preliminary draft did not include policy
statements on plea agreements, opting instead to pose for public
comment a series of five questions on how the Commission may "insure
responsible plea negotiation practices that do not perpetuate unwarranted
sentencing disparities."568
dismiss. Although the Supreme Court has not delineated the circumstances in which this discretion
may be exercised, the [lower] courts have agreed that the primary purpose of the rule is protection

of a defendant's right.... [T]he purpose of the rule is to prevent harassment of a defendant by
charging, dismissing and re-charging without placing a defendant in jeopardy."'). Therefore, a court
generally would abuse its discretion under Rule 48(a) in refusing to grant a prosecutor's motion to
dismiss a charge that benefited a defendant by limiting his sentencing exposure. See, e.g., United
States v. Hamm, 659 F.2d 624, 629-30 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that, when a defendant consents to
the dismissal of a charge, it is only "in extremely limited circumstances in extraordinary cases [that
a court] may deny the motion").
563. See Schulhofer & Nagel, supra note 13, at 255-56; see also S. REP. No. 98-225, at 63.
564. Meeting Minutes, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, supra note 225, at 1.
565.

William F. Weld, Assistant Att'y Gen., Criminal Div., Department Statement Before the

United States Sentencing Commission 9-10 (1986) (on file with authors); see Dep't of Justice,
Comments on Preliminary Draft of Sentencing Guidelines 268-69 (undated) (on file with authors)
("With respect to the broader question of the interrelationship of plea agreements to the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984, we are of the view that passage of that statute was not intended to modify plea
bargaining in any major way and that the Commission's policy statements should therefore consist
of general factors and considerations that would be applicable now as in the future with respect to
advising judges on when to accept or reject a plea agreement.").
566. Preliminary Draft of Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 51 Fed. Reg. 35,080,
35,086 (Oct. 1, 1986).
567. Id. at 35,086-87.
568. Id. at 35,130.
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The subsequent January 1987 revised draft guidelines contained
policy statements about plea bargain practices that appeared to reflect
what the DOJ had proposed.5 69 Most important, it authorized a judge to
accept a recommended or agreed sentence outside of the guidelines
contained in a plea bargain so long as "reason exists for departure from
the guidelines" and that the sentence does not undermine the purposes of
sentencing. 7 o Consistent with the concept of real offense sentencing, the
revised draft guidelines required plea bargains to "set forth all relevant
facts and circumstances of the offense conduct." 57 1
In accordance with the SRA's directive concerning plea
bargaining,5 72 the original Guidelines Manual ultimately addressed plea
bargain practices in a set of non-binding "policy statements" rather than
in binding guidelines.5 73 These statements provided that a court could
accept a plea bargain agreement that provided for a sentence outside of
the applicable guideline range so long as the sentence "departs from the
applicable guideline range for justifiable reasons."5 7 4 The commentary
further provided that a court should only accept a plea agreement with a
sentence outside of the applicable guideline if the sentence "departs from
the applicable guideline range for justifiable reasons and does not
undermine the basic purposes of sentencing."5 7 The 1987 manual did
not define "justifiable reasons" and, in particular, unlike a subsequent
version of the commentary, did not require there to be a valid factual and
legal basis for a departure from the guidelines range.5 76 The manual did
569. Proposed Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 52 Fed. Reg. 3920, 3977 (Feb.
6, 1987).
570. Id.
571. Id.
572. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(2)(E) (1988) (requiring the Commission to issue "general policy
statements" concerning plea agreements). Judge Wilkins saw significance in the fact that Congress
directed the Commission to issue policy statements rather than guidelines concerning plea

bargaining and stated that "[i]n providing for general policy statements rather than guidelines for
plea negotiations, Congress no doubt recognized the delicate balance to be struck between the ideals
of sentencing reform and the practical realities of a system, however imperfect, that must dispose of
thousands of criminal cases every year." Wilkins, supranote 201, at 187.

573. United States v. Goodall, 236 F.3d 700, 701-02 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ("Both the Introduction
to the Guidelines itself and the brief introductory comments prefacing Chapter 6, Part B, state that
policy statements, such as § 6B1.2, are non-binding 'norms' to which courts may refer in deciding
whether to accept or to reject plea agreements.").
574. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3, § 6B1.2. The same justifiable reasons

standard applied to recommended sentences (i.e. those that would not be binding on the court at
sentencing) or agreed sentences (i.e. those that if the court accepted the plea bargain, would be

binding on the court at sentencing). Id.
575.
576.

§ 6B1.2(b)-(c);

see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 1 1(e)(1)(B)-(C).

SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3, § 6B1.2 cmt.
In 1989, the Commission amended the policy statement's commentary to provide the

following:
[T]he court will accept a recommended sentence or a plea agreement requiring
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provide that courts, before accepting a recommended or agreed sentence
in a plea agreement, should first order the preparation of a presentence
report in order to inform the court's decision.M
The manual explicitly noted the tension between upending current
practices that depended significantly on plea bargains, on one hand, and
creating a "loophole" in the guidelines structure, on the other. 578 The
manual made it clear that the Commission did not make "significant
changes" to plea bargain practices and was reserving a policy decision
on any major changes until data about plea bargain practices under the
guidelines could be collected and analyzed.5 79 Commissioner Breyer
stated that the Commission sought to "leave plea bargaining roughly
where it found it," 5 " with only a "slight[]" change from the pre-

guidelines practice.' On another occasion, he was somewhat more
blunt, suggesting that the Commission had "punted" on the plea
bargaining issue.582 Notably, in a September 1986 memorandum to his
fellow Commissioners, he noted a strong practical advantage of
maintaining the pre-guidelines rate of plea bargaining: "a change in
sentencing practice that significantly raised the number of cases that
imposition of a specific sentence only if the court is satisfied either that the contemplated
sentence is within the guidelines or, if not, that the recommended sentence or agreement

departs from the applicable guideline range for justifiable reasons.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supranote 3, § 6Bl.2 cmt. (app. C, amend. 295 (Nov. 1, 1989).
Thereafter, the circuit courts were divided over whether a district court was required to reject a
below-range sentence in a plea agreement that was not based on a lawful ground for a departure. See
Stephanos Bibas, The Feeney Amendment and the Continuing Rise ofProsecutorialPower to Plea

Bargain, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 295, 305-06 & n.61 (2004). That circuit-split was mooted
in 2005 when the Supreme Court rendered the guidelines "advisory," thereby allowing "variances"

under the broad standard in § 3553(a)--in addition to departures. See United States v. Booker, 543
U.S. 220, 245-46 (2005). Thereafter, the Commission amended the commentary of section 6B 1.2 to
provide, as the original manual did, that a court should accept a bargain with a recommended or

agreed sentence outside of the applicable guideline range only for "justifiable reasons" but without
any other specific limitation. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 651 (Nov. 1,

2011).
577. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3, § 6B1.1(c). With respect to charge
bargains, the initial Guidelines Manual provided that a court could accept a plea agreement that
dismissed one or more charges in exchange for the defendant's guilty plea to a remaining charge or

charges, so long as "the remaining charges adequately reflect the seriousness of the actual offense
behavior and that accepting the plea agreement will not undermine the statutory purposes of

sentencing." Id. § 6B1.2(a).
578. Id. ch. 1, pt. A.
579. See id; see also id. ch. 6, pt. B, introductory cmt. (observing that substantive changes at
that point would be "premature").

580.

Breyer & Feinberg, supra note 191, at 28 (noting that the Commission intended to "go

slowly" in the context of plea agreements); see Sentencing Guidelines: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Crim. Justice of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 40 (1987) (statement of

Stephen G. Breyer, Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the 1st Circuit).
581. Breyer, supra note 234, at 30.
582. Judge Stephen Breyer, supra note 43.
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must be tried would likely require a significant increase in the number of
federal courts."5 83
Despite the initial Commission's decision not to regulate plea
bargaining more vigorously, the guidelines, nonetheless, were said to
offer two distinct advantages over pre-guidelines plea bargaining
practices: the initial guidelines themselves could serve as a baseline for
the prosecutor and defense counsel as they engaged in plea negotiations,
and the applicable guidelines range could serve as a "norm" for a judge
in deciding whether or not to accept a plea bargain.58 4 Because the
guidelines provided that PSRs should be prepared before a judge
accepted a sentence bargain, 8 5 a judge would have significant
information available to him or her about the offender, offense, and
guidelines calculations.586 The judge thus could stand in a better
position, compared with the pre-guidelines world, to weigh the
appropriateness of the plea bargain in light of the real offense conduct
and the guidelines range.
Even with these benefits, the initial guidelines left largely
undisturbed a central feature of pre-guidelines federal sentencing,
thereby preserving prosecutors' significant power over the sentencing
process. It would be up to the DOJ to police itself regarding both charge
and sentence bargains. 8 ' Shortly after the original Guidelines Manual
went into effect in November 1987, the DOJ issued a national policy
applicable to all federal prosecutors. According to a memorandum issued
by Assistant Attorney General Stephen Trott, "plea agreements should
not be used to circumvent the Guidelines." 8 8 Prosecutors ordinarily
should charge the "most serious offense or offenses consistent with the
defendant's conduct," any plea bargain ordinarily should require the
defendant to plead guilty to the most serious charge, and prosecutors
ordinarily should seek a sentence within the applicable guideline range
Breyer, supra note 537, at 9.
See SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3, ch. 1, pt. A; see also Breyer

&

583.
584.

Feinberg, supra note 191, at 28 ("[W]hether a judge accepts a plea or not is likely to depend on his
view of the Guidelines and how the plea arrangement stacks up against the Guidelines.").
585.

SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supranote 3,

§ 6Bl.1(c).

586. See Breyer & Feinberg, supra note 191, at 30.
587. Schulhofer & Nagel, supra note 13, at 252 ("Senior officials of the Department
understood that plea bargaining must be controlled to make the entire Guidelines process work.
Although their commitment to sentencing reform, like the commitment of conservatives in
Congress, may have stemmed more from a desire to curb undue leniency than from a fervor for
equal treatment, these officials (Trott, Weld, and later Thornburgh) were largely dedicated to
plugging loopholes to every extent possible.").
588. Memorandum from Stephen S. Trott, Assoc. Att'y Gen. to All Litigating Div. Heads and
All U.S. Att'ys (Nov. 3, 1987), reprinted in Trott Memorandum, 6 FED. SENT'G REP. 342, 342
(1994).
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or a below-range sentence if it were consistent with the Guidelines
Manual's
provisions
authorizing
departures.'
The
"Trott
Memorandum" was followed up in 1989 by a more detailed and even
more forceful set of plea bargaining standards issued by Attorney
General Richard Thornburg. 59 0
D.

Creatinga "ModifiedReal Offense" System

One of the primary ways that the original Commission sought to
regulate sentencing discretion was for the guidelines to consider not only
the offense or offenses of conviction but also other, related criminal
conduct of which a defendant had not been convicted but which a
sentencing judge found at the sentencing hearing.591 That particular
policy decision differed
significantly from existing
state
sentencing guidelines, which focused almost exclusively on the offense
of conviction.
1. Tension Between Uniformity and Proportionality
As noted above, Congress' concern about sentencing disparities
was the primary motivating factor leading it to create the Commission.59 2
The Commission easily could have furthered the goal of uniformity by
adopting a charged offense system, in which every offense of conviction
carries a set guidelines sentence, regardless of any attendant
circumstances. As Chairman Wilkins noted, "the Commission ostensibly
could have achieved perfect uniformity simply [for example] by

589. Id.
590. Memorandum from Richard Thornburgh, Att'y Gen., to All U.S. Att'ys (Mar. 13, 1989),
reprinted in Thornburgh Bluesheet, 6 FED. SENT'G REP. 347, 347-49 (1994). Thornburgh's
memorandum stated the following:

It is vitally important that federal prosecutors understand these guidelines and make
them work. Prosecutors who do not understand the guidelines or who seek to circumvent
them will undermine their deterrent and punitive force and will recreate the very

problems that the guidelines are expected to solve.... [A] federal prosecutor should
initially charge the most serious, readily provable offense or offenses consistent with the
defendant's conduct.... The basic policy is that charges are not to be bargained away or
dropped, unless the prosecutor has a good faith doubt as to the government's ability
readily to prove a charge for legal or evidentiary reasons .... [P]rosecutors may bargain

for a sentence that is within the specified guideline range. . . .It violates the spirit of the
guidelines and Department policy for prosecutors to enter into a plea bargain which is
based upon the prosecutor's and the defendant's agreement that a departure [from the
sentencing guidelines] is warranted, but that does not reveal to the court the departure

and afford an opportunity for the court to reject it.
Id. at 347-48.
591. See supra Part IV.C.1, C.4.
592. See supraPart I.A.4.
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specifying that every defendant convicted of robbery would receive a
593
two-year prison sentence."

But uniformity is not the only interest in federal sentencing. In
addition to mandating similar sentences for similar offenders, Congress
also required the Commission to ensure that sentences are proportionate
to the offense.594 The Commission concluded that a modified "real
offense" system, based not only on the charged offense but also on the
actual conduct of the offender in committing the offense and related
conduct, would further such proportionality.5 95
There is, however, an inherent tension between uniformity and
proportionality. Promoting uniformity, through a charged offense
system, could, as Commissioner Breyer recognized, unduly lump
together offenses that are different in meaningful respects. 596 For
example, a single sentence for all robberies would not reflect important
factual distinctions between robberies, such as whether the offenders
were armed, whether injuries resulted, or how much money was taken.
A charged offense system, he noted, "would have been far too simplistic
to achieve just and effective sentences." 59 8 At the same time, a real
offense system that considers all distinguishing characteristics would
promote proportionality at the expense of uniformity and feasibility.
Commissioner Breyer observed that, a "system tailored to account for
every conceivable offense and offender characteristic would quickly
become too complex and unworkable." 5 99
2. "Modified Real Offense" Approach
In the choice between a charged offense and real offense system,
the Commission's early efforts began on the "pure real offense" end of
the spectrum. The just deserts draft based sentences on a myriad of
harms resulting from the commission of an offense that could be
identified and gradated. 60 Commissioners Robinson and Gainer,
together with the DOJ, supported the use of such a real offense
system.6 01 In that sentencing scheme, "every harm must count. "602 But,

593.
594.
595.
596.
597.
598.
599.
600.
601.
602.

Memorandum from Stephen Breyer to Williams W. Wilkins, Jr., supranote 520, at 573.
See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 46, 77, 86 (discussing the need for proportionate sentences).
See infra Part IV.D.2.
Memorandum from Stephen Breyer to Williams W. Wilkins, Jr., supra note 520, at 573.
Id. at 573 n.4.
Id.
Id. at 573.
See supra notes 215-25 and accompanying text.
Interview with Ilene H. Nagel, supra note 46, at 60.
Testimony of Assoc. Att'y Gen. Stephen Trott, supra note 231, at 65-66; see also

Interview by Gen. Accounting Office with Stephen G. Breyer, supra note 1, at 9.
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as noted above, other Commissioners came to realize that the pure real
offense system was not workable. 603
On July 28, 1986, the Commission moved away from a "pure" real
offense system to a "modified" real offense system. 604 in its
deliberations, the Commission first rejected the charged offense
approach used by the existing state sentencing guidelines. 605 The
Commission decided in favor of a system based both on the offense of
conviction as well as on certain "real offense" aspects, because such
sentencing comported with current practice in which judges relied on
presentence reports to base sentences on what offenders actually did-in
addition to what they had been convicted of.6 06 Indeed, the Supreme
Court in Williams v. New York` 7 had held that uncharged criminal
conduct was relevant to sentencing, and the federal parole guidelines
also considered an offender's real offense conduct and not merely the
offense of conviction.60 8
In addition, the SRA clearly envisioned such a system, as it both
created a broad rule of admissibility 609 and directed the Commission to
consider the relevance of several "real offense" factors along with the
offense conviction. These included the "circumstances under which the
offense was committed which mitigate or aggravate the seriousness of
the offense;"6 10 the defendant's "role in the offense;"6 1' and "the nature
and degree of the harm caused by the offense, including whether it
involved property, irreplaceable property, a person, a number of persons,
or a breach of public trust."6 12 Many of these types of factors are not
typically elements of the offense of conviction.
603.

See supranote 225 and accompanying text; see also Interview by Gen. Accounting Office

with Stephen G. Breyer, supra note 1, at 16 ("Realization (1) [from Commissioner Robinson's
draft] was that this real offense approach would not work.").

604.
605.
606.
607.

Meeting Minutes, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n 3 (July 28, 1986) (on file with authors).
See id.
Id.
337 U.S. 241 (1949).

608.

Id. at 249-52; see U.S. PAROLE COMM'N, RULES AND PROCEDURES MANUAL

§ 2.19

(1985).
609. See 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (1988) ("No limitation shall be placed on the information
concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a
court of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate
sentence."). Before the SRA, the provision in section 3661 appeared in a different statutory section,
which was later re-codified as part of the SRA. See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L.
No. 91-452, § 3577, 84 Stat. 922, 951 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3577). This provision was later
renumbered. See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 212(a)(1), 98 Stat. 1987,
1987 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3661).
610. 28 U.S.C. § 994(c)(2) (1988).
611. Id. § 994(d)(9).
612. Id. § 994(c)(3). The Senate Judiciary Committee's report also clearly envisioned that
Commission would create guidelines that considered a broad range mitigating and aggravating
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In the September 1986 preliminary draft guidelines, the
Commission explained the "modified real offense" paradigm. The
preliminary draft explained that a real offense approach would promote
proportionality in that it would permit judges to sentence "[t]wo
seemingly alike offenders .. . in a way that reflects [real] differences"
between the two.6 13 The example is given of two individuals: both are

charged with bank robbery, but one steals more money, uses a gun in the
commission of the offense, and strikes a teller; under a real offense
system, this offender should be sentenced more severely. 614 In doing so,
the sentencing judge can ensure that a sentence properly serves
"society's needs for retribution, deterrence, and incapacitation. "615
The preliminary draft also noted that it was common practice at that
time for sentencing judges to consider "actual" or "real" offense
conduct.616 The preliminary draft therefore comported with what judges
were actually doing, and had been doing for decades. Moreover, the
Commission pointed to the fact that the "present parole guidelines
system overtly relies on real criminal conduct."61
The preliminary draft also acknowledged several problems with a
pure real offense system. First, that approach may be unfair to the
offender from a procedural standpoint.6 18 That is, a charge of conviction
must be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, or the defendant
must plead guilty to the charge, but the real offense conduct need only
be found by a judge by a preponderance of evidence.619 In addition, the
real offense conduct may be based on information that would not be
factors other than the elements of the offense or offenses of conviction. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 98225, at 170 ("Among the considerations the Commission might examine under [section 994(c)(2)]
are whether the offense was particularly heinous; whether the offense was committed on the spur of
the moment or after substantial planning; whether the offense was committed in reckless disregard
of the safety of others; whether the offense involved a threat with a weapon or use of a weapon;
whether the offense was committed in a manner plainly designed to limit the danger to victims;
whether the defendant was acting under a form of duress not rising to the level of a defense; etc.").
Also notable in this regard is the report's statement that, in factoring in a defendant's past criminal
conduct, the Commission could account not only for prior convictions but also any prior criminal
acts "whether or not they resulted in convictions." Id. at 174.
613. Preliminary Draft of Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 51 Fed. Reg. 35,080,
35,086 (Oct. 1, 1986).
614. Id.; see Breyer, supra note 234, at 9-10 (observing that, under a charged offense system,
"particular crimes may be committed in different ways, which in the past have made, and still
should make, an important difference in terms of the punishment imposed").
615. Preliminary Draft of Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 51 Fed. Reg. 35,080,
35,086.
616.
617.
618.
619.
35,086.

Id.
Id.
See Breyer, supra note 234, at 10-11.
Preliminary Draft of Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 51 Fed. Reg. 35,080,
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admissible at trial, such as hearsay.6 20 Second, an offender may expect
that certain facts may be "mooted" by a plea agreement, only to find out
later that the facts are weighed by a judge and even then based on a
lower standard of proof.6 2' Third, under a pure real offense system, an
offender would not know with reliability what added circumstances a
sentencing judge may or may not consider in imposing a sentence, and
as such an offender may not be able to predict his or her sentence and
thereby evaluate the benefits of a particular plea offer.62 2 In a related
manner, if a judge were to go outside of negotiated facts to real offense
conduct, the value of plea negotiation would be undermined. 6 23 As a
consequence, trials could become more common and judicial resources
strained. 624 Fourth, taking into account every conceivable aspect of the
offense would introduce significant complexity into the sentencing
process and thereby heighten the risk of erroneous guideline application,
which could produce sentencing disparities and threaten the goal of
uniformity that lies at the heart of the SRA and the guidelines.6 25
The draft also noted that an offense of conviction system had
advantages because it would promote certainty in sentencing and
facilitate plea negotiations.626 It would also maximize procedural
protections for defendants because, as Commissioner Breyer stated, "it
places before a jury all factual elements relevant to punishment" and
"the jury must find the existence of each relevant disputed fact 'beyond
reasonable doubt. "'627
But the Commission recognized that a charged offense system
contains problems of its own. First, statutes may be written in very
general, broad language that may not provide a judge with the
information necessary for proportionate sentencing.628 Second, even if
statutes were specific, variations in offense conduct would be ignored,
thereby inviting "unwarranted similarit[ies] in sentences," 62 9 subverting
the SRA's command that relevant variations be considered, 630 and
620.
621.
35,086.
622.
623.
624.
625.
626.
627.

See Breyer, supra note 234, at 10-11, 11 nn.65-66.
Preliminary Draft of Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 51 Fed. Reg. 35,080,
See id. at 35,086-87.
See id. at 35,087.
Id
Id.
Id.
Breyer, supra note 537, at 3.

628. See id. at 3-4; see also Preliminary Draft of Sentencing Guidelines for United States
Courts, 51 Fed. Reg. 35,080, 35,087.
629. Preliminary Draft of Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 51 Fed. Reg. 35,080,
35,087; see Breyer, supra note 537, at 4-5.

630.

See Preliminary Draft of Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 51 Fed. Reg.
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creating mismatches between the seriousness of the offense and the
sentences imposed. 63 1 Third, a charged offense guideline system would
tether sentences to the offense of conviction,6 32 resulting in the transfer
of sentencing authority from the judge to the prosecutor.633
Considering both the advantages and drawbacks of a real offense
system, the Commission in the preliminary draft settled upon a limited,
or "modified," real offense system.634 Consistency and proportionality
would both be furthered by assigning specified weight to the offense of
conviction (the "base offense" level) and by mandating that judges
consider some (but not all) real offense conduct as aggravating or
mitigating circumstances, each having specified weight ("specific
offense characteristics").
As to what real offense conduct would be considered, the
September 1986 draft contained only those real offense characteristics
that are "bound up with the conduct that constitutes the crime
charged." 635 It did not account for any real offense conduct that did not
"typically accompany" the offense.636 The Commission also expressly
rejected a rule that would have limited a sentencing judge from
considering a real offense characteristic when it could have been, but
was not charged as a separate federal offense along with the offense
actually charged. 637 This decision was made in part because the
existence of "a separate [federal] crime often depends upon the
The
happenstance of factors creating federal jurisdiction.,"63
rule
a
draft
1986
Commission also declined to include in the September
that would define the scope of relevant harms to mean "in furtherance
of' the crime of conviction, because it believed that determining
what was "in furtherance of' would be difficult and could tend to
produce disparities. 63 9

35,080, 35,087; see also 28 U.S.C. § 994(c)(2)-(3) (1988).
631. See Preliminary Draft of Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 51 Fed. Reg.
35,080, 35,087.
632.

See id.; see also Breyer, supra note 537, at 5.

633. See Preliminary Draft of Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 51 Fed. Reg.
35,080, 35,087; see also Interview with Ilene H. Nagel, supra note 46, at 59 ("The argument against
[the charged offense system] . . . was that it completely turns all of the discretion over to the
prosecutor.... [E]verything is in the prosecutor's hands. He can determine the sentence by virtue of

the offense for which you are convicted.").
634. Preliminary Draft of Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 51 Fed. Reg. 35,080,
35,084.
635. Id. at 35,087.
636. Id.
637. Id. at 35,088.
638. Id.
639. See id.
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3. "Relevant Conduct"
Following the publication of the September 1986 draft in the
Federal Register, the Commission held six hearings, received hundreds
of public comments, and continued to engage in discussions with various
stakeholders."40 In review of this feedback and these conversations,
Senior Research Associate Phyllis Newton and the Chairman's law clerk
Russell Ghent stated in a December 8, 1986, memorandum that the
revised draft of the guidelines-to be completed in January 1987 and
then published in the Federal Register for public comment-should
retain the modified real offense approach." But, according to Newton
and Ghent, the term "modified real offense" seemed "value-laden" and
suggested that the Commission was "developing a new concept of
sentencing" as opposed to capturing the current sentencing process.642
As a result, "modified real offense" was to be replaced with the term
"relevant conduct." 64 3
The memorandum proposed specific rules about the consideration
of real offense characteristics. "Relevant conduct" was defined as "all
conduct and injuries relevant to the offense of conviction and all relevant
defendant characteristics."' But the relevant offense conduct would be
tied to the offense of conviction, such as conduct in preparation of,
during, and following the offense of conviction.645 In this sense, the
Commission's approach could be said to have "moved closer to a
'charge[d] offense' system." 646
On December 16, 1986, the Commission approved principles for
the redrafting of the preliminary guidelines, which had been prepared by
Commissioner Breyer. 647 The principles adopted the "relevant conduct"
approach: "While generally referring to the statutory offense of
conviction, the Guidelines will provide a method for the judge to take
into account all relevant misconduct."' The revised draft guidelines
maintained the relevant conduct approach as outlined in the December 8,
1986, memorandum. 64 9 The original Guidelines Manual similarly kept
640.

SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 37, at 10-11.

641. Memorandum from Phyllis Newton & Russell Ghent, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, to
Suzanne Conlon, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, (Dec. 8, 1986) (attaching Phyllis Newton & Russell
Ghent, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, Sentencing Guidelines Manual, ch.2 intro, pt. A (unpublished
draft) (Dec. 8, 1986)) (on file with authors).
642. See id.
643. See id.
644. Id. at 1.
645. Id
646.

SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3, ch. 1, pt. A.

647. See supra note 452 and accompanying text.
648. Breyer, supranote 234, at 48 app. B.
649. Proposed Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 52 Fed. Reg. 3920, 3927 (Feb.
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this model, though it moved the pertinent language from the overview of
chapter two to the application instructions of chapter one. 50 It also
expressed the Commission's expectation that the "court system will
be able to devise fair procedures" for the determination of
relevant conduct.65 1
One critical issue concerning "relevant conduct" was what actions
of another person-either a co-defendant or an uncharged coconspirator-would be attributable to a defendant for sentencing
purposes. By the mid-1980s, the federal law of vicarious criminal law
liability was well-established.652 A federal defendant could be convicted
of a federal crime for which the defendant did not engage in the actual
criminal conduct-the actus reus-in two different ways. First, a
defendant could be convicted for having aided or abetted another who
actually engaged in the actus reus, when the defendant did not do so, so
long as the defendant intended the co-defendant to succeed in
committing the crime.653 Second, the defendant could be convicted of a
crime that was committed by a co-conspirator "in furtherance" of a
conspiracy concerning a different crime, so long as the crime committed
in furtherance of the conspiracy was "reasonably [foreseeable]."654
The original Commission adopted similar legal principles as part of
the "relevant conduct" provision of the original Guidelines Manual.
Relevant conduct, as defined in the 1987 manual, included:
[A]cts or omissions committed or aided and abetted by the defendant,
or by a person for whose conduct the defendant is legally accountable,
that . . are part of the same course of conduct, or a common scheme
or plan, as the offense of conviction . .655

6, 1987).
650.

SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3, ch. 1, cmt.

651.
652.
653.
654.

Id.
See, e.g., Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 618-19 (1949).
Id. at 619.
Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 645-48 (1946).

655.

SENTENCING GUIDELINES

MANUAL,

supra note 3,

§

1B1.3(a). The original

1987

Guidelines Manual was somewhat ambiguous about whether this definition allowed for conduct
outside of the scope of the offense of conviction to be used to calculate a defendant's guideline
range. See United States v. Taplette, 872 F.2d 101, 106 (5th Cir. 1989). This resulted in the
Commission amending the "relevant conduct" definition in January 1988 in order to provide that
"relevant conduct" was to be used in determining: "(i) the base offense level where the guideline

specifies more than one base offense level, (ii) specific offense characteristics and (iii) cross
references in Chapter Two, and (iv) adjustments in Chapter Three." SENTENCING GUIDELINES

MANUAL, supra note 3, app. C, amend. 3; see also United States v. Silverman, 692 F. Supp. 788,
792 (S.D. Ohio 1988). In 1992, for clarification purposes, the Commission also later amended the
"relevant conduct" definition to replace "acts and omissions" by a person for whose conduct the
defendant is legally accountable with "jointly undertaken criminal activity (a criminal plan, scheme,

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol45/iss4/11

94

Newton and Sidhu: The History of the Original United States Sentencing Commission,

THE ORIGINAL UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION

2017]

1261

Therefore, a defendant would be vicariously accountable for
sentencing purposes for (1) conduct of another that the defendant aided
and abetted or (2) "reasonably foreseeable" conduct committed by
another in furtherance of a conspiracy. The relevant conduct rule also
encompassed the defendant's (or a conspirator's or codefendant's)
conduct that was part of the "same course of conduct or common scheme
or plan" as the offense of conviction. The Commission modeled this
aspect of the rule conceptually on both Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b),
concerning the admissibility of evidence of "other crimes" similar to that
charged, and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8(a), concerning
"joinder" of related offenses in an indictment.656 Notably, both aidingand-abetting and conspiratorial vicarious sentencing accountability
provisions were included in Commissioner Robinson's just deserts draft
guideline manual.'
Such "relevant conduct" could factor into a defendant's guideline
penalty levels in one of two ways. First, and most commonly, uncharged
relevant conduct-such as using a weapon during a bank robbery or
drug deal, when the indictment did not allege such conduct-could
increase a defendant's offense level.65 In rare cases, such uncharged
conduct also could result in a cross-reference to a different chapter two
guideline if the relevant conduct-when assessed in the other
guideline-would result in a higher guideline sentencing range than the
range in the guideline associated with the offense of conviction.6 59
E.

Offense Characteristicsas a Basisfor Sentencing

Although the Commission's "relevant conduct" policy permitted a
broad range of offense conduct beyond the elements of the offense or
endeavor, or enterprise undertaken by the defendant in concert with others, whether or not charged
as a conspiracy)." U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 11.3 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N
1992, amended 2016); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 439 (U.S.

SENTENCING COMM'N 2003, amended 2016).
656.

U.S. SENT. GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3,

§ 111.3 cmt.

n.1.

657. See United States Sentencing Commission Proposed Sentencing Guidelines Manual,
supranote 208, at 7. The January 1987 draft included the aiding and abetting provision, but not the
conspiracy provision. See Proposed Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 52 Fed. Reg.
3827 (Feb. 6, 1987).
658.

See, e.g., SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3,

§ 2B3.1(b)(2)

("(A) If a

firearm was discharged increase by 5 levels; (B) if a firearm or a dangerous weapon was otherwise
used, increase by 4 levels; (C) if a firearm or other dangerous weapon was brandished, displayed or
possessed, increase by 3 levels.").
659. See, e.g., id. § 2A4. 1 (b)(5) ("If the victim was kidnapped, abducted, or unlawfully
restrained to facilitate the commission of another offense: (A) increase by 4 levels; or (B) if the
result of applying this guideline is less than that resultingfrom applicationof the guidelinefor such
other offense, apply the guidelinefor such other offense." (emphasis added)).
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offenses of conviction to be considered for sentencing purposes, the
Commission still had to determine which offense characteristics
mattered at sentencing and how they would impact guideline
calculations. Chairman Wilkins framed the Commission's decision about
offense characteristics in this way: "[W]hat is it about a particular crime,
the way in which it is committed, [and] the impact upon others which we
should consider as a Commission in drafting our guidelines?" 660
Inherent in this inquiry were two subsidiary issues. First, what were
the proper sources of offense-based distinctions? As Commissioner
Nagel asked, "According to whose values do we define likeness of
crime.... By what criteria [for example] does one [equate] a robbery
with an embezzlement[?]" 6 6 1 Second, how should the Commission
achieve a proper balance between simplicity and comprehensiveness? In
his summary of major policy decisions, Commissioner Breyer noted that
while the Commission was to "identify, offense by offense, those
characteristics about the way in which an offense is committed that
should lead to a greater (or lesser) punishment," it "cannot take all
arguably relevant distinctions into account without producing guidelines'
that are unworkably complex." 662 Such complexity would come at the
cost of "misunderstanding or mistakes in application," and
"reintroducing sentencing disparity," but "an inadequate number of
distinctions also risks unfairness" in that "two offenders who engaged in
quite different behavior would nonetheless receive exactly the
same sentence." 6 63
Early on, the Commission formed a subcommittee on offense
characteristics that was chaired by Commissioner Breyer and joined by
Commissioner Robinson.66 4 The committee's work was guided by the
SRA, which required the Commission to consider whether and to what
extent several offense-related factors have an impact in sentencing
determinations: "the grade of the offense;" "the circumstances under
which the offense was committed which mitigate or aggravate the
seriousness of the offense;" "the nature and degree of the harm caused
by the offense, including whether it involved property, irreplaceable
property, a person, a number of persons, or a breach of public trust;"
"the community view of the gravity of the offense;" "the public concern

660.

Public Hearing Before the

U.S.

Sentencing Comm'n on Offense Seriousness 4

(Washington, D.C., Apr. 15, 1986) [hereinafter PublicHearing] (statement William W. Wilkins, Jr.,
Chairman, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n) (on file with authors).
661. Nagel et al., supra note 43, at 1816.
662. Breyer, supra note 537, at 21-22.
663. Id. at 22.
664. Meeting Minutes, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n (Jan. 21, 1986), supra note 177, at 4.
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generated by the offense;" "the deterrent effect a particular sentence may
have on the commission of the offense by others;" and "the current
incidence of the offense in the community and in the Nation as
a whole."665
The Committee focused its efforts on distinctions that affected the
relative seriousness of offenses. Chairman Wilkins observed that "[t]he
ranking of offenses by seriousness is one of the most important steps in
establishing a rational sentencing policy and promulgating
guidelines."66 6 To provide a taxonomy and ranking of federal offenses
for sentencing purposes, the Committee looked to multiple sources,
including the mandatory minimums and statutory maximums set by
Congress. 6 7 Commissioner Breyer believed that the failed federal code
reform legislation-that had created an elaborate taxonomy of federal
offenses-was an appropriate consideration as well.668 He observed that
"[t]he use of the proposed Criminal Code Revision [was] for
classification purposes" only-not for actually setting penalty levels or
criminalizing new conduct. 669
The Committee also examined the actual time served by federal
offenders for particular offenses as a measure of relative offense
seriousness, 67 0 as well as how the federal parole guidelines ranked
offense seriousness.671 Outside of the federal system, the committee
looked at the relative severity of offenses in state systems.672 It also
examined the MPC's offense rankings 673 and the rankings prepared by
other organizations, such as the American Civil Liberties Union.6 74
The committee also considered existing surveys, and distributed its
own offense seriousness questionnaire to around 200 judges and

665. 28 U.S.C. § 994(c) (1988).
666. Letter from William W. Wilkins, Jr., Chairman, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, to Strom
Thurmond, Chairman, Senate Judiciary Comm., and Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Ranking Minority
Member, Senate Judiciary Comm. 1 (Mar. 19, 1986) (on file with authors).
667. See Public Hearing, supra note 660, at 83-84 (statement Stephen G. Breyer, Comm'r,
U.S. Sentencing Comm'n).

668. See Meeting Minutes, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, supra note 372, at 6; Meeting Minutes,
U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, supra note 338, at 5-6.
669. See Meeting Minutes, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, supra note 372, at 7 ("[A]bout 98% of
the changes in the proposed Criminal Code Revision were technical, and only about 2% were
controversial.").
670. See Meeting Minutes, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, supranote 338, at 5-9.

671. See id. at 5-6.
672. See Meeting Minutes, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n 5 (Feb. 11, 1986) (on file with authors);
Meeting Minutes, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n 6-7 (Feb. 12, 1986) (on file with authors).
673. Public Hearing, supra note 660, at 84 (statement Alvin Bronstein, Nat'l Prison Project,
Am. Civil Liberties Union).
674. See id.
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practitioners, newspaper editors, and organizations. 6 5 The questionnaire
asked respondents to rank sixteen "crime scenarios" by seriousness.676
Chairman Wilkins noted that these vignettes were "derived from the
67 7
legal and social science literature pertaining to offense seriousness."
The accompanying cover letter, signed by Chairman Wilkins, also asked
respondents to address three questions: "[1] How should the
Commission compare the relative seriousness of different kinds of
crimes? .. . [2] Should the manner of carrying out an offense affect a
ranking more or less than the harm caused by the offense? [and] [3] Are
certain kinds of sanctions more appropriate for certain kinds of
crimes?"" The Commission received over 130 completed responses.67 9
The idea of conducting a broader public opinion survey-proposed
initially by Commissioner Nagel 6 80-was not pursued, 68 1 although the
Commission later did so in the 1990s. 68 2

At the March 12, 1986, Commission meeting, Commissioner
Breyer went over the offense committee's initial report. The report, in
Commissioner Breyer's view, would serve as a catalyst for reaction from
criminal justice professionals and others.' To obtain that outside
perspective, the Commission endorsed Commissioner Breyer's
suggestion of preparing and distributing the aforementioned offense
seriousness questionnaire.684 A March 26, 1986, version of the report
classified offenses into eight larger groups: "Offenses Against the
Person; Offenses Against Property; Offenses Against Government
Processes; Offenses Against Public Order, Safety, Health, and Welfare;
Offenses Against National Defense; Offenses Against Civil Rights;
Offenses Involving International Affairs; and Offenses Involving
675. See id. at 83-84, 149-50; see also U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, supranote 341, at 1.
676. U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, supra note 341, at 1.
677. Letter from William W. Wilkins, Jr., to Strom Thurmond & Joseph R. Biden, Jr., supra
note 666, at 2.
678. Letter from William W. Wilkins, Chairman, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, to Anthony Ward,
Asst. Editorial Page Editor, Pittsburgh Press (Mar. 18, 1986) (on file with authors).
679. Public Hearing, supra note 660, at 5 (statement of William W. Wilkins, Jr., Chairman,
U.S. Sentencing Comm'n).
680. See Meeting Minutes, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, supra note 372, at 12 (suggesting a
public opinion survey conducted by two leading survey experts, Dr. Peter H. Rossi and Dr. Richard
A. Berk); see also Interview with Ilene H. Nagel, supra note 46, at 22.

681. Breyer, supra note 234, at 16 ("The [initial] Commissioners believed that public polling
was not sufficiently advanced or detailed to warrant its use as accurate sources in ranking criminal
behaviors.").
682. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, A NATIONAL SAMPLE SURVEY: PUBLIC OPINION ON
SENTENCING FEDERAL CRIMES 15-24 (1995) (noting that the survey was conducted for the

Commission by Doctors Berk and Rossi).
683. Meeting Minutes, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, supra note 372, at 8.
684. Id. at 10-12.
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Taxation." 685 The bulk of the report listed and described offenses within
these eight categories, and set out for each offense the mean and median
time served, the percentage of offenders sentenced to probation, the
statutory minimum and maximum penalties, and the Parole
Commission's rankings of the offense types.686 The report also contained
"grading factors," which were factors that seemed to bear on the offense
severity within a single offense type, including the amount of drugs
distributed,' the monetary amount of the fraud,688 and the defendant's
role in the offense.689
On April 15, 1986, the Commission also held a public hearing on
offense seriousness. 690 The Commission received testimony from a
number of stakeholders, including representatives from the American
Civil Liberties Union, New York City Bar Association, Crime
Magazine, Federal Probation Officers Association, Federal Public
Defenders Association, Institute for Government and Politics, National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, National Interreligious
Service Board for Conscientious Objectors, National Rifle Association,
and Washington Legal Foundation.691 The witnesses addressed a number
of topics, including the relevance of real offense conduct at
sentencing, 69 2 regional differences in perceived offense seriousness and
the need for a single federal sentencing policy applicable across the
nation, 6 93 and the relationship between the theories of punishment and
offense seriousness.69 4
The September 1986 preliminary draft guidelines contained twelve
offense classifications-it kept the eight original classifications in the
offense committee report, but added categories for criminal enterprises,
drugs, and immigration, and also split into two categories offenses
against public order and safety and offenses against public health. 6 95 The

685. Memorandum from Dennis Hauptly, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n & Marla
Wilson, Research Assoc., U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, to Stephen H. Breyer, Chairman, U.S.
Sentencing Comm'n (Mar. 26, 1986) (on file with authors).
686. See id.
687. See, e.g., id.
688. See, e.g., id.
689. See, e.g., id
690. Public Hearing, supra note 660, at 2 (statement of William W. Wilkins, Jr., Chairman,
U.S. Sentencing Comm'n); see also U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, Offense Seriousness Questionnaire,
supra note 341.

691. See Public Hearing,supranote 660, at 2 (stating the hearing's agenda).
692. Id. at 17.
693. Id. at 24-27.
694. Id. at 112-14.
695. Preliminary Draft of Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 51 Fed. Reg. 35,080,
35,080-81 (Oct. 1, 1986).
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draft manual focused on harm values-those actual or intended harms
attributable to and foreseeable by the offender 69 6-and offense values
were assigned to characteristics similar to those in the committee report,
such as loss amount, drug weight, and the offender's role in
the offense.697
The preliminary draft guidelines retained much of Commissioner
Robinson's earlier just desert draft's categorization of offenses and
retributivist bases for distinguishing between offenses. The preliminary
draft manual, for example, contained different base offense levels
depending on the amount of the fraud698 and the drug quantity
involved.699 In the chapter on offender characteristics, the manual called
for total offense levels to be multiplied by figures corresponding with
the offender's role in the offense. 7" For instance, the total offense level
for an offender who controlled a criminal enterprise would be multiplied
"by a number between 1.5 and 2,"701 whereas a "minor participant"
would have the total offense level multiplied "by a number within a
range of .5 to .7.702
While the September 1986 preliminary draft marked an
improvement in simplicity from the just deserts draft, the
Commissioners agreed that the next draft manual needed to be simplified
"considerably." 703 In particular, Commissioner Breyer's drafting
principles, approved by the Commission, noted that distinctions between
offenses would be made if required by statute, supported by past
practice, or otherwise based on a "persuasive or special reason" found by
the Commission. 7 0 Accordingly, the subsequent revised draft guidelines
manual aimed to include fewer offense-based distinctions. The revised
draft retained features of the preliminary draft, but with important
differences. Drug quantity still determined the base offense level for
trafficking offenses,705 but loss amount became a specific offense
characteristic. 706 Role in the offense moved from an offender
characteristic to an' offense characteristic, and also served as a specific
696. See id. at 35,084.
697. See id. at 35,084, 35,093, 35,098.
698. See, e.g., id. at 35,094-95.
699. See, e.g., id. at 35,098 (containing the base offense values table for drug trafficking).
700. Id. at 35,114-15.
701. Id. at 35,115.
702. Id.
703. U.S. Sentencing Comrn'n, Principles Governing the Redrafting of the Preliminary
Guidelines, supra note 452.

704. Id.
705. Proposed Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 52 Fed. Reg. 3920, 3938-39
tbl.I (Feb. 6, 1987).
706. Id. at 3931.
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offense characteristic that would result in added or subtracted points
according to specified ranges rather than a multiplication of the total
offense value.707
The 1987 Guidelines Manual adopted a modified structure
concerning offense-based distinctions. The manual listed specific
offense characteristics corresponding only to particular offenses in
chapter two, 70 s and placed generic offense characteristics, including an
offender's role in a multi-offender case (as a leader or follower), in
chapter three.70 9 Notably, the Commission generally only included
offense characteristics-as aggravating or mitigating factors-in the
original manual if the "past practice" data analyses showed that those
characteristics made a difference in sentence length in more than a trivial
number of cases.7 '0 For instance, the Commission decided not to include
death occurring during the course of a robbery as a specific offense
characteristic, because the past practice analyses showed that death
rarely occurred during robberies prosecuted in federal court. Instead of
including death in the robbery guideline, it was included as a potential
ground for departure.7 11
F. Setting Guideline Penalty Levels
1. On What Basis to Set Penalty Levels?
Shortly after the Commission first met, debates ensued about where
penalty levels should be set and, in particular, on what basis they should
be set. As discussed above, certain Commissioners' views on this topic
were informed by their different philosophical perspectives-with
Commissioner Robinson advocating for penalty levels reflecting a "just
deserts" or retributivist philosophy, and Commissioners Block and
Nagel advocating for penalty levels that would optimize utilitarian
considerations of "crime control."712 When the former failed to produce
a viable draft and the latter did not produce any draft at all, the

707.

Id. at 3972.

708. See, e.g., SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3, §§ 2B3.1(b)(2), 2D1.1(b)(1)
(noting the offense enhancement for the use of a firearm in the course of a robbery and drug

trafficking guidelines).
709. Id. §§ 3Bl.1-.2.
710.

See Interview by Gen. Accounting Office with Stephen G. Breyer, supra note 1, at 41-42

app. A.
711. See id. at 42; see also SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3,
(authorizing an upward departure if death resulted from an offense).

712.

§§

2B3.1, 5K2.1

See supraPart IV.B.2.
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Commission was forced to look for a different manner on which to
base penalties.
As it turned out, Congress had instructed the Commission to first
consider average sentences for different offense types in pre-guidelines
federal criminal cases. In particular, the SRA required the Commission,
"as a starting point in its development of the initial sets of guidelines for
particular categories of cases," to "ascertain the average sentences
imposed in such categories of cases prior to the creation of the
Commission, and in cases involving sentences to terms of imprisonment,
the length of such terms actually served."' But Congress did not direct
the Commission to simply codify average sentences. The SRA required
the Commission to "insure that the guidelines reflect the fact that, in
many cases, current sentences do not accurately reflect the seriousness
of the offense."714 The SRA made clear that the Commission is not
"bound by such average sentences," and instead must "independently
develop a sentencing range," provided only that the range "is consistent
with the purposes of sentencing described in section 3553(a)(2) of title
18, United States Code."71 5
In setting penalty levels, the original Commission considered two
related sources of data about past sentencing practices: data about the
application of the parole guidelines and a more complex dataset, which
considered all sentences imposed by district courts.716 The latter dataset,
unlike the former dataset, included not only prison sentences in which
parole or good-time credit had been granted but also non-incarceration
sentences and prison sentences of twelve months and below (which were
not subject to parole).7 17 The latter types of sentences accounted for
around two-thirds of pre-SRA sentences."'
a. Data About the Parole Guidelines
The federal parole guidelines provided imprisonment ranges for a
wide variety of federal offense types, which the Sentencing Commission
719
considered in formulating penalty levels in the sentencing guidelines.
713. 28 U.S.C. § 994(m) (1988).
714. Id.
715. Id.
716. See infra Part IV.F. Lb (discussing the "past practice" data study).
717.

SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 37, at 25 n.66.

718. See MECHAM, supra note 61, at 261-62 tbl.D-5. In the pre-SRA era, approximately onehalf of federal offenders received non-incarceration sentences. See id. at 262 tbl.D-5. Furthermore,
of those receiving prison sentences, around one-third received sentences of twelve months or less.

See id. at 261 tbl.D-5. Therefore, the parole guidelines applied to only around one-third of federal
offenders in the pre-SRA era. See id at 261-62 tbl.D-5.
719. See Interview by Gen. Accounting Office with Stephen G. Breyer, supra note 1, at 37-39;

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol45/iss4/11

102

Newton and Sidhu: The History of the Original United States Sentencing Commission,

2017]

THE ORIGINAL UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION

1269

Yet the Commission put less weight on the parole guidelines, which
Congress clearly did not intend for the Commission to simply mimic, 7 20
and more weight on the past practice data that considered all types of
cases-not merely the one-third of pre-SRA cases subject to the
parole guidelines.
The April 1987 sentencing guidelines submitted to Congress
differed from the parole guidelines in both complexity and penalty levels
regarding many offense types. For example, in the parole guideline for
theft offenses, there were five gradations for the monetary value of the
stolen property, while in the sentencing guidelines there were fourteen
gradations. 72 1 Those differences in gradations resulted in significant
differences in penalties. For example, under the parole guidelines, an
offender with no criminal history who stole $200,000 faced a range of
twenty-four to thirty-six months.72 2 Conversely, an offender who stole
that same amount with "more than minimal planning" faced a range of
fifteen to twenty-one months under the 1987 sentencing guideline for
theft, before any credit for acceptance of responsibility-an adjustment
not made in the parole guidelines.7 23
b. Past Practice Study
The primary empirical basis for the original sentencing guidelines
was the Commission's study of federal sentences imposed in the mid1980s. 724 The Commission assembled detailed data in 40,000 of these
cases, which included the most commonly prosecuted crimes, were
drawn from fiscal year 1985 (from October 1984 through September
1985), and featured wide geographical representation.72 5 The

see also SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 37, at 25, app. C.

720. S. REP. No. 98-225, at 168 (1983) (directing the Sentencing Commission to produce
"guidelines considerably more detailed than the existing parole guidelines").
721.

Compare 28 C.F.R.

§ 2.20

(1986), with SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supranote 3,

§ 211.1.
722. See 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 (noting that a lost amount of $200,000, but not more than $500,000,
falls within category five of the Sentencing Table); see also infra App.A, (Sentencing Table for the
parole guidelines, showing a sentencing range of twenty-four to twenty-six months for an offender

with no criminal history, as reflected in his SFS).
723.

See SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3,

§ 2B 1.1(a),

(b)(1)(J), (b)(4)

(providing that for a loss amount between $ 100,001 to $200,000 there was an offense level of four
plus eight levels based on the loss amount and two additional levels if there was "more than

minimal planning"); id. at § 3E1.1 (potential two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility);
see also id ch. 5, pt. A (Sentencing Table) (offense level of fourteen and CHC I results in a
sentencing range of fifteen to twenty-one months).
724. See SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supranote 37, at 16.

725. Memorandum from William Rhodes, Research Dir., U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, to
Commissioners, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n (Feb. 2, 1987) (on file with authors).
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Commission then focused on a representative sample of around 10,500
of those cases and created a dataset providing information about
sentences for (1) first-time offenders, (2) convicted at trial, (3) who had
committed felonies and serious misdemeanors, and (4) who were
sentenced to some term of imprisonment.726 The PSRs from those cases
were coded for a variety of offender and offense characteristics, and a
multiple-regression analysis was conducted in order to identify which
7 27
real offense sentencing factors mattered to judges in sentencing. The
coding was done by probation officers, as they were "most qualified to
728
do the data collection since they are the most familiar with the cases."
In order to account for the effect of parole and good time credit on
sentence length and thereby determine the length of prison terms
"actually served" 729 for each offense type, the Commission integrated
data from the BOP and Parole Commission into the "front-end"
sentencing data.730 In its 1987 Supplementary Report, the Commission
published summaries of its past practice data results, noting the average
73
"baseline" amount of time-served for various offense typeS 1' and the
average "adjustments" in sentence length for various aggravating or
mitigating circumstances. 73 2 These numbers generally served as the
"numerical anchor" for base offense levels and certain specific offense
733
characteristics in the 1987 Guidelines Manual.
Commissioner Nagel noted that the "past practice" data was not
precise-in terms of average sentences for particular types of offensesbut instead provided estimated ranges. 734 Research Director Rhodes
echoed his view by noting that "[g]iven the limitations of available data
726. See SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 37, at 21-22. The Commission focused on trial
cases (rather than guilty plea cases) because it was concerned with setting chapter two offense

levels. See Memorandum from Rhodes, supra note 725. The Commission realized that sentences, on
average, were lower for defendants who pleaded guilty compared to defendants who went to trial.
See SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 37, at 48 (noting the Commission's data analysis showed
that the average time served for offenders who pleaded guilty, rather than going to trial, was "30 to

40 percent" lower). A downward adjustment for guilty pleas was made in chapter 3 of the
Guidelines Manual. See SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3,

§ 3E1.1.

727. See id at 21-24. The coding instrument used by the probation officers is on file with
authors.

728. Meeting Minutes, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, supranote 372, at 16.
729. 28 U.S.C. § 994(m) (1988).
730.

SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supranote 37, at 21.

731. Id. at 27-34 tbl.1(a).
732. Id. at 35-39 tbl.1(b).
733. Id. at 22.
734. Interview with Ilene H. Nagel, supra note 46, at 35-36 ("[IWt was never the case that we
could give an exact number. We couldn't say the sentence for [a particular type ofl bank
robbery. . . had been 3 years. We could say that it probably was between 2 years and 4 years. That's
about as good as past practice data could be.").
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and the need to make simplifying assumptions to analyze the data, [the
results of the data analyses for the many offense types do not] perfectly
reflect typical sentencing practices." 735
The complex nature of the past practice analyses and the
incomplete description of the past practice data analyses in publicly
available documents raised questions about the accuracy, and severity,
of the guideline penalty levels set by the original Commission. In
particular, if the past practice data was based only on past average prison
sentences, the concern was that average sentences would not reflect
actual sentencing practices and, instead, would be artificially high. In his
dissent to the original guidelines, Commissioner Robinson alleged that,
in calculating average past sentences, the Commission "[eliminated] all
past nonincarcerative sentences from the 'averages' calculations," which
"seriously distort[ed] [the] claimed replication of past practice."7 36
Other Commissioners disputed Commissioner Robinson's claim.
For example, when asked about Commissioner Robinson's point,
Commissioner Breyer stated, "he's wrong," in that the Commission
considered both data on average prison time served for those offenders
who were sentenced to a term of imprisonment and data on "the
percentage of the people who go to prison."737 Similarly, Commissioner
Nagel explained that the Commission was "anchored ... [b]ut not bound
by an examination of the average time served in past years for offenders
convicted of that same offense ... [a]nd the percentage given a non
incarceration sentence."738
The 1987 Supplementary Report offers additional evidence of the
Commission's consideration of non-incarceration sentences in devising
penalty levels. According to the report, the average "baseline" figures
were for offenders who had been sentenced to some amount of
imprisonment for particular offense types. But a column next to these
figures also noted the estimated percentage of such offenders who were
sentenced to prison. 739 The Commission "discounted" the average
sentence based on the percentage of such offenders who did not receive
a sentence of imprisonment. The Supplementary Report offers an
example of this reduction:

735. Memorandum from William Rhodes, supra note 725, at 1.
736. Dissenting View of Commissioner Paul H. Robinson on the Promulgation of Sentencing
Guidelines by the United States Sentencing Commission, 52 Fed. Reg. 18,121, 18,122 (May 13,
1987).
737. Interview by Gen. Accounting Office with Stephen G. Breyer, supra note 1, at 52.
738. See Nagel et al., supra note 43, at 1817.
739.

See SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supranote 37, at 27-34 tbl.1(a).
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[C]onviction for an unsophisticated embezzlement of less than $1,500
results in a level 8 prison term (an average of about 5 months or a
range of 2-8 months) if a prison term is imposed. However, a prison
term is currently imposed in only about 24 percent of such cases.
Because of this, the average time served by all first-time embezzlers
convicted at a trial of stealing $1,500 is actually about 1 month
(rather than [the average of] 2-8 months [or 5 months as an
7 40

in-between point]).

The guideline levels in the original Guidelines Manual confirm that
the Commission did not set penalty levels based on "un-discounted"
average prison sentences. Staying with the example of an
unsophisticated embezzler who stole less than $1500 and who went to
trial (i.e., was not eligible for a two-level downward adjustment for
acceptance of responsibility under section 3E1.1), the base offense level
would be four741 and the specific offense characteristic for a loss amount
42
of between $1001 to $2000 would be two.7 A total offense level of six
combined with a Criminal History Category of I corresponded to a
guideline range of zero to six months-not a range of two to eight
months that would have been based on consideration of average prison
sentences alone. If the guidelines' offense levels had been based on data
that did not account for "nonincarcerative" sentences, the guideline
minimum for such an offender would have been two months, not zero
months. In this instance, the Commission actually set the bottom of the
guideline range below the "discounted" average sentence of one month
for such offenders. Accordingly, the historical record supports the
conclusion that the Commission did not base the original Guidelines
Manual's penalty levels solely on data from pre-guidelines cases in
which defendants were sentenced to prison.
c. Adjusting Average Past Sentences
Congress envisioned that the Commission would "independently"
assess the appropriateness of past sentences and, for "many" cases,
743
would create sentencing guidelines that called for higher penalties. in
740. Id. at 24.
741.

See SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3,

§ 2B1.1.

742. Id. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(C). The two-level enhancement for "more than minimal planning" was
not applied, because the defendant was characterized as an "unsophisticated" embezzler who stole
as a relatively small amount of money. See Id. § 2B 1.1 (b)(4).
743. 28 U.S.C. § 994(m) (1988); see U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, THE FEDERAL SENTENCING
GUIDELINES: A REPORT ON THE OPERATION OF THE GUIDELINE SYSTEM AND SHORT-TERM
IMPACTS ON DISPARITY IN SENTENCING, USE OF INCARCERATION, AND PROSECUTORIAL
DISCRETION AND PLEA BARGAINING 365 (1991) ("Congress ensured that incarceration rates would

increase under the guidelines as a result of specific and general directives to the Commission in the
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determining which offenses warranted these higher penalties, the
Commission took its cue from Congress. In particular, the Commission
raised guideline sentences as to certain drug trafficking offenses, violent
offenses, and significant white-collar offenses, because Congress
established new statutory mandatory minimum penalties and also issued
directives in the SRA concerning these three areas. 74
First, regarding drug trafficking, Congress directed the Commission
to ensure that a "substantial" term of imprisonment would be imposed
on an offender who trafficked in "a substantial quantity of a controlled
substance." 7 45 At the time of the SRA, there were no mandatory
minimum statutory penalties for federal drug trafficking offenses.746
However, at the same time that it enacted the SRA, Congress also raised
the statutory maximum for federal drug trafficking offenses from fifteen
to twenty years-for first offenders-and from thirty to forty years for
offenders with a prior felony drug conviction.74 7 Two years after the
SRA was enacted, Congress established new mandatory minimum
penalties for many drug trafficking offenses and also further raised
the statutory maximum penalties, including providing for life
imprisonment without parole as the maximum penalty for some
first-time defendants. 74 8
Second, regarding violent offenses, Congress directed the
Commission to ensure that the guidelines reflected the "general
appropriateness" of imposing a "substantial" term of imprisonment for
violent offenses that resulted in a serious bodily injury and of imposing a
non-incarceration sentence for first-time offenders not convicted of a
"violent" or "otherwise serious offense."74 9
[SRA] to increase the use of imprisonment for certain classes of offenses and offenders."); see also
id at 384 ("Congress sent a strong message that sentences for certain types of offenses and
offenders would be increased.").

744. See Memorandum from Bill Rhodes, Research Dir., U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, to Michael
Block, Comm'r, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n 8 (Aug. 10, 1987) (on file with authors) ("Excluding
sentences for drug law violators, career offenders, some white collar offenders, and certain violent

crimes, there exists a close correspondence (but not an identity) between [the prison] time at risk
[for offenders] given .. .sentencing practices [from fiscal year 1985, which were set forth in the
levels table in the 1987 Supplementary Report] and given the [corresponding ranges in the]
guidelines.").
745. 28 U.S.C. § 994(i)(5) (1988).
746. See 18 U.S.C. § 841(b) (Supp. II 1984).
747. See Controlled Substances Penalties Amendments Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473,
§ 502, 98 Stat. 2068, 2068 (1984) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 960).
748. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, §§ 1002, 1007-08, 100 Stat. 3207,
3207-2, 3207-7 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 960). The Commission's policy
decisions concerning how to account for the 1986 statutory penalties are further discussed in the
next section. See infra Part IV.F. 1.d.
749. 28 U.S.C. § 994(j).
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Third, regarding white-collar offenses, Congress generally
expressed the need for higher penalties in this area. For example, the
Senate Judiciary Committee's report stated that "[t]here will be some
logical changes from historical [sentencing] patterns, of course, as in the
case of... white-collar offenses for which plainly inadequate sentences
have been imposed in the past."75o The sense of Congress, according to

Commissioner Nagel, was that the discrepancies in penalties for whitecollar offenses compared to penalties for theft had class-based and racebased undertones.751 Similarly, Commissioner Breyer discussed the
Commission's findings that, "people who were convicted of fraud, a
white-collar crime, were treated less harshly than those convicted of
theft, a blue-collar crime," and the Commission's conclusion that white75 2
collar penalties should be elevated to "mirror the theft penalties."
This would mean, Commissioner Breyer noted, "less unadulterated
probation and more brief terms of confinement" for typical
white-collar offenders. 75 3
d. Accounting for New Statutory Mandatory Minimum
Sentences in Drug Cases
In the wake of enacting the SRA-which directed the new
Commission to create a detailed set of sentencing guidelines addressing
"all important variations that commonly may be expected in criminal
cases, and that reliably break[] cases into their relevant components and
assure[] consistent and fair results" 7 54-Congress took a substantial step
in the opposite direction by enacting new statutory mandatory minimum
sentences that carried severe penalties.755 If guidelines were intended to
750.

S. REP. No. 98-225, at 77, 116 (1983) ("[S]ome major offenders, particularly white collar

offenders and serious violent offenders, frequently do not receive sentences that reflect the

seriousness of their offenses."); see id. at 92 ("The placing on probation of an embezzler, a
confidence man, a corrupt politician, a businessman who has repeatedly violated regulatory laws, an
operator of a pyramid sales scheme, or a tax violator, may be perfectly appropriate in cases in
which, under all the circumstances, only the rehabilitative needs of the offender are pertinent; such a
sentence may be grossly inappropriate, however, in cases in which the circumstances mandate the
sentence's carrying substantial deterrent or punitive impact.").

751. Interview with Ilene H. Nagel, supra note 46, at 47-49.
752. Breyer & Feinberg, supra note 191, at 19.
753. Id.
754. S. REP. No. 98-225, at 168-69 (directing that the guidelines should "reflect every
important factor relevant to sentencing"). The senate report also noted that "[t]he Committee

generally looks with disfavor on statutory minimum sentences ... since their inflexibility
occasionally results in too harsh an application of the law." Id. at 89 n. 194.
755. See Breyer, supra note 284, at 184-85 ("Congress, in simultaneously requiring Guideline
sentencing and mandatory minimum sentences, is riding two different horses. And those horses, in
terms of coherence, fairness, and effectiveness, are traveling in opposite directions.... [Congress

needs to] abolish mandatory minimums altogether."); Freed, supra note 163, at 1752 ("These rigid
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be carefully-calibrated tools for sentencing based on a wide variety of
offense and offender characteristics that seek to sentence in a
proportionate manner, mandatory minimum sentences generally are
blunt instruments that are based on a single offense characteristic.
The most important of these new statutes concerned drug
trafficking offenses. These offenses constituted about one quarter of the
federal criminal caseload before the guidelines went into effect and
increased to around 40% of the caseload during the height of the "War
on Drugs" in the late 1980s and continuing throughout the 1990s." 6 In
October 1986, a month after the Commission had published its first
preliminary draft guidelines in the Federal Register for public comment,
Congress enacted the ADAA, which created new statutory mandatory
minimum penalties for a wide variety of drug offenses-including fiveand ten-year mandatory minimum penalties with corresponding
maximum penalties of forty years and life imprisonment-and for a
wide variety of drug trafficking offenses, including for first-time
offenders.757 The new statute, codified in an amended 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(b), set forth mandatory minimum penalties for a wide variety of
drug
types,
including
powder cocaine,
"crack"
cocaine,
methamphetamine, heroin, and marijuana.' The mandatory minimums
were triggered by certain drug types and drug quantities. For example,
500 grams of powder cocaine carried a mandatory minimum prison
sentence of five years, while five kilograms of powder cocaine carried
ten years.7 59 The ADAA was hastily enacted by Congress. The original
bill was introduced in early August of 1986 and was enacted less than
three months later, on October 27, 1986.760
[mandatory minimum] statutes are wholly at odds with the sort of principled guidance and

permissible individualization of penalties that Congress described in the SRA."); Orrin G. Hatch,
The Role of Congress in Sentencing: The United States Sentencing Commission, Mandatory
Minimum Sentences, and the Search for a Certain and Effective Sentencing System, 28 WAKE

FOREST L. REv. 185, 193-94, 194 n.72, 195 (1993) (noting that "[lt]he compatibility of the
guidelines system and mandatory minimums is also in question" because "they are structurally and
functionally at odds with each other and with the SRA's goals"); see also Anthony M. Kennedy,
Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S., Speech at the Am. Bar Ass'n Annual Meeting (Aug. 9,
2003) (criticizing mandatory minimum statutes).

756.
757.
amended
758.

See Newton, supra note 58, at 331-33.
See Pub. L. 99-570, §§ 1002, 1007-08, 100 Stat. 3207, 3207-2-3, 3207-7 (codified as
at 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 960).
21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (1988). Crack cocaine (called "cocaine base" in the statute) was

a new drug type not previously differentiated from "powder" cocaine in the former versions of the

statute. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(a)(ii)(IV)-(iii) (referring to "a compound, mixture, or
preparation" of coca leaves).
759. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B).
760. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (codified as
amended at 21 U.S.C. § 801); see also H.R. 5484 (99th): Anti-DrugAbuse Act of 1986, GOVTRACK,

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2017

109

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 4 [2017], Art. 11

HOFSTRA LAW RE VIEW

1276

[Vol. 45:1167

The Commission felt compelled to re-write the draft drug
trafficking guidelines following the passage of the 1986 statute. As
noted, shortly before the 1986 statute was enacted in October, the
Commission had published for public comment a preliminary draft of
the guidelines manual. 76 1 The penalty levels set forth in that draft
guideline were "highly tentative, preliminary, and subject to change" in
the final promulgated manual.762
The primary drug trafficking guideline in the preliminary draftsection D2 11-included different "base offense values" (the precursor of
offense levels in the guidelines eventually promulgated in April 1987)
that depended on drug type and drug quantity. 763 Notably, for the most
common serious drug types, such as cocaine and heroin, the highest base
offense value was 180, which equated to a sentencing range of 168 to
210 months for an offender with no criminal record (before any
reduction for acceptance of responsibility evidenced by a guilty plea or
for other cooperation with the authorities). 7 64 The threshold drug
quantities triggering the maximum "base offense values" were one
kilogram of heroin and two kilograms of cocaine. 765 Aggravating factors,
such as possession of a firearm or causing bodily injury during the
offense, could increase the guideline range.766
The maximum guideline penalty ranges based solely on drug
quantity were substantially higher than the average prison sentences
actually served by federal drug offenders in the period immediately
before the Commission was created. For instance, in fiscal year 1985,
the average prison sentence actually served by offenders convicted at
trial of trafficking in amounts between one and ten kilograms of heroin
was between fifty-one and sixty-three months, while the average prison
sentence actually served by offenders convicted at trial of trafficking in
amounts between one and six kilograms of cocaine was between fortysix and fifty-seven months.767
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/99/hr5484 (last visited Aug. 1, 2017).
761. See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
762. Preliminary Draft of Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 51 Fed. Reg. 35,080,
35,089 (Oct. 1, 1986).
763. Id. at 35,098.
764. Id. at 35,098, 35,121. That base offense level of 180 was equivalent to what later would
become offense level 35 (for first offenders) in the Sentencing Table. See SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL, supra note 3, ch. 5, pt. A.

765. Preliminary Draft of Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 51 Fed. Reg. 35,080,
35,098. Trafficking in very large quantities-such as 100 kilograms of cocaine-would carry the
same guideline range as trafficking in the threshold quantity of two kilograms. See id
766. Id.at35,100.
767.

SUPPLEMENTARY

REPORT, supra note 37,

at 32 tbl.l(a). Note that those average

sentencing ranges were adjusted based on the assumption that all offenders would have received the
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Although the penalty levels set forth in the preliminary draft were
"highly tentative" and that draft was solely intended to elicit public
comment and did not yet reflect the definitive policy position of the
Commission,7 68 it appears the Commission was implementing the
congressional directive in the SRA to provide for "substantial term[s] of
imprisonment" for "trafficking in substantial quantit[ies] of a controlled
substance."' Indeed, for large-scale drug traffickers, the proposed
sentencing ranges, when measured by quantity alone, roughly tripled the
sentences from their pre-guidelines levels. It is also notable that,
although the ADAA had not yet been enacted when the Commission
published the preliminary draft for public comment, Congress had
already been conducting high-profile hearings about drug trafficking and
a bill, creating five- and ten-year mandatory minimum penalties
depending on the type and quantity of drugs being trafficked, had been
reported out of the House Committee on the Judiciary on August 13,
1986.770 Furthermore, there was strong bipartisan support for the bill."
After the ADAA was enacted in October 1986, the Commission
decided that, to be consistent with new statutory scheme, the drug
trafficking guideline in the January 1987 draft should be recalibrated to
reflect the new statutory punishment scheme.772 In particular, the
15% good time credit created by the SRA. See id at 23-24.
768. Preliminary Draft of Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 51 Fed. Reg. 35,080,
35,081 ("[T]he Commission voted to publish a preliminary working draft of sentencing guidelines
well in advance of any required publication date in order to provide a vehicle for critical analysis
and public comment. While these guidelines do not reflect the views of all Commissioners, the
Commission voted for publication to provide a means for identifying the issues that must ultimately
be resolved."); see id. at 35,089 ("Offense values are based on preliminary research results and
initial efforts to reflect appropriate sentences for different forms of criminal conduct. Due to the
Commission's desire to obtain early comment, the published numerical values must be treated as
highly tentative, preliminary, and subject to change.").
769. 28 U.S.C. § 994(i)(5) (1988).
770. See H.R. REP. No. 99-845, at 1-2, 14-16 (1986); see also Eric E. Sterling, The Sentencing
Boomerang: Drug Prohibition Politics and Reform, 40 VILL. L. REv. 383, 408-11 (1995)
(discussing the legislative history of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986). The original bill had a tenyear mandatory minimum prison sentence for threshold amounts of one kilogram of heroin or five
kilograms of cocaine and a five-year mandatory minimum prison sentence for threshold amounts of
125 grams of heroin and one kilogram of cocaine. See H.R. REP. No. 99-845, at 1-2.
771. Matthew P. Fitzsimmons, Primary, Significant, or Merely More than Incidental: What
Level ofIntent Does the FederalDrug-Involved Premises Statute Really Require?, 35 NEW ENG. J.

ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENr 177, 188 nn.64-65 ("The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 came to the
floor of the House with an astounding 301 co-sponsors and strong bipartisan support.").
772. See Proposed Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 52 Fed. Reg. 3920, 3920
(Feb. 6, 1987); see also Nagel, supra note 97, at 25-26 ("Because these mandatory minimum
sentences enacted by Congress were deliberately set to increase sentences substantially beyond past
sentencing practice, the [C]ommission was obliged to disregard past sentencing practice data for the
crimes in question, and to prescribe guidelines sentences ... [that were] significantly more severe
than past sentencing practices.").
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Commission set the guideline penalty ranges-based on drug type and
drug quantity-to track the statutory penalty levels. The offense levels
for the most serious common drug types, such as cocaine and heroin,
corresponded to the minimum amounts triggering statutory mandatory
minimum penalties (for offenders with no criminal record and whose
offenses did not involve any aggravating conduct such as possessing a
weapon or causing bodily harm). For example, one kilogram of heroin
and five kilograms of powder cocaine-which triggered a ten-year
statutory mandatory minimum penalty under the amended 21
U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)-were set at offense level thirty-two, which
corresponded to a guideline range of 121 to 151 months, before any
reduction for acceptance of responsibility evidenced by a guilty plea or
other cooperation with the authorities. 773 One hundred grams of heroin
and five hundred grams of cocaine-which triggered a five-year
statutory minimum penalty under the new statute-were pegged at
offense level twenty-six, which corresponded to a guideline range of
sixty-three to seventy-eight months for an offender with no criminal
history, before any reduction for acceptance of responsibility evidenced
by a guilty plea or other cooperation with the authorities.7 74 As
Commissioner Block informed Congress in March of 1987, "[g]iven the
recent and strongly-expressed intent of Congress and the Administration
to deal harshly with drug traffickers, the Commission does not feel at
liberty to propose guidelines" not tied to the statutory mandatory
minimum penalties.775
Nevertheless, like the drug trafficking guideline in the September
1986 preliminary draft, the guideline in the January 1987 revised draft
provided for a maximum base offense level based on threshold amounts
(i.e., one kilogram of heroin and five kilograms of cocaine) that were
much lower than the amounts that later appeared in the guideline
promulgated in April of 1987. After the Commission published the
January 1987 draft, it decided that it needed to create higher offense
levels for drug quantities in excess of the amounts that triggered the
statutory mandatory minimum penalties.7 76 In the January 1987 draft, the
maximum offense level, based on quantity alone, was thirty-two, which
corresponded to a range of 121 to 151 months for an offender with no
773. Proposed Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 52 Fed. Reg. 3920, 3924, 3927
tbl., 3938 tb.I.
774. Id.
775.

FederalPrisonPolicy: HearingBefore Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties & the Admin.

of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 36 (1987) (testimony of Michael Block,
Comm'r, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n).
776. Meeting Minutes, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n supra note 256, at 9; Meeting Minutes, U.S.
Sentencing Comm'n 3 (Jan. 22, 1987) (on file with authors).
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criminal record. 777 Conversely, the April 1987 Guidelines Manual
included a maximum offense level of thirty-six for threshold amounts of
ten kilograms of heroin and fifty kilograms of cocaine.ns An offense
level of thirty-six corresponded to a range of 188 to 235 months for an
offender with no criminal record. 7 79 According to Commissioner Nagel,
"the only logical way to proceed was to interpolate and develop a
[proportional] scale" in the Drug Quantity Table for quantities
significantly above the minimum amounts that triggered the ten year
minimum penalty under the ADAA. 780 The April 1987 drug trafficking
guideline created different penalty levels for all of the drug types listed
in the ADAA-including cocaine, cocaine base, heroin, PCP, LSD and
marijuana. For each drug type associated with mandatory minimum
prison sentences in the ADAA based on particular quantities, the
guideline levels were mathematically interpolated in the Drug Quantity
Table based on the minimum amounts triggering the mandatory
minimums in the statute.
For drug types and quantities that did not trigger mandatory
minimum prison sentences-including many types of less commonly
known drugs appearing in the Drug Enforcement Agency's ("DEA")
schedules (I-IV)-the Commission set offense levels based on
"equivalents," with a particular quantity of each such drug being
equivalent to a certain quantity of drugs that triggered statutory
mandatory minimum sentences.7 82 Both the portions of the Drug
Quantity Table not tied to the statutory mandatory minimums and the
Drug Equivalency Table were created after consultation with the DEA,
prosecutors and defense counsel, probation officers, and outside

777.

Proposed Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 52 Fed. Reg. 3939.

778.

SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3,

§ 2D1.1

(containing a Drug Quantity

Table).
779. Id. ch. 5, pt. A.
780. Interview with Ilene H. Nagel, supra note 46, at 43 ("When Congress says for 50 grams of
crack the minimum is 10 years, they are not saying the mandatory sentence is 10 years, they are
saying the minimum sentence is 10 years. The Commission interpreted that meaning if 5 grams of

crack was 5 years and 50 grams of crack was 10 years, then the only logical way to proceed was to
interpolate and develop a [proportional] scale [in the Drug Quantity Table] .... ).
781.

SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3,

§ 2DI.1

cmt. n.10. For the first time

under federal law, the ADAA (and, thus, the guidelines) distinguished between "cocaine base"
(known as "crack" cocaine) and "powder" cocaine and the 1986 law severely punished crack in
relation to powder cocaine-with a "l00-to-l" ratio in terms of the quantities necessary to trigger
the statutory mandatory minimum penalties. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, COCAINE AND
FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY 2-3 (2007).
782. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3, § 2D1.1 cmt. n.10. For instance, one

gram of methamphetamine (which was not then explicitly mentioned in 21 U.S.C.
deemed equivalent to two grams of cocaine. Id.
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experts, 7 83 including Dr. Louis Harris, one of the country's leading
experts on the effects of drug use. 784 The equivalencies for drugs not
specifically mentioned in the ADAA were derived "after considering the
nature of the substances . .. their potential for abuse, and the statutory
maximum sentences authorized" for the different drugs set forth in the
DEA schedules of drugs. 785 At least for some types of drugs, the
equivalencies in the sentencing guidelines were modeled to some degree
on the drug equivalencies in the parole guidelines.786
The initial just deserts draft guideline manual included adjustments
in penalty levels based on the purity of drugs being trafficked,8 which
The Sentencing
was consistent with the parole guidelines. 8
Commission abandoned a purity adjustment, 78 9 except for PCP,790 after
Congress made virtually no distinctions in purity levels in the ADAA.7 91
Rather than create varying penalty levels based on purity, Congress, with
a single exception in the original ADAA, created its statutory penalty
levels for offenders trafficking in particular quantities of "a mixture or
substance containing a detectable amount of' a particular drug type.792
2. Acceptance of Responsibility, Cooperation with the
Authorities, and Obstruction of Justice
In addition to incorporating factors related to the offense and the
offender, the Commission also accounted for offenders' post-offense
783. Proposed Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 52 Fed. Reg. 3920, 3939 (Feb.
6, 1987).
784. Meeting Minutes, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n 3 (Apr. 1, 1987) (on file with authors); see
NAT'L INSTITUTE ON DRUG ABUSE, PROBLEMS OF DRUG DEPENDENCE 4-9, 12 (1985) (discussing

Dr. Harris's role as a leading pharmacological researcher on drugs).
785. Ronnie M. Scotkin, The Development of the Federal Sentencing Guideline for Drug
Offenses, 26 CRIM. L. BULL. 50, 55 (1990).
786.

See U.S. PAROLE COMM'N, USPC RULES AND PROCEDURES MANUAL 42-49 (1985). Both

Peter Hoffman and Ronnie Scotkin-the two staff members at the Sentencing Commission
primarily responsible for creating the drug guidelines (including the equivalency tables)-came to
the Sentencing Commission from the Parole Commission.
787. United States Sentencing Commission Proposed Sentencing Guidelines Manual, supra
note 208, at 20.
788. Scotkin, supra note 785, at 51-52, 55.
789.

See SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3,

§ 2D1.1

cmt. n.9 (permitting an

upward departure in the case of high purity levels).
790. In the original statute, Congress provided for different penalties for PCP based on purity
levels. See 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(b)(1)(A)(iv)

(1988); see also SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra

note 3, § 2D1.1 cmt. n.9 (containing the Drug Quantity Table, which distinguished between "pure"
and non-pure PCP).
791. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)() (1988); see also Preliminary Observations of the
Commission on Commissioner Robinson's Dissent, supra note 254, at 18,135 n.9 (noting that the
guidelines did not focus on drug purity even though Congress did so in the ADAA).
792. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A).
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behavior. The Commission determined that two of those factorsacceptance of responsibility and cooperation with the authoritiesshould lead to a lower sentence, while a third factor-obstruction of
justice-should lead to a higher sentence.
a. Acceptance of Responsibility
Despite being so detailed about offense and offender
characteristics, the SRA was silent about whether the Commission
should create a provision that allowed for reductions in defendants'
guideline ranges if they pled guilty or expressed remorse. The
Commission's research revealed that guilty pleas and corresponding
sentencing reductions were an extremely common feature of preguidelines cases. 794 The high incidence of guilty pleas was largely a
function of the Supreme Court's blessing of the practice of plea
bargaining in 1971.79' For example, in a Commission study of 450
federal cases from 1985 involving all of the major offense types, 81.3%
of cases were disposed with guilty pleas, with 77.6% of the 450 cases
pursuant to plea agreements.796 The guilty pleas translated into
significant reductions in the sentences imposed. The Commission's "past
practice" study demonstrated that guilty pleas generally reduced
offenders' sentences by 30% to 40%.797
The Commission's decision to adopt a guideline providing for
reductions of defendants' sentences for their "acceptance of
responsibility"-a phrase proposed by Chairman Wilkins that became
the title of one of the most well-known provisions in the Guidelines
Manual 7"-was not, however, a foregone conclusion. Such a reduction
was not included in the parole guidelines, which otherwise helped
793.
794.

SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supranote 3, §§ 3C1.1, 3.E1.1, 5Kl.1.
See SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 37, at 48 (noting that 85% of the study sample

involved guilty pleas, which reduced sentences on average by 30% to 40%).
795. See Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 76-77 (1977) ("Only recently has plea bargaining
become a visible practice accepted as a legitimate component in the administration of criminal
justice. For decades it was a sub rosa process shrouded in secrecy and deliberately concealed by
participating defendants, defense lawyers, prosecutors, and even judges. Indeed, it was not until our
decision in Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, that lingering doubts about the legitimacy of the
practice were finally dispelled."); see also Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261-63 (1971)
(recognizing that guilty pleas are both an "essential" and "highly desirable" part of the criminal
process).
796. See Memorandum from Debbie Lister to Michael K. Block, supranote 552.
797.

See Wilkins, supra note 201, at 191; see also SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 37, at

38 tbl.l(b), 48 (noting that sentence reduction varied by offense type but could be as much as the
equivalent of a seven level reduction under the guidelines).
798. Interview with William K. Wilkins (July 13, 2016) (on file with authors); see also
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3,

§ 3E1.1.
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inform the contents of the original sentencing guidelines. Moreover, the
Commissioners were concerned that a reduction in penalty levels based
on a guilty plea could be deemed an unconstitutional "trial penalty" for
those defendants who did not plead guilty. Commissioner Breyer, for
example, acknowledged the argument that "a discount for a guilty plea
means an aggravated sentence for insisting upon one's right to a jury
trial."799 But he noted the fact that the Supreme Court had upheld, the
"providing [of] an offender with an incentive" to plead guilty. 00 If the
inducement of guilty pleas was happening with the imprimatur of the
Court, "arguably the guidelines should cover the practice and regulate
it," he reasoned.s 0
The different preliminary drafts of the guidelines and the ultimate
Guidelines Manual contained a sentencing reduction for "acceptance of
responsibility." Commissioner Robinson's just deserts draft had
authorized a 25% sentence reduction for a defendant who cooperated
with the authorities against another person or who "show[ed] sincere and
genuine remorse." 80 2 The September 1986 preliminary draft also had
included a downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility: if an
offender "recognizes and sincerely accepts responsibility for the
offense(s)," the judge would be authorized to reduce the sentence by up
to 20% of the total offense level from chapter two.803 That draft further
8
provided that a reduction for acceptance was not automatic, * but
instead was conditioned on a finding by the judge of the offender's
sincere remorse.80o The draft explained that the reduction has support in
the purposes of punishment, as acceptance is a "sound indicator of
[rehabilitative] potential."s0 6 The January 1987 revised draft retained the
acceptance of responsibility provision, although this version specified
that a judge had discretion to reduce the total offense level between one
799. Breyer, supra note 537, at 40; see U.S. CONST. amend. VI (providing the right to a jury
trial in a criminal case).
800. Breyer, supra note 537, at 40; see Santobello, 404 U.S. at 260-61; Brady v. United States,
397 U.S. 742, 756-58 (1970).
801. Breyer, supra note 537, at 40.
802. United States Sentencing Commission Proposed Sentencing Guidelines Manual, supra
note 208, at 61.
803. Preliminary Draft of Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 51 Fed. Reg. 35,080,
35,116 (Oct. 1, 1986).
804. Id. Chairman Wilkins explained that the Commission rejected automatic discounts for
acceptance of responsibility for several reasons, including the fact that "sentence reductions for
guilty pleas under past practices were not automatically given in every case. . . . [A]n automatic
fixed discount would reward every defendant who pled guilty regardless of the circumstances of the
offense or the defendant's post-offense conduct." Wilkins, supranote 201, at 191.
805. Preliminary Draft of Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 51 Fed. Reg. 35,080,
35,116.
806. Id.
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and three levels. 07 Responding to the Justice Department's objection to
such variable adjustments,"' the Commission in the initial Guidelines
Manual authorized judges to reduce by two levels the total offense level
for a defendant's acceptance of responsibility, additionally making clear
that the reduction is neither predicated on a guilty plea nor an automatic
benefit for those who do plead guilty.809 A two-level reduction on
average resulted in around a 25% reduction in an offender's sentence. 10
The maximum three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility for
defendants with final offense levels of sixteen or greater was later added
in 1992.811

b. Cooperation with the Authorities
Related but distinct from a defendant's acceptance of responsibility
was the issue of a sentencing reduction for a defendant's affirmative
cooperation with the authorities against another offender. The parole
guidelines authorized the Parole Commission to consider, as a factor in
release determinations, "a prisoner's assistance to law enforcement
authorities in the prosecution of other offenders."8 12 Such assistance had
to be "important" or "significant" in a prosecution or investigation, and
had to be verified by a prosecutor or similar official. 813 The parole
guidelines generally contemplated a one-year reduction in sentence for
such assistance.8 14
When the SRA was originally enacted in October 1984, it did not
include any reference to a defendant's cooperation as a basis for a
reduction in sentence.8 1' However, in the ADAA in 1986, Congress
created two provisions concerning cooperation81 6 -the
statutory

807. Proposed Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 52 Fed. Reg. 3920, 3975 (Feb.
6, 1987).
808. See supra notes 249-50 and accompanying text.
809. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3, § 3E1.1; see Wilkins, supra note 201,
at 190-91 (noting that a "fixed" discount for acceptance of responsibility was "consistent with one

of the underlying purposes of sentencing reform, that of 'certainty' of punishment").
810. See SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3, ch. 5, pt. A. The precise percentage
reduction varies depending on the particular combination of offense level and criminal history
category in the Sentencing Table, yet the typical reduction in the guideline range minimum and
maximum is around 25% when two offense levels are subtracted. See id.
811. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 1992,

amended
812.
813.
814.
815.
816.
(codified

2016) (app. C, amend. 459 (Nov. 1, 1992)).
28 C.F.R. § 2.62(a) (1986).
28 C.F.R. § 2.63(a)(l)-(2).
28 C.F.R. § 2.63(b).
See 28 U.S.C. § 994(d), (t) (1988).
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, §§ 1007-1008, 100 Stat. 3207, 3207-7
as amended at 18 U.S.C. §3553(e); 28 U.S.C. § 994(n)).
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8 17
and
provisions that currently appear in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e)
28 U.S.C. § 994(n)."'
In public hearings conducted by the Commission, both prosecutors
and defense counsel urged the Commission to include in the guidelines a
potential reward for cooperation. "These parties argued forcefully that
without some mechanism to give these defendants special consideration,
few would be willing to cooperate," Chairman Wilkins recalled.'
Commissioner Robinson's just deserts draft allowed for a 25% sentence
reduction for cooperation, as an alternative to a reduction for acceptance
of responsibility.820 The Commission's September 1986 draftpromulgated shortly before the October 1986 statutory provisions
governing cooperation-provided that, upon the prosecutor's
certification, an offender's total offense level could be reduced by 25%
for "truthful and significant information" on others' criminality, a 30%
reduction for "active[]" assistance in an ongoing investigation or
"truthful and significant" testimony, and a 40% reduction for
"exceptional assistance."821 Under the January 1987 draft, which was
published for public comment after the statutory amendments, a
defendant who provided "significant and truthful information" about the
criminal activities of others, assisted in an ongoing investigation, or
otherwise provided "substantial assistance," could receive a decrease in
sentence as the court deemed "appropriate."822 The draft guideline made
clear that a refusal to cooperate could not be an aggravating factor,
823
though it could bear on the issue of acceptance of responsibility.
Notably, the provision for cooperation did not require a motion by the
prosecution. Rather, it was in the sole discretion of the court, although

817. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (1988) ("Upon motion of the Government, the court shall have the
authority to impose a sentence below a level established by statute as a minimum sentence so as to
reflect a defendant's substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who

has committed an offense. Such sentence shall be imposed in accordance with the guidelines and
policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to section 994 of title 28, United
States Code.").
818. 28 U.S.C. § 994(n) ("The Commission shall assure that the guidelines reflect the general
appropriateness of imposing a lower sentence than would otherwise be imposed, including a
sentence that is lower than that established by statute as a minimum sentence, to take into account a

defendant's substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has
committed an offense.").
819. Wilkins, supra note 201, at 196.
820. United States Sentencing Commission Proposed Sentencing Guidelines Manual, supra
note 208, at 59-60.
821. See Preliminary Draft of Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 51 Fed. Reg.
35,080, 35,116 (Oct. 1, 1986).
822. Proposed Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 52 Fed. Reg. 3920, 3920, 397576 (Feb. 6, 1987).
823. Id. at 3976.
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the draft advised that "[s]ubstantial weight should be given to the
government's evaluation of the extent of the defendant's cooperation." 824
The 1987 Guidelines Manual shifted consideration of cooperation
from an adjustment in chapter three, where it had resided along with the
acceptance of responsibility provision, to a departure provision-section
5KI.1-in chapter five.825 This move recognized an important
conceptual difference between acceptance of responsibility and
cooperation: acceptance is focused on the offender as related to his or
her offense; by contrast, substantial assistance concerns the offender and
the criminality of others.8 26 In addition, unlike other departure
provisions, the 1987 Guidelines Manual specified that the court may
depart for a defendant's cooperation only where, "[u]pon motion of the
government," a defendant that "has made a good faith effort to provide
substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another
person who has committed an offense." 8 27 Although the 1986 legislation
required a motion from the prosecution for a departure below a statutory
mandatory minimum penalty, it did not require such a motion for a
sentencing reduction under the guidelines where no statutory mandatory
minimum sentence applied.82 8 Nevertheless, section 994(n) did reference
departures under the guidelines and departures under a statutory
minimum in the same breadth and, thus, could be read as in pari
materia.829 After debating whether to require a prosecution motion for a
guidelines departure for cooperation, the Commission on March 25,
1987, voted six to zero-with Commissioner Robinson abstaining-to
require a government motion.'

824. Id.
825.

826.
827.
828.
§ 994(n)

SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3,

§ 5KI

1.

See id. at ch. 5, cmt. background.
Id. § 5Kl.1.
Compare 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (1988) (requiring government motion), with 28 U.S.C.
(noting that the guidelines "should reflect the general appropriateness of imposing a lower

sentence" but not specifying whether a government motion was required).

829. 28 U.S.C. § 994(n) (1988) ("The Commission shall assure that the guidelines reflect the
general appropriateness of imposing a lower sentence than would otherwise be imposed, including a
sentence that is lower than that established by statute as a minimum sentence, to take into account a

defendant's substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has
committed an offense." (emphasis added)).
830. Meeting Minutes, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n 1 (Mar. 5, 1987) (on file with authors). At
one point during the debate, Commission Breyer had stated that allowing a downward departure
from the guidelines range "only on the government's motion took too much discretion away from
judges." Id. He ultimately decided to vote in favor of the requirement. Id
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c. Obstruction of Justice
The Commission decided that, whereas acceptance and cooperation
were aspects of an offender's post-offense conduct that could yield a
reduction in sentence, an offender's efforts to obstruct justice, such as
committing material perjury or intimidating witnesses, could lead to a
sentence increase.83 1
It is important to differentiate obstruction of justice as a separate
offense, on the one hand, and as an aggravating factor tied to the instant
offense, on the other. Before and after the SRA, federal law prohibited
32
obstruction of justice as standalone crimes.8 The guideline drafts
reflected these federal prohibitions. Commissioner Robinson's just
desert draft, for example, specified offense levels for perjury, improper
influence, obstruction, or disruption of "government processes."833
Similarly, the September 1986 draft8 34 contemplated, and both the
January 1987 revised draft 835 and initial Guidelines Manual 83 6 contained,
in chapter two, separate guidelines for obstruction of justice offenses.
An offender also could receive an enhanced sentence for a different
offense, such as fraud or a drug offense, based on obstruction of justice
in connection with the investigation or prosecution of that offense. The
just deserts draft did not provide for obstruction of justice as an
aggravating factor,83 7 but the chapter three adjustments in the
8 40
preliminary draft,8 38 revised draft, 8 39 and initial Guidelines Manual all
did. Neither the SRA nor the legislative history of the SRA expressly
mentions obstruction of justice as a sentencing enhancement, referring
831. See Meeting Minutes, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n (Jan. 21, 1987), supra note 177, at 4.
Perjury is a distinct criminal act, although for guidelines purposes, it is viewed in tandem with
obstruction of justice. Id. (agreeing that the enhancement range for obstruction of justice should be

the same as the range for perjury).
832. See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 368 & n.1 (1983) (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503, 1505, 15121515).
833. United States Sentencing Commission Proposed Sentencing Guidelines Manual, supra
note 208, at 36.
834. Preliminary Draft of Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 51 Fed. Reg. 35,080,
35,115 (Oct. 1, 1986).
835. Proposed Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 52 Fed. Reg. 3920, 3949 (Feb.
6, 1987).

§§

2J1.2-.3.

836.

SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3,

837.

See United States Sentencing Commission Proposed Sentencing Guidelines Manual,

supra note 208, at 56 (noting the harm value for "hindering law enforcement efforts" but not

classifying it as an aggravating factor).
838. Preliminary Draft of Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 51 Fed. Reg. 35,080,
35,115. This enhancement could not be applied if the offender was independently prosecuted for the
same conduct giving rise to the enhancement. Id.
839. Proposed Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 52 Fed. Reg. 3920, 3949.
840.

See SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3,
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only instead to the independent violation. But the Commission's past
practice study indicated that judges were imposing upward adjustments
for offenders who engaged in the obstruction of justice as to their
instant offenses.84 1
G.

Accountingfor CriminalHistory

The SRA specifically directed the Commission to consider
offenders' criminal record in several ways 8 4 2 and, two years after the
enactment of the SRA, Congress also had demonstrated its clear
intention that, at least for drug trafficking and firearms offenders,
criminal history was a particularly important aggravating factor.843 The
Commission received a large amount of public comment about the
consideration of an offender's criminal history in the guidelines and also
conducted a public hearing on the subject. 8" In chapter four of the
Guidelines Manual that was submitted to Congress in the spring of 1987,
the Commission addressed an offender's criminal history--or lack
thereof-in three main ways: (1) providing, as a general matter, for
higher guideline ranges for offenders with more serious criminal records
than for otherwise similar offenders with less serious records; (2)
providing a "career offender" enhancement for offenders who met the
criteria set forth in the SRA; and (3) providing for potential nonincarceration sentences for "first offenders" who were convicted
of non-violent and-in the Commission's judgment-otherwise
non-serious offenses.845
841.

See SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supranote 37, at 39 tbl.1(b).

842. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(d)(10) (1988) (directing the Commission to consider an offender's
"criminal history" in formulating the guidelines); § 994(h) (directing the commission to consider
offenders who have been previously convicted "of two or more prior felonies"); § 994(i)(1)
(directing the Commission to "assure that the guidelines specify a sentence to a substantial term of
imprisonment for [a defendant who] ... has a history of two or more prior Federal, State, or local
felony convictions for offenses committed on different occasions"); id. § 994() (directing the
Commission to "insure that the guidelines reflect the general appropriateness of imposing a sentence
other than imprisonment in cases in which the defendant is a first offender who has not been
convicted of a crime of violence or an otherwise serious offense").

843. See id. § 924(e) (providing that an offender convicted of being a felon in possession of a
firearm faces a statutory range of imprisonment of fifteen years to life without parole if the offender
has three or more predicate violent or drug trafficking offenses; offenders without three such
predicate offenses face a statutory range of punishment of probation to ten years of imprisonment);

see also 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (1988) (setting forth enhanced statutory ranges of punishment for
drug traffickers with prior felony drug offenses-defendant with one such prior conviction could
face a twenty-year mandatory minimum rather than a ten-year mandatory minimum prison sentence

for possessing at least five kilograms of powder cocaine).
844. See William W. Wilkins, Chairman, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, Public Hearing on the
Treatment of Prior Criminal Record 2-3 (May 22, 1986) (on file with authors).
845.

SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL,

supra note 3, ch. 4, pt. A introductory cmt.,
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1. Criminal History Points and Criminal History Categories
The September 1986 preliminary draft guidelines simply added
incremental "sanction units" to account for an offender's criminal record
8 46
on top of sanction units for the offense conduct, just as the earlier just
47
deserts draft did.8 In the January 1987 draft and the original Guidelines
Manual, however, the Commission decided to create a separate
horizontal axis on a two-dimensional sentencing table, as discussed
further below in Part IV.H,8 48 which would provide for increasing
sentencing ranges based on the extent of an offender's criminal
history. 849 The horizontal axis comprised six "Criminal History
Categories" ("CHCs"), which in turn were based on the number of
criminal history points calculated in a defendant's case."o As a general
rule, each increase in CHC was equivalent to a one-level increase in
offense level on the vertical axis of the grid. Such an increase was
generally around a 12% to 15% increase in the bottom and top ends of
the applicable sentencing range. 5'1 Therefore, the increase from CHC I
to CHC VI generally would be approximately twice the amount of the
85 2
bottom and top ends of the applicable sentencing range.
With respect to determining the number of criminal history points
appropriate for an offender, the original Commission studied both the
existing state sentencing guidelines and the federal parole guidelines.
The Commission ultimately decided to model what became chapter four
of the 1987 Guidelines Manual more on the federal parole guidelinesin particular, its Salient Factor Score ("SFS")--than on criminal history
provisions of the state guidelines. The SFS had been developed by Peter
Hoffman in the 1970s, when he was the Director of Research at the U.S.
§§

4Al.1, 4A1.3, 4B1.L.
846. See Preliminary Draft of Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 51 Fed. Reg.
35,080, 35,120 (Oct. 1, 1986). That criminal history calculus assigned different "criminal history
points" depending on the length of the sentence imposed in the defendant's prior case. Id. at 35,119.
A defendant's total criminal history points were translated to additional "offense values" to be

added to the offense values resulting from the defendant's offense conduct, which in turn
corresponded to sentencing ranges. See, e.g., id at 35,131.
847. United States Sentencing Commission Proposed Sentencing Guidelines Manual, supra
note 208, at 58.
848. See infra Part IV.H.
849. See Proposed Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, supra note 210, at 3974,
3977; see also SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3, ch. 4, pt. A.
850. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3, § 4Al.1, ch.5, pt. A.

851. Id. ch. 5, pt. A. For instance, offense level fifteen and CHC I results in a range of eighteen
to twenty-four months, while offense level fifteen and CHC II results in a range of twenty-one to
twenty-seven months. Id.
852. See id. For instance, offense level fifteen and CHC I results in a range of eighteen to
twenty-four months, while offense level fifteen and CHC VI results in a range of forty-one to fiftyone months. Id.
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Board of Parole.853 The SFS was intended to serve solely as an easilyapplied risk assessment instrument, and an offender's SFS score placed
him in one of four categories on the horizontal axis of the parole
guidelines' sentencing grid. After moving from the Parole Commission
to the Sentencing Commission, Hoffman was influential in convincing
the original Commissioners to model the federal sentencing guidelines'
criminal history rules on the SFS.854 As discussed below, although there
were some major similarities between the chapter four calculus and the
SFS, notable differences existed."'
First, like the parole guidelines and unlike the criminal history
provisions of most existing state guidelines, chapter four of the 1987
Guidelines Manual based criminal history points on the length of
sentences imposed for prior convictions rather than on the nature of prior
convictions-for example, whether it was a "violent" or "drug"
offeise.856 The Commission chose sentence lengths of sixty days and
thirteen months as break points-providing for three criminal history
points for a prior conviction receiving a sentence of incarceration in
excess of thirteen months; two points for a prior conviction receiving a
sentence of incarceration between sixty days and thirteen months; and
one criminal history point for a prior conviction receiving any other
sentence.857 The SFS's calculus provided for a simpler demarcation, with
sentences of thirty days or less and sentences in excess of thirty days
receiving different treatment.5 8 Both the SFS and chapter four excluded

853. Peter B. Hoffman & James L. Beck, ParoleDecision-Making:A Salient FactorScore, 2 J.
CRIM. JUST. 195, 195, 197-99 tbl.I (1974).
854. See Peter B. Hoffman & James L. Beck, The Origin of the Federal Criminal History
Score, 9 FED. SENT'G REP. 192, 192 (1997).
855. See infra notes 856-67 and accompanying text.
856. State guidelines' criminal history provisions are based on the nature of an offender's prior
convictions rather than on sentence length. See Julian V. Roberts, Refining the Criminal History
Guidelines: A Few Lessons from the States, 9 FED. SENT'G REP. 213, 213 (1997); see also Linda
Drazga Maxfield, Prior Dangerous Criminal Behavior and Sentencing Under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 87 IOWA L. REv. 669, 669-71, 676 (2002) ("The [federal] Guidelines are the
only sentencing system in the United States that measures the offense severity of a prior conviction
based on the length of its imposed sentence.").
857. LINDA DRAZGA MAXFIELD ET AL., A COMPARISON OF THE FEDERAL SENTENCING
GUIDELINES CRIMINAL HISTORY CATEGORY AND TH4E U.S. PAROLE COMMISSION SALIENT FACTOR
SCORE 5 n.22 (2005). The thirteen-month break point was selected over a twelve-month break point
to account for the common practice of sentencing judges' imposition of prison sentences of twelve
months and one day (rather than twelve months) to render defendants eligible for parole (which did
not apply to prison sentences of one year or less in many jurisdictions with parole). See
Memorandum from the Probation Committee of the Judicial Conference of the United States Courts
to the United States Sentencing Commission, Feb. 11, 1987 (on file with authors) (commenting on
section A31 1(a) the January 1987 revised preliminary draft guidelines).
858. 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 (1986).
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consideration of many types of minor petty misdemeanors-either
categorically or based on certain sentence lengths.85 9
Second, the SFS was designed solely to be a risk assessment
instrument. Factors were included in the SFS's calculus only if they
added to the calculus's predictive value regarding an offender's
likelihood of recidivating. Conversely, although chapter four's calculus
was primarily a risk assessment instrument, it also had certain
retributivist elements not present in the SFS that were not shown to
predict recidivism.8 60 For instance, the original Commission decided to
have ten- and fifteen-year "staleness" rules that limited consideration of
older prior convictions depending on the length of the sentence imposed.
For example, a prior conviction for which the offender received a
sentence in excess of thirteen months would be counted so long as the
offender was incarcerated in connection with the conviction within
fifteen years of commission of the current federal offense. The SFS had
only a single ten-year "staleness" rule for all prior convictions. The
sentencing guidelines' ten- and fifteen-year rules were "negotiated
among Commission members on the basis of perceptions of just desert"
rather than because they predicted recidivism better than the SFS's
simpler model.861 Despite the more complex nature of chapter four's
calculus, both chapter four and the SFS have been shown to have similar
predictive power regarding recidivism, although the SFS performs
slightly better.86 2
Third, unlike other risk assessment instruments used in the criminal
justice system, 6 the version of the SFS on which chapter four was
modeled did not include factors related to an offender's socio-economic
status, such as his employment record or family circumstances. A prior
864
but the Parole
version of the SFS had included such factors,
Commission deleted them in 1981 -despite their additional predictive
power-because of "fairness" concerns, insofar as such factors may be
859. Compare id, with SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3, § 4Al.2(c).
860. SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 37, at 41-43. Chapter four's criminal history rules
were not in any manner based on the Commission's "past practice" study. See Interview by Gen.

Accounting Office with Stephen G. Breyer, supra note 1, at 44-45 ("Chapter Four [did not] derive[]
from the Rhodes [past practice] data.... It's much more closely correlated with and derives from
the Parole Commission [parole guidelines]."); see also id at 45, 48 (giving Peter Hoffman primary
credit for the creation of chapter four).
861. Hoffman & Beck, supranote 854, at 193-94.
862. See LINDA DRAZGA MAXFIELD ET AL., supra note 857, at 12.
863. See, e.g., John Ortiz Smykla, Critique Concerning Prediction in Probation and Parole:
Some Alternative Suggestions, 30 INT'L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 125, 130-

31 (1986) (noting that prevailing risk assessments include "employment information and education,
class-based variables that, in effect, discriminate against the poor").
864. See Hoffman & Beck, supra note 854, at 195, 196-97.
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beyond an offender's control because of his socio-economic
circumstances. 6 5 Consistent with the directives in the SRA that either
prohibited or discouraged the sentencing guidelines' consideration of an
offender's education, employment record, and family ties, chapter four's
calculus also did not consider any such personal characteristics of
offenders and, instead, focused solely on an offender's criminal
record.866 In addition to socio-economic factors like employment and
educational records, the Commission also excluded consideration of an
offender's age and drug abuse history in chapter four's calculus-two
offender characteristics included in the version of the SFS originally
considered by the Commission.8 67
2. Career Offenders
The SRA contained a specific directive requiring the Commission
to create a "three strikes" guideline enhancement provision for offenders
whose prior convictions and their current conviction involved crimes of
violence or drug trafficking.8 68 That provision had been added to earlier

865. See Peter B. Hoffman, Twenty Years of OperationalUse ofa Risk Prediction Instrument:
The United States Parole Commission's Salient FactorScore, 22 J. CRIM. JUST. 477, 480-81 (1994).
As John Steer would later state:

[I]s it really a good idea for the guidelines to increase sentences for younger offenders,
those with less education or those from less advantageous family backgrounds?
Likelihood of recidivism alone probably would suggest longer sentences for each such
factor. In fact, a number of state guideline systems and the federal parole guidelines use
some of these factors to lengthen sentences, but I question whether that would be

acceptable or even a good idea in the federal guideline system.
Interview by Champion, supranote 176, at 44.
866. 28 U.S.C. § 994(e) (1988); SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supranote 3, ch. 4.
867. See SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3, ch. 1, pt. A, §§ 4.Al.2(d),

5B1.4(b)(23); see also 28 C.F.R. § 2.20(a), (h)-(j)(1) (1986).
868. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(h). That provision states:
The Commission shall assure that the guidelines specify a sentence to a term of
imprisonment at or near the maximum term authorized for categories of defendants in

which the defendant is eighteen years old or older and(1) has been convicted of a felony that is(A) a crime of violence; or
(B) an offense described in section 401 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C.
841), sections 1002(a), 1005, and 1009 of the Controlled Substances Import and
Export Act (21 U.S.C. 952(a), 955, and 959), and chapter 705 of title 46; and
(2) has previously been convicted of two or more prior felonies, each of which is-

(A) a crime of violence; or
(B) an offense described in section 401 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C.
841), sections 1002(a), 1005, and 1009 of the Controlled Substances Import and
Export Act (21 U.S.C. 952(a), 955, and 959), and chapter 705 of title 46.
Id.
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versions of the SRA legislation introduced by Senator Kennedy in 1982
and 1983.869
The plain language of the directive to the Commission required it to
create a guideline range for offenders convicted of their third strike "at
or near the statutory maximum" for the offense of conviction.8 70 The
Commission responded to this directive by promulgating section 4B1.1
("Career Offender"), which assigned offense levels that, in conjunction
with the offender's CHC corresponded to a guideline sentencing range at
or near the statutory maximum for the third strike conviction. The
guideline required all "career offenders" to be placed in CHC VI, even if
an offender's actual criminal history points would have placed him or
her in a lower CHC.1 7 1 Thus, for example, a career offender facing a
statutory maximum of life imprisonment for his offense of conviction
would be at offense level thirty-seven and be in CHC VI, with a
corresponding guideline range of 360 months to life.872
Shortly after completing his service on the Commission, thenCircuit Judge Breyer-a former chief counsel for the Senate Judiciary
Committee-stated that, in creating the directive requiring the
Commission to promulgate a career offender guideline, Senator
Kennedy and other sponsors of the SRA envisioned "federal code
reform" that would have worked rationally with the career offender
guideline concerning statutory maximums.' In the early 1980s, when
the career offender provision was first introduced in the proposed
sentencing reform legislation, there was still some momentum in the
Senate for federal code reform. 874
869. See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 175 (1983); Stith & Koh, supra note 111, at 268-69 & n.283;
see also 128 CONG. REC. 26,517-18 (1982).
870. See Breyer, supra note 57, at 43 (observing that "the Commission had little legal room"
regarding the Career Offender provision); see also United States v. Wright, 924 F.2d 545, 549 (4th
Cir. 1991) ("In setting forth the duties of the Sentencing Commission in 28 U.S.C. § 994, Congress
specifically required that career offenders be sentenced at or near the maximum term allowed under
the Guidelines. 28 U.S.C. § 994(h). And the Commission took note of that mandate in writing the
Career Offender guideline."); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3,

§ 4B1.1,

cmt.

background.
871. Id. § 4B1.1.
872. See id. Notably, the original Guidelines Manual did not allow a reduction in a career
offender's final offense level for acceptance of responsibility. See United States v. Summers, 895
F.2d 615, 617-18 (9th Cir. 1990). Effective November 1, 1989, the Commission amended the career
offender guideline to allow a reduction for acceptance of responsibility. See U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 266 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 2016).

873. Breyer, supra note 57, at 44 ("Congress intended the words 'at or near the maximum
authorized' to refer to rationalized, real time, sentences that a revised criminal code was to contain,
not pre-existing (and current) statutory law.").
874. See Gainer, supranote 51, at 123-24 (noting that the last bill in the Senate for federal code
reform, S.1630, died in 1982, but that Senator Thurmond, chairman of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, believed that "general code [reform] ... could then be resumed in the following
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Furthermore, when the career offender provision was introduced as
an amendment to sentencing reform legislation in the early 1980s, the
highest statutory maximum for any federal drug trafficking offense was
fifteen years, unless an offender had a prior felony conviction for a drug
offense, in which case the maximum increased to twenty years-but
only in the event that the prosecutor filed an "information" alleging the
prior conviction before the defendant's conviction in the instant federal
case.175 The same Congress that enacted the SRA also had enacted the
Controlled Substances Penalties Amendments Act of 1984.6 That
statute raised the statutory maximum for the most serious drug
trafficking offenses from fifteen years to twenty years.177 For offenders
with "one or more" state or federal prior felony drug convictions, the
statutory maximum was raised to forty years. 7 Yet, just as under prior
law, section 851 required the prosecutor to file an "information" alleging
the prior conviction before the enhanced statutory maximum could
apply. 879 The maximum remained fifteen years for most other Schedule I
or II controlled substances, with a thirty-year statutory maximum for an
offender with one or more prior felony drug convictions, properly
alleged under section 851, and three or five years for other drug typesincluding marijuana. 8 o It was not until the enactment of the ADAAtwo years after the SRA-that the statutory maximums for most federal
drug trafficking offenders were raised to forty years and life
imprisonment, even for first time offenders who possessed the minimum
quantities required to trigger the mandatory minimum penalties."' Those
increased statutory maximums had a direct and substantial impact on the
career offender guideline, which, as noted, required sentences "at or near
the statutory maximum."882
3. "First Offenders"
As a counter-balance to the career offender directive in the SRA,
Congress also directed that, "[t]he Commission shall insure that the
guidelines reflect the general appropriateness of imposing a sentence
other than imprisonment in cases in which the defendant is a first
Congress").
875. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(c), (e), 851 (1988).
876. Pub. L. No. 98-473, §§ 502 & 504, 98 Stat. 2068, 2068-2070 (codified as amended at 21
U.S.C. §§ 841(b) & 960(b)).
877. Id.
878. Id.
879. 21 U.S.C. § 851(a).
880. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (Supp. I1 1985); see also 21 U.S.C. § 851(a) (1982).
881. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1987).
882.

SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3,
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offender who has not been convicted of a crime of violence or an
otherwise serious offense."883
The original Commission sought to implement this directive in two
ways. First, it generally set base offense levels for violent offenses high
enough that, even with credit for acceptance of responsibility (which
was originally a maximum reduction of two levels), such offenders'
guideline ranges would preclude probation 88 4-requiring at least some
imprisonment, absent a downward departure."' Second, with respect to
"otherwise serious" non-violent offenses, the Commission allowed for
non-incarceration sentences only if a first offender's final offense level
was ten or less." The original Commission's policy decision was to
draw a line between offense level ten and eleven-the dividing line
between probation eligibility for first offenders"'--with respect to what
was "otherwise serious" for offenders in CHC I.8" Although reasonable
883. 28 U.S.C. § 994(j).
884. The original Commission created a sentencing scheme that provided that, absent a
downward departure from the applicable guideline range, only offenders with final offense levels of
ten or less, what later were designated Zones A or B of the Sentencing Table, could receive
probation. Offenders above that offense level had to require some amount of imprisonment, absent a
downward departure. See infra notes 897-98 and accompanying text.
885. See e.g., SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3, §§ 2Al.3, 2A2.2, 2A4.1
(noting base offense levels of twenty-five for voluntary manslaughter, fifteen for aggravated assault,

and twenty-four for kidnapping).
886. In the introduction to the original Guidelines Manual, the Commission stated the
following:
The [SRA] provides that the guidelines are to "reflect the general appropriateness of
imposing a sentence other than imprisonment in cases in which the defendant is a first
offender who has not been convicted of a crime of violence or an otherwise serious

offense . . . ." 28 U.S.C.

§ 994()

. . . [T]he guidelines work as follows in respect to a first

offender. For offense levels one through six, the sentencing court may elect to sentence
the offender to probation (with or without confinement conditions) or to a prison term.
For offense levels seven through ten, the court may substitute probation for a prison
term, but the probation must include confinement conditions (community confinement or
intermittent confinement).
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supranote 3, ch. 1, pt. A (citation omitted). This discussion of

"first" offenders' eligibility for probation under the guidelines equated "first" offenders with all
those falling in CHC I-as opposed to only those with zero criminal history points. See id. ch. 5, pt.
A cmt. Yet some offenders falling in CHC I have a criminal history and, thus, are not actually
"first" offenders. Id. Furthermore, even some offenders with zero criminal history points have
convictions

that

did

not

receive

criminal

history

points

under

Sentencing

Guidelines

section 4A1.2(e)'s staleness rule. Id. § 4Al.2(e).
887. Id ch. 5,pt. A, § 5B1.l(a).
888. See Meeting Minutes, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n 3-4 (Apr. 9, 1987) (on file with authors)
(noting that the policy decision was proposed by Commissioner Breyer and adopted by the
Commission without dissent); see also Interview by Gen. Accounting Office with Stephen G.
Breyer, supra note 1, at 73-74. The Commissioners discussed the apparent conflict between 18
U.S.C. § 3561 (which authorized, but did not require, probation for federal offenses other than class
A or class B felonies), and 28 U.S.C. § 994(j), which directed the Commission, generally, to provide
for probation or other non-incarceration sentences for offenses that were not violent or "otherwise
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people (including at least one original Commissioner) have debated
whether ten was too low of a dividing line on the Sentencing Table,"'
the original Commission's decision was itself reasonable in view of
sentencing data from the early years of the guidelines. In particular, over
half of all defendants who had no criminal history points in the early
years of the guidelines fell in cells of the Sentencing Table allowing for
probation.s90 Furthermore, although the guidelines did not include an
explicit presumption in favor of probation for first-time offenders falling
in such cells, the SRA itself contains a provision-known as the
"parsimony clause"-directing sentencing judges to "impose a sentence
sufficient, but not greater than necessary" to fulfill the purposes of
punishment and comply with the sentencing guidelines.891 Notably, the
original Commission decided to include that language from the
parsimony clause in the introductory commentary immediately before
the Sentencing Table, presumably to signal that probation was normally
the appropriate sentence for a first offender whose final offense level
was ten or less.8 92
not serious" and only when the offender was a first offender. See Meeting Minutes, U.S. Sentencing
Comm'n, supra, at 3-4.
889. In 1990, an advisory group led by original Commissioner Helen G. Corrothers-which
included some of the then-leading members of the national criminal justice communityrecommended that the Commission expand zones A through C of the Sentencing Table not only for
offenders in CHC I, but also those in CHCs II and 1. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N
ALTERNATIVES TO IMPRISONMENT PROJECT, THE FEDERAL OFFENDER: A PROGRAM OF
INTERMEDIATE PUNISHMENTS 55-65, attachment 2 (1990), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/
pdf/research-and-publications/research-projects-and-surveys/alternatives/121990_Intermediate
Punishments.pdf. For CHC I offenders, their proposal called for effectively expanding Zone B of
the Sentencing Table by permitting probation with the condition of home detention or community
confinement in lieu of incarceration all the way up to offense level thirteen-with a guideline range
of twelve to eighteen months-in the case of probation with home detention and to offense level
fifteen-with a guideline range of eighteen to twenty-four months-in the case of probation with
the condition of community confinement. See id. at 63-64, attachment 2. The Commission did not
adopt the recommendation.
890. Newton, supra note 58, at 324 n.65, 325.
891. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)-(2)(C) (1988); United States v. Macias-Pedroza, 694 F. Supp.
1406, 1417-18 (D. Ariz. 1988) ("The Sentencing Table ... when read with the probation guidelines
(§ 5B1.1), permits probation without a confinement condition as a Guidelines sentence for the first
six offense levels for a first offender, and permits probation with a confinement condition as a
Guidelines sentence for four additional offense levels. When these Guidelines provisions are read
together with the directive to the sentencing judge found in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) that he impose a
sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary to comply with the purposes of sentencing, the
result is that a first offender convicted of a non-serious offense will usually be sentenced to
probation.").
892. See Meeting Minutes, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, supra note 256, at 7 (stating that the
Commissioners voted to include in the Guidelines Manual's chapter five's introduction the
following: "[t]he court shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply
with the statutory purposes of sentencing"); see also United States v. Lacy, 99 F. Supp.2d 108, 119
(D. Mass. 2000) ("The Sentencing Guidelines mandate the parsimony principle: I am obliged to
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The Sentencing Table

As discussed above in Part III, the first two draft guidelines
manuals-Commissioner Robinson's just deserts draft and the
September 1986 preliminary draft guidelines-did not feature a biaxial
sentencing grid.8 93 Beginning with the January 1987 revised draft, the
Commission included a sentencing table, which had an "offense level"
vertical axis and a "criminal history" horizontal axis.894 Such a biaxial
grid was included in the federal parole guidelines and also in several
state sentencing guidelines already in existence by the mid-1980s."' It
also had been proposed by future Sentencing Commission staff members
Hoffman and Rhodes in articles that they published in social science
journals in the 1970s.96
The vertical axis of the original Guideline Manual's Sentencing
Table, which had forty-three "offense levels," was much simpler than
the September 1986 preliminary draft's 360 "sanction units" (a vestige
of Commissioner Robinson's just deserts draft).8 97 The original
Sentencing Table appears below as Appendix D. 9' According to Peter
Hoffman, the forty-three levels were based on a compromise positionin-between the 360 sanction units in the September 1986 draft and the
eighteen levels that Hoffman had proposed to the Commissioners.899
Hoffman's eighteen-level proposal was, mathematically, meant to
account for two things: (1) the statutory range of punishment of zero
months (i.e., probation or a fine only as the punishment) all the way to
life imprisonment, the least severe minimum sentence and the most
severe non-capital sentence under federal law (as the Sentencing Table
would be used for all federal offense types); and (2) the 25% rule, which
required that "the maximum" of each guideline range set by the
Commission "shall not exceed the minimum of that range by more than
the greater of 25% or 6 months, except that, if the minimum term of the
range is 30 years or more, the maximum may be life imprisonment." 900
In addition, under an eighteen-level vertical axis, "each guideline range
assign a sentence 'sufficient, but not greater than necessary' to comply with the purposes of
sentencing.").
893. See supra notes 237-38 and accompanying text.
894. Proposed Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 5? Fed. Reg. 3920, 3926-27
(Feb. 6, 1987).
895. See supra notes 29-30, 361-63, and accompanying text.
896. See supra notes 179-81 and accompanying text.
897. Peter B. Hoffman, Simplifying the U.S. Sentencing Commission's Offense Scale, 44 ST.
Louts U. L.J. 365, 366-67 (2000).
898. See infra app. D.
899. See infra app. D.
900. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(2) (1988); see also Hoffman, supra note 897, at 366.
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contains at least one point in common with the adjoining range, thereby
avoiding 'cliffs' between the guideline ranges."901
According to Hoffman, another staff member 90 2 convinced the
Commissioners to adopt forty-three offense levels instead of the
mathematically minimum eighteen levels:
The compromise adopted by the Commission - a forty-three-level
offense scale having overlapping guideline ranges drafted by another
Commission staffer - is, in essence, the eighteen-level offense scale
with (1) three additional even-numbered offense levels at the lower
end of the scale (addressing minor offenses); (2) one additional oddnumbered offense level at the upper end of the scale (providing life
imprisonment only); and (3) twenty-one additional odd-numbered
offense levels placed on either side of, and substantially overlapping
with, the twenty-one even numbered offense levels.903
The Commission's stated rationale for the forty-three level system
was that:
By overlapping the [ranges], the table should discourage unnecessary
litigation. Both prosecutor and defendant will realize that the
difference between one level and another will not necessarily make a
difference in the sentence that the judge imposes. Thus, little purpose
will be served in protracted litigation trying to determine, for example,
whether $10,000 or $11,000 was obtained as a result of a fraud.'
As discussed above, the horizontal axis of the Sentencing Table,
which accounted for an offender's criminal history, was based primarily
on the horizontal axis of the Parole Commission's sentencing grid. The
Commission added two additional categories to the parole guidelines'
grid, which had four categories compared to the six CHCs in the
Sentencing Table.905

901. Hoffman, supra note 897, at 366.
902. See supra note 246 and accompanying text. Although Hoffman's article does not name
that other staff member, it presumably was David Lombardero, who, along with Hoffman, was the
other staff member primarily involved in drafting the Guidelines Manual that was sent to Congress
in the spring of 1987. See supranote 246 and accompanying text.
903. Hoffman, supranote 897, at 366.
904.

SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supranote 3, ch. 1, pt. A.

905.

See supranotes 853-54 and accompanying text.
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ConsideringPrison Capacity

directed

that,

in

promulgating

guidelines,

[S]hall take into account the nature and capacity of the penal,
correctional, and other facilities and services available, and shall make
recommendations concerning any change or expansion in the nature or
capacity of such facilities and services that might become necessary as
a result of the guidelines promulgated pursuant to the provisions of this
chapter. The sentencing guidelines prescribed under this chapter shall
be formulated to minimize the likelihood that the Federal prison
population will exceed the capacity of the Federal prisons, as
906
determined by the Commission.
This provision was added to the SRA in lieu of an unsuccessful
amendment in early 1984 by Senator Charles Mathias from Maryland,
who wished instead for there to be a stronger provision requiring the
Commission to "assure" that the guidelines did not result in prison
overcrowding.9 07 The corresponding legislative history in the Senate
Judiciary Committee Report stated the following:
The purpose of [requiring the Commission to take into account the
nature and capacity of the penal, correctional, and other facilities and
services available] is to assure the most appropriate use of the facilities
and services to carry out the purposes of sentencing, and to assure that
the available capacity of the facilities and services is kept in mind
when the guidelines are promulgated. It is not intended, however, to
limit the Sentencing Commission in recommending guidelines that it
908
believes will best serve the purposes of sentencing.
According to Commissioner Nagel, at the 1985 confirmation
hearing for the original Commissioners, unnamed senators told the
Commission nominees that the Senate's vote against the Mathias
amendment was ninety-three to one-which she interpreted to mean that
the Senate did not want the original Commission to be concerned with
9 09
prison overcrowding when it created the sentencing guidelines. Prior
9 10
In
public comments by key Senators confirmed her understanding.
906. 28 U.S.C. § 994(g) (1988).
907. Stith & Koh, supra note 111, at 261, 266-67.
908. S. REP. No. 98-225, at 175 (1983).
909. See Meeting Minutes, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n (Apr. 1, 1986), supra note 177, at 19; see
also Interview with Ilene H. Nagel, supranote 46, at 15-16.
910. 130 CONG. REc. 13,077 (1984). Senator Hatch, a principal sponsor of the SRA,
representing that his position was shared by the chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee and
several other Committee members who were the other principal sponsors, stated the following:
"Preventing overcrowding is not the Commission's function. It is the function of the Commission
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addition, the position of the DOJ-of which the BOP is a componentand the actions of Congress in late 1986 also were consistent with that
understanding.91 ' So did the increasing size of the BOP's annual
budgets. While the annual budget had doubled in size during the first
seven years of the 1980s-from $329,844,000 in 1980 to $605,562,000
in 1986-it quadrupled in size during the first few years of the
guidelines' implementation. It reached $2,650,731,000 by 1990.912
The original Commission undertook a study that estimated the
effect that the guidelines, along with the new mandatory minimum
statutory penalties that Congress also recently had enacted, would have
on the federal prison population. That study was done under the
direction of Commissioner Block, with the assistance of William Rhodes
and an outside consultant, Professor Arnold Barnett, an MIT economist
with an expertise in statistical modeling.9 13 They proved to be
remarkably prescient. They predicted that, in a "high growth scenario,"
the federal prison population would grow from approximately 42,000 in
1987 to approximately 118,000 by 1997-ten years after the guidelines
went into effect-and to approximately 156,000 by 2002-fifteen years
after the guidelines went into effect. 914 In fact, by 1997, the BOP
population was 112,973, and it grew to 151,618 by 2002.915 Notably,
simply to assure the imposition of sentences that will achieve the purposes of sentencing period. It is
the function of the executive branch and the Congress to avoid unnecessary overcrowding of the

prison system." Id.
911.

According

to Associate Attorney

General Trott,

in a written

submission to the

Commission in late 1986:
We do not view section 994(g) as limiting the assessment of the guidelines' impact on
prison capacity to the status of prison space in the short run. That is, a temporary excess

in prison population as the result of guideline implementation that will be followed by a
gradual increase in prison space with a resultant adequate capacity would meet all the

requirements of 28 U.S.C. [§] 5994(g). In this regard it should be noted that Congress
recently authorized $96,500,000 for the construction of federal penal and correctional
institutions for fiscal year 1987, and directed the Secretary of Defense to provide the
Attorney General with a list of all sites under the jurisdiction of the Department of

Defense which could be used, or are being used, as detention facilities for felons.
Letter from Stephen S. Trott, Assoc. Att'y Gen., to William W. Wilkins, Jr., Comm'r, U.S.
Sentencing Comm'n (page 23 of attachment) (Dec. 3, 1986) (on file with authors).
912. NATHAN JAMES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42428, THE BUREAU OF PRISONS (BOP):
OPERATIONS AND BUDGET 11 (2014).
913. See SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 37, at 53-67, 67 fig.1 (explaining the study);

Michael K. Block & William M. Rhodes, Forecasting the Impact of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 7 BEHAV. SCt. & L. 51, 63-64, 64 tbl.II, 65 tbl.IV (1989); Interview by Gen.
Accounting Office with Stephen G. Breyer, supra note 1, at 23; Faculty & Research: Arnold
Barnett, MIT
MGMT.
SLOAN
SCH.,
http://mitsloan.mit.edu/faculty-and-research/faculty-

directory/detail/?id=41132 (last visited Aug. 1, 2017).
914. SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 37, at 73 tbl.5.
915. DARRELL K GILLARD & ALLEN J. BECK, PRISONERS IN 1997 at 1 (1998); PAIGE M.
HARRISON & ALLEN J. BECK, PRISONERS IN 2002, at 2 (2003).
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Block and Rhodes predicted that the growth would only be marginally
attributable to the impact of the sentencing guidelines, other than its
career offender provision, which, as discussed above, was dictated by
Congress in the SRA.9 16 The majority of the growth that the study
predicted would result from the implementation of the new mandatory
minimum statutory penalties, such as those contained in the ADAA,
together with the career offender guideline.9 17 Three decades of
experience have confirmed their specific prediction. 918
V.

CONCLUSION

The original Guidelines Manual was a product of collaboration of
the original Commissioners, who each brought different strengths and
Commissioner Robinson, who vigorously
perspectives9 19-including
dissented from the promulgation of the 1987 Guidelines Manual, but
whose intellectual contributions were reflected in the final product
transmitted to Congress in the spring of 1987.920 Several key original
staff members-including William Rhodes, Peter Hoffman, and David
Lombardero-also contributed in important respects to the creation of
916.

See supra Part IV.G.2.

917.
918.

SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 37, at 53, 62-64.
See Quick Facts: Career Offenders, U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, http://www.ussc.gov/

sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/quick-facts/Quick_FactsCareerOffender
FY14.pdf (last visited Aug. 1, 2017) ("The average sentence for career offenders was 145
months."); Quick Facts: Federal Offenders in Prison, U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N,
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/quick-facts/QuickFactsBOPMarch2O6.pdf (last visited Aug. 1, 2017) ("More than half (56.8%) of offenders in the
federal prison population were convicted of an offense carrying a mandatory minimum penalty.");

Quick

Facts: Mandatory Minimum Penalties, U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, http://www.ussc.gov/

sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/quick-facts/QuickFactsMandMinsFY15.pdf
(last visited Aug. 1, 2017) ("The average sentence length of offenders who remained subject to a
mandatory minimum penalty at sentencing was 138 months, over twice the average sentence of
offenders receiving relief from such a penalty (66 months). The average sentence for offenders not
convicted of any offense carrying a mandatory minimum penalty was 28 months.").
919. See, e.g., Breyer, supra note 284, at 180 ("We were able to write the initial [Guidelines
Manual] in part because Commissioner Michael Block-an economist, not a lawyer-pointed out
the importance of thinking crudely about punishment. Punishment is a blunderbuss."); Interview by
Michael Courlander & Kent Larsen with Stephen Breyer, supra note 141, at 57-59 (observing that
the original Commissioners worked well "because we were rather different," and noting that
Commissioner Corrothers understood "how prisons worked"; Commissioner Nagel "wasn't a
lawyer, which was a plus, and she was highly intelligent and. .. knows the sociological literature";
Commissioner MacKinnon "had experience as a prosecutor" and the understanding of a judge; and
Chairman Wilkins had experience as a judge, prosecutor, and legislative staffer).
920. See Interview by Gen. Accounting Office with Stephen G. Breyer, supra note 1, at 7
("[T]here is no way to understand the work of the Commission without understanding
[Commissioner Robinson's original 'just desert' draft], because, for better or for worse, and in many
respects for better and in some respects for worse, [his draft] absolutely conditioned what happened
subsequently.").
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the first Guidelines Manual.9 2 1 Often the policy decisions were the result
of compromises among the Commissioners,9 22 including what
Commissioner Breyer referred to some "uneasy compromises."923
Although in many instances those compromises rested ultimately on an
empirical basis-in particular, the "past practice" study-in other
instances the Commission simply followed the political will of
Congress, most notably, in the case of the drug trafficking guideline
following the passage of the ADAA and the career offender guideline.
In his dissent from the January 1987 draft guidelines,
Commissioner Robinson correctly recognized that "[t]he Commission
has been given an extremely difficult task and asked to perform it
quickly under the bright lights generated by strong and conflicting
political [and institutional] interests." 9 24 Senator Fritz Hollings went
further, deeming it "an almost impossible task."9 25 One cannot review
the history of the original Commission without appreciating the
enormity of the its responsibilities: to start a novel federal agency from
scratch and to develop necessarily complex sentencing guidelines
governing several hundred fiercely independent federal judges
accustomed to complete sentencing discretion, while facing competing
macro-level theoretical and micro-level practical difficulties, significant
inter-branch and intra-branch pressures, and an extremely daunting
statutory deadline. In addition, the historical context in which the
original Commission operated-historically high (and rising) crime rates
and a general belief that rehabilitation did not work-should not be
overlooked. Whatever one thinks of the substantive product sent to
Congress in the spring of 1987, the Commission's ability to discharge its
statutory duties was nothing short of remarkable. In addition to the
different contributions made by various Commissioners and staff
members, the promulgation of the original Guidelines Manual under
such difficult circumstances was a tribute to the leadership of Chairman
921. See Interview by Michael Courlander & Kent Larsen with Stephen Breyer, supra note
141, at 11-14, 25 (noting that "Rhodes gets absolutely very, very high marks for creating" the past
practice dataset upon which much of the original guidelines were based and recognizing Hoffman

and Lombardero for their role in drafting Draft X, which evolved into the initial Guidelines
Manual); Interview by Gen. Accounting Office with Stephen G. Breyer, supra note 1, at 45, 48
(crediting Hoffman for chapter four of the Guidelines Manual); Interview with Ilene H. Nagel,
supra note 46, at 58-59 (attributing the "modified real offense" approach of the sentencing
guidelines to the influence of Hoffman).
922. See generally Breyer, supra note 234 (discussing the various compromises that led to the
creation of the sentencing guidelines).
923. Breyer, supranote 57, at 13.
924.

Paul H. Robinson, Dissentfrom the United States Sentencing Commission's Proposed

Guidelines, 77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1112, 1122 (1986).
925. 140 CONG. REC. 14715 (1994).
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Wilkins, who was widely praised by both supporters and critics of the
sentencing guidelines alike. 9 26
Following the promulgation of the first Guidelines Manual,
Chairman Wilkins appeared before members of the House Judiciary
Committee. He reminded the committee members that the task of the
Commission was not to develop a "perfect [guideline] system," one that
we may "dream about." 927 Rather, he said, our goal was to "bring greater
certainty and fairness" to federal sentencing. 928 This Article describes
how the Commission sought to fulfill this charge, to replace an
unstructured, decentralized federal sentencing regime with structured,
national sentencing policies and to thereby enhance the justice and
effectiveness of federal sentencing. 929 In particular, this Article
chronicles the key policy decisions of the original Commission and the
process that led to those critical decisions.930 It does so by way of
synthesizing historical information already in the public domain and by
adding information from important sources that heretofore have not been
part of the public record. The hope is that this integrated, comprehensive
treatment of the early Commission will yield a deeper, more accurate
understanding of the original Commission's work.9 3 1
Aside from improving the historical account of the original
Commission, this Article has a more ambitious aim. The guidelines were
9 32
It is hoped
viewed, at the outset, as necessarily being "evolutionary."
sentencing
the
as
resource
a
useful
that this Article will serve as
community considers how it may achieve an increasingly just and
workable sentencing system in the federal courts. In this respect, we
seek not only to enrich the current understanding of the past, but also to
926. See, e.g., 152 CONG. REC. 8070 (2006) (noting the remarks of Senator Lindsay Graham
praising Chairman Wilkins's leadership on the Commission); 140 CONG. REC. 14715 (noting the
remarks of Ernest Hollings praising Chairman Wilkins's leadership on the Commission); Albert W.
Alschuler, supra note 306, at 91-92 n.8 (noting that Chairman Wilkins "has always been courteous,
open, and fair"); Naftali Bendavid, Wilkins' Tenure Transformed the Courts, LEGAL TIMES, Sept.

19, 1994, at 23 (quoting the President of the American Bar Association's Sentencing Guidelines
Committee, Sam Buffone, as stating that "I have nothing but praise for Billy Wilkins's
tenure.... We certainly came from opposite sides in terms of the issues. But he was always fair,

always willing to meet and talk. He did and exceptional job, given a very difficult situation");
Interview with John Steer, supranote 176 (praising Wilkins's "masterful leadership").
927.

Sentencing Guidelines: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House

Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 646 (1987) (statement of William W. Wilkins, Jr., Chairman,
U.S. Sentencing Comm'n).
928. Id. at 645, 649, 657.
929.
930.

See supra PartI.
See supra Part IV.

931.

See supra Part IV.

932.

SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3, ch. 1, pt. A (stating that the guidelines

were "but the first step in an evolutionary process").
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achieving a more just federal

sentencing system.
Finally, any historical accounting of the original Commission and
the initial sentencing guidelines should be careful to disaggregate the
work of the original Commission from what occurred during the ensuing
three decades-a significant amount of it unforeseeable in 1987. During
those three decades, many dramatic changes occurred in the statutory9 33
and constitutional landscape,934 in Congress's relationship with the
Commission,93 in the nature of federal offenses and offenders,936 and in
other factors such as the crime rate,93 7 the ability of the criminal justice
system to rehabilitate offenders, 93 8 and changing views about the
purposes of sentencing among leading criminal justice policy-makers. 93 9

933.

Such statutory changes have included substantial

increases in statutory maximum

penalties. See e.g., Uniform Federal Crime Reporting Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7345(a),
102 Stat. 4181, 4471 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (2012)) (raising the statutory
maximum for the offense of illegal reentry from two years to fifteen years); Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 903, 116 Stat. 745, 805 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341,
1343 (2012)) (raising statutory maximum for wire fraud and mail fraud from five to twenty years).
The statutory changes also included new or increased mandatory minimum statutory penalties. See,

e.g., PROTECT Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, §§ 103(b)(1)(D)-(F), 502(d), 503, 505-507, 510,
117 Stat. 650, 653, 679, 680, 682-684 (amending child pornography statute, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251,
2252, 2552A, to create several mandatory minimum penalties).
934. See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005) (holding that the
"mandatory" nature of the guidelines was unconstitutional and, as a remedy, rendering the

guidelines "advisory").
935. See R. Barry Ruback & Jonathan Wroblewski, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines:
Psychological and Policy Reasons for Simplification, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 739, 752-53

(2001) ("The Commission itself, in an attempt to ward off mandatory minimum penalties, offers
Congress more aggravating factors that the Commission argues can do the job of mandatory
minimums while at the same time retaining proportionality. Examples of this phenomenon of 'factor
creep' include congressional directives to the Commission to consider adding some type of new
enhancement for a variety of aggravating factors, ranging from hate motivation, to use of juveniles
in the course of certain crimes, to the involvement of gangs, to property damage at veterans'

cemeteries."); Sessions, supra note 191, at 317-21 ("In addition to, or sometimes in lieu of,
mandatory minimums, Congress has issued countless 'directives' to the Commission over the past
twenty-five years [almost always requiring higher penalty levels]. There have been different species

of directives - some general (requiring the Commission to consider adjusting penalties for certain
types of offenses after a period of study) and some very specific (dictating precise changes in
specific guidelines).").
936. See Newton, supra note 58, at 330-38 (discussing the substantial changes, during the past
three decades, in the types of offenses prosecuted in federal court and the changes in federal
offenders-both of which have resulted in higher penalties being imposed irrespective of changes in
the guidelines).
937.

See supra note 96 and accompanying text (discussing the decreasing crime rate since the

1990s).
938.

See supra note 102 and accompanying text (discussing improvements in correctional

programming, which has reduced the recidivism rate).
939. See, e.g., DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SMART ON CRIME: REFORMING THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 4 (2013) ("Incarceration is not the answer in every criminal case.
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In other words, an assessment of the original Commission and its
inaugural guidelines, while not with an uncritical eye, should not occur
through the lens of 20/20 hindsight.

Across the nation, no fewer than seventeen states have shifted resources away from prison
construction in favor of treatment and supervision as a better means of reducing
recidivism.... Federal law enforcement should encourage this approach. In appropriate instances
involving non-violent offenses, prosecutors ought to consider alternatives to incarceration, such as
drug courts, specialty courts, or other diversion programs."); Brian Bensimon, Texas Committee
Recommends Reducing Costs by ExpandingAlternatives to Incarceration,RIGHT ON CRIME (Feb. 2,
2017), http://rightoncrime.com/2017/02/texas-committee-recommends-reducing-costs-by-expanding
-alternatives-to-incarceration ("Despite a perceived reputation as a 'tough on crime' state, Texas has
led the criminal justice reform movement by enacting bold reforms that emphasize public safety and
reduce recidivism.... By adopting alternatives to incarceration, such as drug courts and expanding
parole and probation capacity, large numbers of non-violent offenders have been diverted away
from the prison system."); John Comyn, It's Time for Criminal Justice Reform, MEDIUM BLOG
(June 21, 2016) https:/medium.com/@JohnCoryn/its-time-for-criminal-justice-reform-bae837ce
09c8#.utylfdg5p ("It's not often that some of the Chamber's most liberal Members like Senator
Leahy and Senator Durbin come together with conservatives like myself and Senator Lee to rally
behind a piece of legislation [i.e., the Sentencing Reform and Corrections Act].... The bill retargets and reduces some mandatory minimums and sentencing enhancements to make sure law
enforcement directs resources towards locking up violent and career criminals, instead of nonviolent, low-level drug offenders.").
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APPENDIX A: SENTENCING GRID FROM 1986
FEDERAL PAROLE GUIDELINES

OFFENSE
CHARACTERISTIC&
Severity of Onse
Behaior

Category One

OFFENDER CHARAkCTERSTICS:PaFoirdo goosis
(Solient Factor Scoe)
Very Good

Good

Fair

Poor

10-8)

(7-6)

(54)

(3-0)

Guidae Range
<=4months

<=8 months

8-1 months

12-16 months

CaiMebe Range

Category Two

<=6 months

<=10 months

12-16months

16-22 months

CategoryThne

GaMeaine Range
<=10 months

12-16months

13-24 months

2442 months

Category Four

GuMellae Range
12-18 months

20-26 months

26-4 months

3444 months

Category Five

Guidelne Range
24-6 months

36-48 months

48"60 months

60-72 months

Category Stk

Guieline Range
451 months

52-64 months

64-78 months

78-100
months

Category Seven

Gu esen Range
52-80 months

64-92 months

7-110iomoths

100-148
months

Category Eght

Guideline Range
100+ months

120+ months

150+ months-

180 months
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APPENDIX B: PHOTOGRAPH OF ORIGINAL COMMISSIONERS

9 40

940. Standing (left to right): George E. MacKinnon, Stephen G. Breyer, Michael K. Block,
Paul H. Robinson. Seated (left to right): Ilene H. Nagel, William W. Wilkins, Helen G. Corrothers.
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C: EXCERPT FROM "JUST DESERTS" DRAFT OF
SENTENCING GUIDELINES

(THE FACTORS AND VALUES THAT APPEAR ON THIS PAGE DO NOT NECESSARILY
-mnfarances,
no aF
nCeIrast
u
REPRESENT TuE VItWS OFu
E-j
Harms T1a
Less that 92 1
92-117
1d
116-148
17
149-198
is
186-228
19
229-279
30
30-333
23
22
339-0
407-483
23
414-471
24
372471
25
672-763
26
784-90$
27
909-1,041
28
1,049-1,203 29
1,204-1,75 30
3,376-165 31
2,S66-1,774 32
1,775-2,603 33
2,004-2,2$3 54
2,254-2,426 35
2,S27-2,124 36
2,2-3,147 37
3,148-3,497 38
3,498-3,S73 39
3,876-4,283 40
4,284,4,723 41
4,724-5,19
42
5,196-3,702 43
5.7034,146 44
6,247-6,127 45
4.828-7,448 46
7,449-4,110 47
8,111-8,816 46
8,817-9,567 49
9466-1,0364 s0
10,365-1,211 SI
31,212-12,108 32
12,109-13,059 3
13,060-14,064 54
14,45-35,126 SS
15,127-16,247 $6
16,248-17,429 $7
17,430-11,674 S
1,675-19,986 59
19,987-21,365 60

21,36642,114
2,815-U,336
24,337-25.932
23,933-27,606

27,607-29,360
29,361-31,196

61
42
43
64
63
6

$I,197-33,116

67

33,317-35,124
35,125-37.222
37,23-39,413
39,414-41,699
41,70044,083
44,084-46,567
4468-49,156
49,157-51,850
518AS34,655
54,656-37,571
$7,$72-40,602
60,603-63,752
63,753-47,023
67,024-70,418
70,419-73,940
73,941-77,593
77,594-1,380
11,38145,303
45,30449,367
49.368-93.574
03,375-97,929

68
69
70
71
71
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
SI
S2
83
84
15
36
37
$8
19
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
9
100
101
102
103
104
105
106

97,930-102.433

102,434-107,491
107,092-111,906
111,907-116,882
116,883-122,011
132,022-127,329
127,330-132,107
132,808-138,461
133,442-144,293
144,294-150,306
150,389-156,508
1364,09-1462,199
162,900-169,483
169,484-176,26S
176,264-163,249
183250-190,431
190,439-397,836
197.37-205,448

205,449213,277
213.276-221,328
221,329-229,605
229,606-231,112
238,113-246,854
246,655-255,333
2355,834-265,06
26,057-274,52
274,526-214.246
214,247-294,213
294,224-304,401
304,462-314,963
314,964-323,733
325,736-336,790
336,781-348,104
348,105-359,712
359,713-373,607
371,608-383,793
383,796-396,230
396,281*409006
409,068-422,162
422,163-435,568
433,569-449,291
449,292-463,336
463,337-477,707
477,708-492,411
492,412-507,43
507,451-522,833
$22,334-53"462
538463-$54,643
$54.644-571,082
571,013-587,184
387,5-605,953
405,054-622,S96
622,597-440,511

107
109
109
110
111
112
131
114
is
116
117
111
119
120

1$S
154
353
156
938,567-983,110
1$7
983,311.1,008,330 158

121

658,24377,320

122
123
124
IS
126
127
125
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
134
137
13
139
140
141
142
143

477,5214-96,410
696,611716,102
716,103-735,999
736,000-756,308
736,309-777,035
777,036-798,115
798.86-119,743
519,764-341.777
841.778-864,230

143
146
147
146
149
150
151
152

640,516-601,824

164,231-887,130
087,133-910,482
910,433-934,292
934,293-93,566

344

The Harm Value may also be calculated aWoo go electronic calculator as rollows

@
1

(0) Enter the total monetary va.1e, rooded t0 be. nearest dollar.
(0i) Posh the sqare, root button (usuali marked with a .41g
LWu
u
(iii) Multiply the resulting number by 1.
0

To other words, Harm Value . SJ!i value
is
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APPENDIX D: SENTENCING TABLE IN 1987 GUIDELINES MANUAL

SENTENCING TABLE
Criminal History catefory

I

Offese

a

1

2
3
4
6
7
8
9
10
it
12

0.

1

0000.
124.
6-

3
4
5
6
7
8
10
12
14
16
18
21
24

8-

13
14
15

1012J514 -

16

21 , 27

17
Is
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

24 - 30
27. S3
30333741 46 $1 5763 70 -

V
1o 1 L 12

IV

Ill

7 or 3

Igai

0.
00-

2
3
4

0- 5
0. 6
2.
4681o123318 21 2427w
30-

8
10
12
14
16
18
21
24
27
30
3$'
37

37
41
46

33- 41
17 - 46
41- 51

53
37

46 - 57

63
71
78
87
78 - 97
87 - 108
97- 121

57 - 71

51

-

6370 78.
8797 308-

63
78

87

0- 3
0- 4
04-

6
7

64-- 10
J2
6. 12
8 . 14
0to 16
12- I1
Is- 21
18 212427
30

24
27
30

4
5
6
8
t0
12

00-

9- 14
0- 16
12- 18

12-

000*
246*

13- 21

18

21 -

24
27

30
33
37
41
46
SV
37

-

71
78

77 - 96
84- 105
92S 115

87
97

87

84- 105
92. IIS

100- 25
130- 137
120- 150
130- 162
140- 175
151 - 188
168-210
188- 235
210- 262
235. 293
262- 327
292- 365
324- 40S
60 - l1f
360 - life

123 - 151
135- 168
15 - 188

135 * 168
11 - i88

I68- 210
188 - 231

168 - 210
184 215
210 - 262

230- 262
23$ - 293
262 * 327

23 - 293
262 - 327

388 * 233
210- 22
235 - 293
242.- 327

188
368 210
188 -235
210 262
235 - 293
262- 327

40
41
42

292 - 365

324 - 405
360 - life

43

life

38
39

324 -405
360 - life

292 -365

84 - 105

1

63- 78
70* 87
77. 96

110- 137
123- 3513
135 * 168

37

46- 57
5 - 63
S7- 71
63. 78
70 - 87
77- 96

63

100 - 125

135 - 168
151 . 188

33 - 41
37 - 46
41 - 51

SI 57 63*
707S
-

18- 210

292 -365
324 - 405

151

292- 36$
324 - 405

360 . life,

360 - life

30 - lie
360 - lire
360 - life

360 - lite
360 - life

life

life

life

360 - life

18

30- 37
33- 41
37 - 46

1510.
212427-

57.

51 - 63

6- 32
12-

13- 21
It- 24
21 - 27
24- 30
27- 33
30 37

37-

46
41 - S1

6
7

1-

38
21
24
27
30
31

46- S7

108

108 135
121- 315

4- t0
6. 12
9- 15

41 - 5
46- 57
531- 03
57- 71
63 - 78
0- 87

33

37
33 - 41

0-

2- 8

24.
2730333741*
46-

97 - 121
(08. 135
3f -. 1S1

28
29
30
31
32
31
34
35
36

97
108
121
135

5
6

VI
1t or mars

360- life
360 - life
360 - life
life

92- 11
100-125
110 - t37
120. 150
330 - 162
140- 175

Isi

3s"

-

168 -210
188 - 235
210 - 262
235 - 293
262292 324.
360 360 360 -

327
365
405
life
lie

life

360 - life
360 . life
360 . life
life
Oober 1987
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